The Anti Slavery Examiner, Part 2 of 4 by American Anti Slavery Society

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You can find around you, I doubt not a large number of persons
intemix'd, in your society, who are entirely destitute of that care,
and attention, towards them that is enjoyed by our slaves, and who
are destitute of that deep feeling of interest, in guarding their
morals and habits, and directing them through Life in all things,
which is here enjoyd by our slaves, to those let your efforts be
directed immediately around you and do not trouble with your vague
speculations those who are contented and happy, at a distance
from you.

Very respectfully yours,

N. CANNON."

Mr. JAS. G. BIRNEY, _Cor. Sec._ &c.

* * * * *

[The letter of the Secretary to the governor of South Carolina was not
_answered_, but was so inverted and folded as to present the
_subscribed_ name of the secretary, as the _superscription_ of the same
letter to be returned. The addition of _New York_ to the address brought
it back to this office.

Whilst governor Butler was thus refusing the information that was
proffered to him in the most respectful terms from this office, he was
engaged in another affair, having connection with the anti-slavery
movement, as indiscreet, as it was unbecoming the dignity of the office
he holds. The following account of it is from one of the Boston
papers:--]

"_Hoaxing a Governor_.--The National Aegis says, that Hollis Parker,
who was sentenced to the state prison at the late term of the
criminal court for Worcester county, for endeavoring to extort money
from governor Everett, had opened an extensive correspondence,
previous to his arrest, with similar intent, with other
distinguished men of the country. Besides several individuals in New
York, governor Butler, of South Carolina, was honored with his
notice. A letter from that gentleman, directed to Parker, was lately
received at the post office in a town near Worcester, enclosing a
check for fifty dollars. So far as the character of Parker's letter
can be inferred from the reply of governor Butler, it would appear,
that Parker informed the governor, that the design was entertained
by some of our citizens, of transmitting to South Carolina a
quantity of 'incendiary publications,' and that with the aid of a
little money, he (Parker) would be able to unravel the plot, and
furnish full information concerning it to his excellency. The bait
took, and the money was forwarded, with earnest appeals to Parker to
be vigilant and active in thoroughly investigating the supposed
conspiracy against the peace and happiness of the South.

The Aegis has the following very just remarks touching this
case:--'Governor Butler belongs to a state loud in its professions
of regard for state rights and state sovereignty. We, also, are
sincere advocates of that good old republican doctrine. It strikes
us, that it would have comported better with the spirit of that
doctrine, the dignity, of his own station and character, the respect
and courtesy due to a sovereign and independent state, if governor
Butler had made the proper representation, if the subject was
deserving of such notice, to the acknowledged head and constituted
authorities of that state, instead of holding official
correspondence with a citizen of a foreign jurisdiction, and
employing a secret agent and informer, whose very offer of such
service was proof of the base and irresponsible character of him who
made it.'"

* * * * *

GOVERNOR CONWAY'S LETTER.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, _March_ 1, 1838.

Sir--A newspaper, headed '_The Emancipator_,' in which you are
announced the 'publishing agent,' has, for some weeks past, arrived
at the post office in this city, to my address. Not having
subscribed, or authorized any individual to give my name as a
subscriber, for that or any such paper, it is entirely _gratuitous_
on the part of its publishers to send me a copy; and not having a
favorable opinion of the _intentions_ of the _authors and founders_
of the '_American Anti-Slavery Society_;' I have to request a
discontinuance of '_The Emancipator_.'

Your ob't servant, "J.S. CONWAY."

R. G. WILLIAMS, Esq., New York.

* * * * *

[NOTE.--The following extract of a letter, from the late Chief Justice
Jay to the late venerable Elias Boudinot, dated Nov. 17, 1819, might
well have formed part of Appendix E. Its existence, however, was not
known till it was too late to insert it in its most appropriate place.
It shows the view taken of some of the _constitutional_ questions by a
distinguished jurist,--one of the purest patriots too, by whom our early
history was illustrated.]

