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A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents by James D. Richardson

J >> James D. Richardson >> A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents



A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS

BY JAMES D. RICHARDSON

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE


VOLUME III


PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY OF CONGRESS 1902



Copyright 1897

BY JAMES D. RICHARDSON




Prefatory Note


The second volume of this compilation, issued a few weeks since, was
received with the same degree of favor as the first volume. It was a
matter of surprise that only sixteen years of our history, or eight
Congresses, could be comprised within the second volume, while the first
covered twenty-eight years, or fourteen Congresses. There is greater
surprise that this volume includes only the period covered by the four
years of the second term of Andrew Jackson and the four years of Martin
Van Buren's term--eight years in all, or four Congresses. However, it
will be found almost, if not quite, as interesting as the preceding
ones. In it will be found the conclusion of the controversy over the
United States Bank, including President Jackson's reasons for the
removal of the deposits from that bank; his Farewell Address, and other
important papers, all of which are characteristic of the man. It was
during the second Administration of President Jackson that the act
changing the ratio between the gold and silver dollar was passed.

This volume contains President Van Buren's message recommending the
independent treasury or subtreasury, and the discussion of that subject,
which terminated in what has been termed "the divorce of the bank and
state in the fiscal affairs of the Federal Government," and which
President Van Buren considered a second Declaration of Independence. The
controversy with Great Britain in relation to the northeastern boundary
of the United States is also included in Van Buren's Administration, and
will prove highly interesting.

The omission of indexes to Volumes I and II has been commented on. The
answer to such comments is, it was deemed best to omit the index to each
volume and publish a general and comprehensive index to the entire work,
in a separate volume. This index will be ready for distribution soon
after the issuance of the last volume.

JAMES D. RICHARDSON.

NOVEMBER 26,1896.




Andrew Jackson

March 4, 1833, to March 4, 1837




Andrew Jackson

SECOND INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: The will of the American people, expressed through
their unsolicited suffrages, calls me before you to pass through the
solemnities preparatory to taking upon myself the duties of President of
the United States for another term. For their approbation of my public
conduct through a period which has not been without its difficulties,
and for this renewed expression of their confidence in my good
intentions, I am at a loss for terms adequate to the expression of my
gratitude. It shall be displayed to the extent of my humble abilities in
continued efforts so to administer the Government as to preserve their
liberty and promote their happiness.

So many events have occurred within the last four years which have
necessarily called forth--sometimes under circumstances the most
delicate and painful--my views of the principles and policy which ought
to be pursued by the General Government that I need on this occasion but
allude to a few leading considerations connected with some of them.

The foreign policy adopted by our Government soon after the formation
of our present Constitution, and very generally pursued by successive
Administrations, has been crowned with almost complete success, and has
elevated our character among the nations of the earth. To do justice to
all and to submit to wrong from none has been during my Administration
its governing maxim, and so happy have been its results that we are not
only at peace with all the world, but have few causes of controversy,
and those of minor importance, remaining unadjusted.

In the domestic policy of this Government there are two objects
which especially deserve the attention of the people and their
representatives, and which have been and will continue to be the
subjects of my increasing solicitude. They are the preservation of
the rights of the several States and the integrity of the Union.

These great objects are necessarily connected, and can only be attained
by an enlightened exercise of the powers of each within its appropriate
sphere in conformity with the public will constitutionally expressed.
To this end it becomes the duty of all to yield a ready and patriotic
submission to the laws constitutionally enacted, and thereby promote and
strengthen a proper confidence in those institutions of the several
States and of the United States which the people themselves have
ordained for their own government.

