The History of Puerto Rico by R.A. Van Middeldyk
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R.A. Van Middeldyk >> The History of Puerto Rico
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The following list of Indians distributed in obedience to orders from
the metropolis is taken from the work by Don Salvador Brau.[14] It was
these first distributions, made in 1509-'10, which led to the
rebellion of the Indians and the distributions that followed:
Indians
To the general treasurer, Pasamonte, a man described by
Acosta as malevolent, insolent, deceitful, and sordid...... 300
To Juan Ponce de Leon...................................... 200
To Christopher Soto Mayor[15]...............................100
To Vicente Yanez Pinzon, on condition that he should settle
in the island.............................................. 100
To Lope de Conchillos, King Ferdinand's Chief Secretary,
as bad a character as Pasamonte............................ 100
To Pedro Moreno and Jerome of Brussels, the delegate and
clerk of Conchillos in Boriquen, 100 each...................200
To the bachelor-at-law Villalobos........................... 80
To Francisco Alvarado.......................................80
A total of 1,060 defenseless Indians delivered into the ruthless hands
of men steeped in greed, ambition, and selfishness.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 10: The scanty remains of the first settlement were to be
seen till lately in the Pueblo Viejo Ward, municipal district of
Bayamon, along the road which loads from Catano to Gurabo.]
[Footnote 11: He may have been the tenth or the twentieth if what the
chroniclers tell us about the adoption of the defunct caciquess' names
by their successors be true.]
[Footnote 12: The manioc of which the "casaba" bread is made.]
[Footnote 13: A "cascabel" (a measure the size of one of the round
bells used in Spain to hang round the neck of the leader in a troop of
mules) full of gold and twenty-five pounds (an arroba) of cotton every
three months for every Indian above sixteen years of age.]
[Footnote 14: Puerto Rico y su historia, p. 173.]
[Footnote 15: Among the Indians given to Soto Mayor was the sister of
the cacique Guaybana second. She became his concubine, and in return
for the preference shown her she gave the young nobleman timely
warning of the impending rebellion.]
CHAPTER V
THE REBELLION
1511
The sullen but passive resistance of the Indians was little noticed by
the Spaniards, who despised them too much to show any apprehension;
but the number of fugitives to the mountains and across the sea
increased day by day, and it soon became known that nocturnal
"areytos" were held, in which the means of shaking off the odious yoke
were discussed. Soto Mayor was warned by his paramour, and it is
probable that some of the other settlers received advice through the
same channels; still, they neglected even the ordinary precautions.
At last, a soldier named Juan Gonzalez, who had learned the native
language in la Espanola, took upon himself to discover what truth
there was in these persistent reports, and, naked and painted so as to
appear like one of the Indians, he assisted at one of the nocturnal
meetings, where he learned that a serious insurrection was indeed
brewing; he informed Soto Mayor of what he had heard and seen, and the
latter now became convinced of the seriousness of the danger.
Before Gonzalez learned what was going on, Guaybana had summoned the
neighboring caciques to a midnight "areyto" and laid his plan before
them, which consisted in each of them, on a preconcerted day, falling
upon the Spaniards living in or near their respective villages; the
attack, on the same day, on Soto Mayor's settlement, he reserved for
himself and Guarionez, the cacique of Utuao.
But some of the caciques doubted the feasibility of the plan. Had not
the fugitives from Quisqueia[16] told of the terrible effects of the
shining blades they wore by their sides when wielded in battle by the
brawny arms of the dreaded strangers? Did not their own arrows glance
harmlessly from the glittering scales with which they covered their
bodies? Was Guaybana quite sure that the white-faced invader could be
killed at all? The majority thought that before undertaking their
extermination they ought to be sure that they had to do with a mortal
enemy.
Oviedo and Herrera both relate how they proceeded to discover this.
Urayoan, the cacique of Yagueeca, was charged with the experiment.
Chance soon favored him. A young man named Salcedo passed through his
village to join some friends. He was hospitably received, well fed,
and a number of men[17] were told to accompany him and carry his
luggage. He arrived at the Guaoraba, a river on the west side of the
island, which flows into the bay of San German. They offered to carry
him across. The youth accepted, was taken up between two of the
strongest Indians, who, arriving in the middle of the river, dumped
him under water--then they fell on him and held him down till he
struggled no more. Dragging him ashore, they now begged his pardon,
saying that they had stumbled, and called upon him to rise and
continue the voyage; but the young man did not move, he was dead, and
they had the proof that the supposed demi-gods were mortals after all.