"Little can be added to what has been said and written on the
subject of slavery. I concur in the opinion, that it ought not to be
_introduced, nor permitted_ in any of the _new_ states; and that it
ought to be gradually diminished, and finally, abolished, in all
of them.

To me, the _constitutional authority_ of the Congress to prohibit
the _migration_ and _importation_ of slaves into any of the states,
does not appear questionable.

The first article of the Constitution specifics the legislative
powers committed to Congress. The ninth section of that article has
these words:--'The _migration_ or _importation_ of such persons as
any of the _now existing_ states shall think proper to admit, shall
not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808--but a tax
or duty may be imposed on such importation not exceeding _ten
dollars_ for each person.'

I understand the sense and meaning of this clause to be, That the
power of the Congress, although _competent to prohibit such
migration and importation_, was not to be exercised with respect to
the THEN existing states, and _them only_, until the year 1808; but
that Congress were at liberty to make such prohibition as to any
_new state_ which might in the _meantime_ be established. And
further, that from and after _that_ period, they were authorized to
make such prohibition as to _all the states, whether new or old_.

Slaves were the persons intended. The word slaves was avoided, on
account of the existing toleration of slavery, and its discordancy
with the principles of the Revolution; and from a consciousness of
its being repugnant to those propositions to the Declaration of
Independence:--'We hold these truths to be self-evident--that all
men are created equal--that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable rights--and that, among these, are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.'"

* * * * *

NO. 9.

THE ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER.

* * * * *

LETTER

OF

GERRIT SMITH,

TO

HON. HENRY CLAY.

* * * * *

NEW YORK:

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, NO. 143 NASSAU STREET.
----- 1839.

* * * * *
This No. contains 3-1/2 sheets.--Postage, under 100 miles, 6 cts. over
100, 10 cts.

_Please Read and circulate_.

LETTER.

* * * * *

PETERBORO, MARCH 21, 1839.

HON. HENRY CLAY:

DEAR SIR,

In the Annual Meeting of the American Colonization Society, held in the
Capitol in the city of Washington, December, 1835, you commented on a
speech made by myself, the previous autumn. Your objections to that
speech formed the principal subject matter of your remarks. Does not
this fact somewhat mitigate the great presumption of which I feel myself
guilty, in undertaking, all unhonored and humble as I am, to review the
production of one of the most distinguished statesmen of the age?

Until the appearance of your celebrated speech on the subject of
slavery, I had supposed that you cherished a sacred regard for the right
of petition. I now find, that you value it no more highly than they do,
who make open war upon it. Indeed, you admit, that, in relation to this
right, "there is no substantial difference between" them and yourself.
Instead of rebuking, you compliment them; and, in saying that "the
majority of the Senate" would not "violate the right of petition in any
case, in which, according to its judgment, the object of the petition
could be safely or properly granted," you show to what destructive
conditions you subject this absolute right. Your doctrine is, that in
those cases, where the object of the petition is such, as the
supplicated party can approve, previously to any discussion of its
merits--there, and there only, exists the right of petition. For aught I
see, you are no more to be regarded as the friend of this right, than is
the conspicuous gentleman[A] who framed the Report on that subject,
which was presented to the Senate of my state the last month. That
gentleman admits the sacredness of "the right to petition on any
subject;" and yet, in the same breath, he insists on the equal
sacredness of the right to refuse to attend to a petition. He manifestly
failed to bear in mind, that a right to petition implies the correlative
right to be heard. How different are the statesmen, who insist "on the
right to refuse to attend to a petition," from Him, who says, "Whoso
stoppeth his ears at the cry of the poor, he also shall cry himself, but
shall not be heard." And who are poor, if it be not those for whom the
abolitionists cry? They must even cry by proxy. For, in the language of
John Quincy Adams, the champion of the right of petition, "The slave is
not permitted to cry for mercy--to plead for pardon--to utter the shriek
of perishing nature for relief." It may be well to remark, that the
error, which I have pointed out in the Report in question, lies in the
premises of the principal argument of that paper; and that the
correction of this error is necessarily attended with the destruction of
the premises, and with the overthrow of the argument, which is built
upon them.