My experience in public concerns and the observation of a life
somewhat advanced confirm the opinions long since imbibed by me, that
the destruction of our State governments or the annihilation of their
control over the local concerns of the people would lead directly
to revolution and anarchy, and finally to despotism and military
domination. In proportion, therefore, as the General Government
encroaches upon the rights of the States, in the same proportion does
it impair its own power and detract from its ability to fulfill the
purposes of its creation. Solemnly impressed with these considerations,
my countrymen will ever find me ready to exercise my constitutional
powers in arresting measures which may directly or indirectly encroach
upon the rights of the States or tend to consolidate all political power
in the General Government. But of equal, and, indeed, of incalculable,
importance is the union of these States, and the sacred duty of all
to contribute to its preservation by a liberal support of the General
Government in the exercise of its just powers. You have been wisely
admonished to "accustom yourselves to think and speak of the Union as of
the palladium of your political safety and prosperity, watching for its
preservation with jealous anxiety, discountenancing whatever may suggest
even a suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned, and indignantly
frowning upon the first dawning of any attempt to alienate any portion
of our country from the rest or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now
link together the various parts." Without union our independence and
liberty would never have been achieved; without union they never can
be maintained. Divided into twenty-four, or even a smaller number, of
separate communities, we shall see our internal trade burdened with
numberless restraints and exactions; communication between distant
points and sections obstructed or cut off; our sons made soldiers to
deluge with blood the fields they now till in peace; the mass of our
people borne down and impoverished by taxes to support armies and
navies, and military leaders at the head of their victorious legions
becoming our lawgivers and judges. The loss of liberty, of all good
government, of peace, plenty, and happiness, must inevitably follow a
dissolution of the Union. In supporting it, therefore, we support all
that is dear to the freeman and the philanthropist.

The time at which I stand before you is full of interest. The eyes of
all nations are fixed on our Republic. The event of the existing crisis
will be decisive in the opinion of mankind of the practicability of our
federal system of government. Great is the stake placed in our hands;
great is the responsibility which must rest upon the people of the
United States. Let us realize the importance of the attitude in which we
stand before the world. Let us exercise forbearance and firmness. Let us
extricate our country from the dangers which surround it and learn
wisdom from the lessons they inculcate.

Deeply impressed with the truth of these observations, and under the
obligation of that solemn oath which I am about to take, I shall
continue to exert all my faculties to maintain the just powers of the
Constitution and to transmit unimpaired to posterity the blessings of
our Federal Union. At the same time, it will be my aim to inculcate by
my official acts the necessity of exercising by the General Government
those powers only that are clearly delegated; to encourage simplicity
and economy in the expenditures of the Government; to raise no more
money from the people than may be requisite for these objects, and in
a manner that will best promote the interests of all classes of the
community and of all portions of the Union. Constantly bearing in mind
that in entering into society "individuals must give up a share of
liberty to preserve the rest," it will be my desire so to discharge my
duties as to foster with our brethren in all parts of the country a
spirit of liberal concession and compromise, and, by reconciling our
fellow-citizens to those partial sacrifices which they must unavoidably
make for the preservation of a greater good, to recommend our invaluable
Government and Union to the confidence and affections of the American
people.

Finally, it is my most fervent prayer to that Almighty Being before whom
I now stand, and who has kept us in His hands from the infancy of our
Republic to the present day, that He will so overrule all my intentions
and actions and inspire the hearts of my fellow-citizens that we may be
preserved from dangers of all kinds and continue forever a united and
happy people.

MARCH 4, 1833.




REMOVAL OF THE PUBLIC DEPOSITS.

[Read to the Cabinet September 18, 1833]

Having carefully and anxiously considered all the facts and arguments
which have been submitted to him relative to a removal of the public
deposits from the Bank of the United States, the President deems it his
duty to communicate in this manner to his Cabinet the final conclusions
of his own mind and the reasons on which they are founded, in order to
put them in durable form and to prevent misconceptions.