[Footnote A: Colonel Young.]

I surely need not stop to vindicate the right of petition. It is a
natural right--one that human laws can guarantee, but can neither create
nor destroy. It is an interesting fact, that the Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, which guarantees the right of petition, was
opposed in the Congress of 1789 as superfluous. It was argued, that this
is "a self-evident, inalienable right, which the people possess," and
that "it would never be called in question." What a change in
fifty years!

You deny the power of Congress to abolish the inter-state traffic in
human beings; and, inasmuch as you say, that the right "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states," does not
include the right to prohibit and destroy commerce; and, inasmuch as it
is understood, that it was in virtue of the right to regulate commerce,
that Congress enacted laws to restrain our participation in the "African
slave trade," you perhaps also deny, that Congress had the power to
enact such laws. The history of the times in which the Federal
Constitution was framed and adopted, justifies the belief, that the
clause of that instrument under consideration conveys the power, which
Congress exercised. For instance, Governor Randolph, when speaking in
the Virginia Convention of 1788, of the clause which declares, that "the
migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by
Congress prior to the year 1808," said, "This is an exception from the
power of regulating commerce, and the restriction is to continue only
till 1808. Then Congress can, by the exercise of that power, prevent
future importations."

Were I, however, to admit that the right "to regulate commerce," does
not include the right to prohibit and destroy commerce, it nevertheless
would not follow, that Congress might not prohibit or destroy certain
branches of commerce. It might need to do so, in order to preserve our
general commerce with a state or nation. So large a proportion of the
cloths of Turkey might be fraught with the contagion of the plague, as
to make it necessary for our Government to forbid the importation of all
cloths from that country, and thus totally destroy one branch of our
commerce with it, to the end that the other branches might be preserved.
No inconsiderable evidence that Congress has the right to prohibit or
destroy a branch of commerce, is to be found in the fact, that it has
done so. From March, 1794, to May, 1820, it enacted several laws, which
went to prohibit or destroy, and, in the end, did prohibit or destroy
the trade of this country with Africa in human beings. And, if Congress
has the power to pass embargo laws, has it not the power to prohibit or
destroy commerce altogether?

It is, however, wholly immaterial, whether Congress could prohibit our
participation in the "African slave trade," in virtue of the clause
which empowers it "to regulate commerce." That the Constitution does, in
some one or more of its passages, convey the power, is manifest from the
testimony of the Constitution itself. The first clause of the ninth
section says: "The migration or importation of such persons, as any of
the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to they year 1808." Now the implication
in this clause of the existence of the power in question, is as
conclusive, as would be the express and positive grant of it. You will
observe, too, that the power of Congress over "migration or
importation," which this clause implies, is a power not merely to
"regulate," as you define the word, but to "prohibit."

It is clear, then, that Congress had the power to interdict our trade in
human beings with Africa. But, in view of what has been said on that
point--in view of the language of the Federal Constitution--of the
proceedings of the Convention, which framed it--and of the cotemporary
public sentiment--is it any less clear, that Congress has the power to
interdict the inter-state traffic in human beings?

There are some, who assert that the words "migration" and "importation,"
instead of referring, as I maintain they do--the former to the removal
of slaves from state to state, and the latter to their introduction from
Africa--are used in the Constitution as synonyms, and refer exclusively
to the "African slave trade." But there is surely no ground for the
imputation of such utter tautology, if we recollect that the
Constitution was written by scholars, and that remarkable pains were
taken to clear it of all superfluous words--a Committee having been
appointed for that special purpose. But, it may be asked, Why, in
reference to the taking of slaves from one state to another, use the
word "migration," which denotes voluntary removal? One answer is--that
it can be used with as much propriety in that case, as in the removal of
slaves from Africa--the removal in the one case being no less
involuntary than in the other. Another answer is--that the framers of
the Constitution selected the word "migration," because of its congruity
with that of "persons," under which their virtuous shame sought to
conceal from posterity the existence of seven hundred thousand slaves
amongst a people, who had but recently entered upon their national
career, with the solemn declaration, that "all men are created equal."