The President's convictions of the dangerous tendencies of the Bank of
the United States, since signally illustrated by its own acts, were so
overpowering when he entered on the duties of Chief Magistrate that he
felt it his duty, notwithstanding the objections of the friends by whom
he was surrounded, to avail himself of the first occasion to call the
attention of Congress and the people to the question of its recharter.
The opinions expressed in his annual message of December, 1829, were
reiterated in those of December, 1830 and 1831, and in that of 1830
he threw out for consideration some suggestions in relation to a
substitute. At the session of 1831-32 an act was passed by a majority
of both Houses of Congress rechartering the present bank, upon which
the President felt it his duty to put his constitutional veto. In his
message returning that act he repeated and enlarged upon the principles
and views briefly asserted in his annual message, declaring the bank
to be, in his opinion, both inexpedient and unconstitutional, and
announcing to his countrymen very unequivocally his firm determination
never to sanction by his approval the continuance of that institution
or the establishment of any other upon similar principles.

There are strong reasons for believing that the motive of the bank in
asking for a recharter at that session of Congress was to make it a
leading question in the election of a President of the United States the
ensuing November, and all steps deemed necessary were taken to procure
from the people a reversal of the President's decision.

Although the charter was approaching its termination, and the bank was
aware that it was the intention of the Government to use the public
deposit as fast as it has accrued in the payment of the public debt,
yet did it extend its loans from January, 1831, to May, 1832, from
$42,402,304.24 to $70,428,070.72, being an increase of $28,025,766.48
in sixteen months. It is confidently believed that the leading object of
this immense extension of its loans was to bring as large a portion of
the people as possible under its power and influence, and it has been
disclosed that some of the largest sums were granted on very unusual
terms to the conductors of the public press. In some of these cases the
motive was made manifest by the nominal or insufficient security taken
for the loans, by the large amounts discounted, by the extraordinary
time allowed for payment, and especially by the subsequent conduct of
those receiving the accommodations.

Having taken these preliminary steps to obtain control over public
opinion, the bank came into Congress and asked a new charter. The object
avowed by many of the advocates of the bank was _to put the President
to the test_, that the country might know his final determination
relative to the bank prior to the ensuing election. Many documents and
articles were printed and circulated at the expense of the bank to bring
the people to a favorable decision upon its pretensions. Those whom the
bank appears to have made its debtors for the special occasion were
warned of the ruin which awaited them should the President be sustained,
and attempts were made to alarm the whole people by painting the
depression in the price of property and produce and the general loss,
inconvenience, and distress which it was represented would immediately
follow the reelection of the President in opposition to the bank.

Can it now be said that the question of a recharter of the bank was not
decided at the election which ensued? Had the veto been equivocal, or
had it not covered the whole ground; if it had merely taken exceptions
to the details of the bill or to the time of its passage; if it had not
met the whole ground of constitutionality and expediency, then there
might have been some plausibility for the allegation that the question
was not decided by the people. It was to compel the President to take
his stand that the question was brought forward at that particular
time. He met the challenge, willingly took the position into which his
adversaries sought to force him, and frankly declared his unalterable
opposition to the bank as being both unconstitutional and inexpedient.
On that ground the case was argued to the people; and now that the
people have sustained the President, notwithstanding the array of
influence and power which was brought to bear upon him, it is too late,
he confidently thinks, to say that the question has not been decided.
Whatever may be the opinions of others, the President considers his
reelection as a decision of the people against the bank. In the
concluding paragraph of his veto message he said:


I have now done my duty to my country. If sustained by my
fellow-citizens, I shall be grateful and happy; if not, I shall find
in the motives which impel me ample grounds for contentment and peace.


He was sustained by a just people, and he desires to evince his
gratitude by carrying into effect their decision so far as it depends
upon him.

Of all the substitutes for the present bank which have been suggested,
none seems to have united any considerable portion of the public in its
favor. Most of them are liable to the same constitutional objections for
which the present bank has been condemned, and perhaps to all there are
strong objections on the score of expediency. In ridding the country of
an irresponsible power which has attempted to control the Government,
care must be taken not to unite the same power with the executive
branch. To give a President the control over the currency and the power
over individuals now possessed by the Bank of the United States, even
with the material difference that he is responsible to the people, would
be as objectionable and as dangerous as to leave it as it is. Neither
one nor the other is necessary, and therefore ought not to be resorted
to.