John Jay, whose great celebrity is partly owing to his very able
expositions of the Constitution, says: "To me, the constitutional
authority of the Congress to prohibit the migration _and_ importation of
slaves into any of the states, does not appear questionable." If the
disjunctive between "migration" and "importation" in the Constitution,
argues their reference to the same thing, Mr. Jay's copulative argues
more strongly, that, in his judgment, they refer to different things.

The law of Congress constituting the "Territory of Orleans," was enacted
in 1804. It fully recognizes the power of that body to prohibit the
trade in slaves between a territory and the states. But, if Congress had
this power, why had it not as clear a power to prohibit, at that time,
the trade in slaves between any two of the states? It might have
prohibited it, but for the constitutional suspension of the exercise of
the power. The term of that suspension closed, however, in 1808; and,
since that year, Congress has had as full power to abolish the whole
slave trade between the states, as it had in 1804 to abolish the like
trade between the Territory of Orleans and the states.

But, notwithstanding the conclusive evidence, that the Constitution
empowers Congress to abolish the inter-state slave trade, it is
incomprehensible to many, that such states as Virginia and Maryland
should have consented to deprive themselves of the benefit of selling
their slaves into other states. It is incomprehensible, only because
they look upon such states in the light of their present character and
present interests. It will no longer be so, if they will bear in mind,
that slave labor was then, as it is now, unprofitable for ordinary
agriculture, and that Whitney's cotton-gin, which gave great value to
such labor, was not yet invented, and that the purchase of Louisiana,
which has had so great an effect to extend and perpetuate the dominion
of slavery, was not yet made. It will no longer be incomprehensible to
them, if they will recollect, that, at the period in question, American
slavery was regarded as a rapidly decaying, if not already expiring
institution. It will no longer be so, if they will recollect, how small
was the price of slaves then, compared with their present value; and
that, during the ten years, which followed the passage of the Act of
Virginia in 1782, legalizing manumissions, her citizens emancipated
slaves to the number of nearly one-twentieth of the whole amount of her
slaves in that year. To learn whether your native Virginia clung in the
year 1787 to the inter-state traffic in human flesh, we must take our
post of observation, not amongst her degenerate sons, who, in 1836, sold
men, women, and children, to the amount of twenty-four millions of
dollars--not amongst her President Dews, who write books in favor of
breeding human stock for exportation--but amongst her Washingtons, and
Jeffersons, and Henrys, and Masons, who, at the period when the
Constitution was framed, freely expressed their abhorrence of slavery.

But, however confident you may be, that Congress has not the lawful
power to abolish the branch of commerce in question; nevertheless, would
the abolition of it be so clearly and grossly unconstitutional, as to
justify the contempt with which the numerous petitions for the measure
are treated, and the impeachment of their fidelity to the Constitution,
and of their patriotism and purity, which the petitioners are made
to endure?

I was about to take it for granted, that, although you deny the power of
Congress to abolish the inter-state traffic in human beings, you do not
justify the traffic--when I recollected the intimation in your speech,
that there is no such traffic. For, when you speak of "the slave trade
between the states," and add--"or, as it is described in abolition
petitions, the traffic in human beings between the states"--do you not
intimate there is no such traffic? Whence this language? Do you not
believe slaves are human beings? And do you not believe that they suffer
under the disruption of the dearest earthly ties, as human beings
suffer? I will not detain you to hear what we of the North think of this
internal slave trade. But I will call your attention to what is thought
of it in your own Kentucky and in your native Virginia. Says the
"Address of the Presbyterian Synod of Kentucky to the Churches in
1835:"--"Brothers and sisters, parents and children, husbands and wives,
are torn asunder, and permitted to see each other no more. Those acts
are daily occurring in the midst of us. The shrieks and the agony often
witnessed on such occasions, proclaim with a trumpet tongue the iniquity
and cruelty of the system. There is not a neighborhood where these
heart-rending scenes are not displayed. There is not a village or road
that does not behold the sad procession of manacled outcasts, whose
chains and mournful countenances tell that they are exiled by force from
all that their hearts hold dear." Says Thomas Jefferson Randolph, in the
Virginia Legislature in 1832, when speaking of this trade: "It is a
practice, and an increasing practice, in parts of Virginia, to rear
slaves for market. How can an honourable mind, a patriot, and a lover of
his country, bear to see this ancient dominion, rendered illustrious by
the noble devotion and patriotism of her sons in the cause of liberty,
converted into one grand menagerie, where men are to be reared for the
market like oxen for the shambles. Is it better--is it not worse than
the (foreign) slave trade--that trade which enlisted the labor of the
good and wise of every creed and every clime to abolish? The (foreign)
trader receives the slave, a stranger in language, aspect, and manner,
from the merchant who has brought him from the interior. The ties of
father, mother, husband, and child, have already been rent in twain;
before he receives him, his soul has become callous. But here, sir,
individuals whom the master has known from infancy, whom he has seen
sporting in the innocent gambols of childhood--who have been accustomed
to look to him for protection, he tears from the mother's arms, and
sells into a strange country--among strange people, subject to cruel
taskmasters."

You are in favor of increasing the number of slave states. The terms of
the celebrated "Missouri compromise" warrant, in your judgment, the
increase. But, notwithstanding you admit, that this unholy compromise,
in which tranquillity was purchased at the expense of humanity and
righteousness, does not "in terms embrace the case," and "is not
absolutely binding and obligatory;" you, nevertheless, make no attempt
whatever to do away any one of the conclusive objections, which are
urged against such increase. You do not attempt to show how the
multiplication of slave states can consist with the constitutional duty
of the "United States to guarantee to every state in the Union a
republican form of government," any more than if it were perfectly
clear, that a government is republican under which one half of the
people are lawfully engaged in buying and selling the other half; or
than if the doctrine that "all men are created equal" were not the
fundamental and distinctive doctrine of a republican government. You no
more vindicate the proposition to enlarge the realm of slavery, than if
the proposition were as obviously in harmony with, as it is opposed to
the anti-slavery tenor and policy of the Constitution--the rights of
man--and the laws of God.

You are perhaps of the number of those, who, believing, that a state can
change its Constitution as it pleases, deem it futile in Congress to
require, that States, on entering the Union, shall have anti-slavery
Constitutions. The Framers of the Federal Constitution doubtless foresaw
the possibility of treachery, on the part of the new States, in the
matter of slavery: and the restriction in that instrument to the old
States--"the States now existing"--of the right to participate in the
internal and "African slave trade" may be ascribed to the motive of
diminishing, if not indeed of entirely preventing, temptation to such
treachery. The Ordinance concerning the North-west Territory, passed by
the Congress of 1787, and ratified by the Congress of 1790, shows, so
far as those bodies can be regarded as correct interpreters of the
Constitution which was framed in 1787, and adopted in 1789, that slavery
was not to have a constitutional existence in the new States. The
Ordinance continues the privilege of recapturing fugitive slaves in the
North-west Territory to the "existing States." Slaves in that territory,
to be the subjects of lawful recapture, must in the language of the
Ordinance, owe "labour or service in one of the _original_ States."

I close what I have to say on this topic, with the remark, that were it
admitted, that the reasons for the increase of the number of slave
States are sound and satisfactory, it nevertheless would not follow,
that the moral and constitutional wrong of preventing that increase is
so palpable, as to justify the scorn and insult, which are heaped by
Congress upon this hundred thousand petitioners for this measure.

It has hitherto been supposed, that you distinctly and fully admitted
the Constitutional power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District
of Columbia. But, on this point, as on that of the right of petition,
you have for reasons known to yourself, suddenly and greatly changed
your tone. Whilst your speech argues, at no small length, that Congress
has not the right to abolish slavery in the District, all that it says
in favor of the Constitutional power to abolish it, is that "the
language (of the Constitution) may _possibly_ be sufficiently
comprehensive to include a power of abolition." "Faint praise dams;" and
your very reluctant and qualified concession of the Constitutional power
under consideration, is to be construed, rather as a denial than a
concession.