On the whole, the President considers it as conclusively settled that
the charter of the Bank of the United States will not be renewed, and
he has no reasonable ground to believe that any substitute will be
established. Being bound to regulate his course by the laws as they
exist, and not to anticipate the interference of the legislative power
for the purpose of framing new systems, it is proper for him seasonably
to consider the means by which the services rendered by the Bank of the
United States are to be performed after its charter shall expire.

The existing laws declare that--

The deposits of the money of the United States in places in which the
said bank and branches thereof may be established shall be made in said
bank or branches thereof unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall at
any time otherwise order and direct, in which case the Secretary of the
Treasury shall immediately lay before Congress, if in session, and, if
not, immediately after the commencement of the next session, the reasons
of such order or direction.

The power of the Secretary of the Treasury over the deposits is
_unqualified_. The provision that he shall report his reasons to
Congress is no limitation. Had it not been inserted he would have been
responsible to Congress had he made a removal for any other than good
reasons, and his responsibility now ceases upon the rendition of
sufficient ones to Congress. The only object of the provision is to make
his reasons accessible to Congress and enable that body the more readily
to judge of their soundness and purity, and thereupon to make such
further provision by law as the legislative power may think proper in
relation to the deposit of the public money. Those reasons may be very
diversified. It was asserted by the Secretary of the Treasury, without
contradiction, as early as 1817, that he had power "to control the
proceedings" of the Bank of the United States at any moment "by changing
the deposits to the State banks" should it pursue an illiberal course
toward those institutions; that "the Secretary of the Treasury will
always be disposed to support the credit of the State banks, and will
invariably direct transfers from the deposits of the public money in aid
of their legitimate exertions to maintain their credit;" and he asserted
a right to employ the State banks when the Bank of the United States
should refuse to receive on deposit the notes of such State banks as the
public interest required should be received in payment of the public
dues. In several instances he did transfer the public deposits to State
banks in the immediate vicinity of branches, for reasons connected only
with the safety of those banks, the public convenience, and the
interests of the Treasury.

If it was lawful for Mr. Crawford, the Secretary of the Treasury at that
time, to act on these principles, it will be difficult to discover any
sound reason against the application of similar principles in still
stronger cases. And it is a matter of surprise that a power which in
the infancy of the bank was freely asserted as one of the ordinary and
familiar duties of the Secretary of the Treasury should now be gravely
questioned, and attempts made to excite and alarm the public mind as if
some new and unheard-of power was about to be usurped by the executive
branch of the Government.

It is but a little more than two and a half years to the termination of
the charter of the present bank. It is considered as the decision of the
country that it shall then cease to exist, and no man, the President
believes, has reasonable ground for expectation that any other Bank of
the United States will be created by Congress.

To the Treasury Department is intrusted the safe-keeping and faithful
application of the public moneys. A plan of collection different from
the present must therefore be introduced and put in complete operation
before the dissolution of the present bank. When shall it be commenced?
Shall no step be taken in this essential concern until the charter
expires and the Treasury finds itself without an agent, its accounts in
confusion, with no depository for its funds, and the whole business of
the Government deranged, or shall it be delayed until six months, or a
year, or two years before the expiration of the charter? It is obvious
that any new system which may be substituted in the place of the Bank
of the United States could not be suddenly carried into effect on the
termination of its existence without serious inconvenience to the
Government and the people. Its vast amount of notes are then to be
redeemed and withdrawn-from circulation and its immense debt collected.
These operations must be gradual, otherwise much suffering and distress
will be brought upon the community.

It ought to be not a work of months only, but of years, and the
President thinks it can not, with due attention to the interests of the
people, be longer postponed. It is safer to begin it too soon than to
delay it too long.

It is for the wisdom of Congress to decide upon the best substitute
to be adopted in the place of the Bank of the United States, and the
President would have felt himself relieved from a heavy and painful
responsibility if in the charter to the bank Congress had reserved to
itself the power of directing at its pleasure the public money to be
elsewhere deposited, and had not devolved that power exclusively on one
of the Executive Departments. It is useless now to inquire why this high
and important power was surrendered by those who are peculiarly and
appropriately the guardians of the public money. Perhaps it was an
oversight. But as the President presumes that the charter to the bank is
to be considered as a contract on the part of the Government, it is not
now in the power of Congress to disregard its stipulations; and by the
terms of that contract the public money is to be deposited in the bank
during the continuance of its charter unless the Secretary of the
Treasury shall otherwise direct. Unless, therefore, the Secretary of the
Treasury first acts, Congress have no power over the subject, for they
can not add a new clause to the charter or strike one out of it without
the consent of the bank, and consequently the public money must remain
in that institution to the last hour of its existence unless the
Secretary of the Treasury shall remove it at an earlier day. The
responsibility is thus thrown upon the executive branch of the
Government of deciding how long before the expiration of the charter the
public interest will require the deposits to be placed elsewhere; and
although according to the frame and principle of our Government this
decision would seem more properly to belong to the legislative power,
yet as the law has imposed it upon the executive department the duty
ought to be faithfully and firmly met, and the decision made and
executed upon the best lights that can be obtained and the best judgment
that can be formed. It would ill become the executive branch of the
Government to shrink from any duty which the law imposes on it, to fix
upon others the responsibility which justly belongs to itself. And while
the President anxiously wishes to abstain from the exercise of doubtful
powers and to avoid all interference with the rights and duties
of others, he must yet with unshaken constancy discharge his own
obligations, and can not allow himself to turn aside in order to avoid
any responsibility which the high trust with which he has been honored
requires him to encounter; and it being the duty of one of the Executive
Departments to decide in the first instance, subject to the future
action of the legislative power, whether the public deposits shall
remain in the Bank of the United States until the end of its existence
or be withdrawn some time before, the President has felt himself bound
to examine the question carefully and deliberately in order to make up
his judgment on the subject, and in his opinion the near approach of
the termination of the charter and the public considerations heretofore
mentioned are of themselves amply sufficient to justify the removal of
the deposits, without reference to the conduct of the bank or their
safety in its keeping.

But in the conduct of the bank may be found other reasons, very
imperative in their character, and which require prompt action.
Developments have been made from time to time of its faithlessness as
a public agent, its misapplication of public funds, its interference in
elections, its efforts by the machinery of committees to deprive the
Government directors of a full knowledge of its concerns, and, above
all, its flagrant misconduct as recently and unexpectedly disclosed
in placing all the funds of the bank, including the money of the
Government, at the disposition of the president of the bank as means
of operating upon public opinion and procuring a new charter, without
requiring him to render a voucher for their disbursement. A brief
recapitulation of the facts which justify these charges, and which have
come to the knowledge of the public and the President, will, he thinks,
remove every reasonable doubt as to the course which it is now the duty
of the President to pursue.

We have seen that in sixteen months ending in May, 1832, the bank
had extended its loans more than $28,000,000, although it knew the
Government intended to appropriate most of its large deposit during that
year in payment of the public debt. It was in May, 1832, that its loans
arrived at the maximum, and in the preceding March so sensible was the
bank that it would not be able to pay over the public deposit when
it would be required by the Government that it commenced a secret
negotiation, without the approbation or knowledge of the Government,
with the agents for about $2,700,000 of the 3 per cent stocks held in
Holland, with a view of inducing them not to come forward for payment
for one or more years after notice should be given by the Treasury
Department. This arrangement would have enabled the bank to keep and use
during time the public money set apart for the payment of these stocks.
After this negotiation had commenced, the Secretary of the Treasury
informed the bank that it was his intention to pay off one-half of the
3 percents on the 1st of the succeeding July, which amounted to about
$6,500,000. The president of the bank, although the committee of
investigation was then looking into its affairs at Philadelphia, came
immediately to Washington, and upon representing that the bank was
desirous of accommodating the importing merchants at New York (which it
failed to do) and undertaking to pay the interest itself, procured the
consent of the Secretary, after consultation with the President, to
postpone the payment until the succeeding 1st of October.