The news spread like wildfire, and from that day the Indians were in
open rebellion and began to take the offensive, shooting their arrows
and otherwise molesting every Spaniard they happened to meet alone or
off his guard.
The following episode related by Oviedo illustrates the mental
disposition of the natives of Boriquen at this period.
Aymamon, the cacique whose village was on the river Culebrinas, near
the settlement of Soto Mayor, had surprised a lad of sixteen years
wandering alone in the forest. The cacique carried him off, tied him
to a post in his hut and proposed to his men a game of ball, the
winner to have the privilege of convincing himself and the others of
the mortality of their enemies by killing the lad in any way he
pleased. Fortunately for the intended victim, one of the Indians knew
the youth's father, one Pedro Juarez, in the neighboring settlement,
and ran to tell him of the danger that menaced his son. Captain Diego
Salazar, who in Soto Mayor's absence was in command of the settlement,
on hearing of the case, took his sword and buckler and guided by the
friendly Indian, reached the village while the game for the boy's life
was going on. He first cut the lad's bonds, and with the words "Do as
you see me do!" rushed upon the crowd of about 300 Indians and laid
about him right and left with such effect that they had no chance even
of defending themselves. Many were killed and wounded. Among the
latter was Aymamon himself, and Salazar returned in triumph with the
boy.
But now comes the curious part of the story, which shows the character
of the Boriquen Indian in a more favorable light.
Aymamon, feeling himself mortally wounded, sent a messenger to
Salazar, begging him to come to his caney or hut to make friends with
him before he died. None but a man of Salazar's intrepid character
would have thought of accepting such an invitation; but _he_ did, and,
saying to young Juarez, who begged his deliverer not to go: "They
shall not think that I'm afraid of them," he went, shook hands with
the dying chief, changed names with him, and returned unharmed amid
the applauding shouts of "Salazar! Salazar!" from the multitude, among
whom his Toledo blade had made such havoc. It was evident from this
that they held courage, such as the captain had displayed, in high
esteem. To the other Spaniards they used to say: "We are not afraid of
_you_, for you are not Salazar."
* * * * *
It was in the beginning of June, 1511. The day fixed by Guaybana for
the general rising had arrived. Soto Mayor was still in his grange in
the territory under the cacique's authority, but having received the
confirmation of the approaching danger from Gonzalez, he now resolved
at once to place himself at the head of his men in the Aguada
settlement. The distance was great, and he had to traverse a country
thickly peopled by Indians whom he now knew to be in open rebellion;
but he was a Spanish hidalgo and did not hesitate a moment. The
morning after receiving the report of Gonzalez he left his grange with
that individual and four other companions.
Guaybana, hearing of Soto Mayor's departure, started in pursuit.
Gonzalez, who had lagged behind, was first overtaken, disarmed,
wounded with his own sword, and left for dead. Near the river Yauco
the Indians came upon Soto Mayor and his companions, and though there
were no witnesses to chronicle what happened, we may safely assert
that they sold their lives dear, till the last of them fell under the
clubs of the infuriated savages.
That same night Guarionex with 3,000 Indians stealthily surrounded the
settlement and set fire to it, slaughtering all who, in trying to
escape, fell into their hands.[18]
In the interior nearly a hundred Spaniards were killed during the
night. Gonzalez, though left for dead, had been able to make his way
through the forest to the royal grange, situated where now Toa-Caja
is. He was in a pitiful plight, and fell in a swoon when he crossed
the threshold of the house. Being restored to consciousness, he
related to the Spaniards present what was going on near the
Culebrinas, and they sent a messenger to Caparra at once.
Immediately on receipt of the news from the grange, Ponce sent Captain
Miguel del Toro with 40 men to the assistance of Soto Mayor, but he
found the settlement in ashes and only the bodies of those who had
perished.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 16: La Espanola.]
[Footnote 17: The chroniclers say fifteen or twenty, which seems an
exaggerated number.]
[Footnote 18: Salazar was able in the dark and the confusion of the
attack on the settlement to rally a handful of followers, with whom he
cut his way through the Indians and through the jungle to Caparra.]
CHAPTER VI
THE REBELLION _(continued)_
1511
Salazar's arrival at Caparra with a handful of wounded and exhausted
men revealed to Ponce the danger of his situation. Ponce knew that it
was necessary to strike a bold blow, and although, including the
maimed and wounded, he had but 120 men at his disposal, he prepared at
once to take the offensive.
Sending a messenger to la Espanola with the news of the insurrection
and a demand for reenforcements, which, seeing his strained relations
with the Admiral, there was small chance of his obtaining, he
proceeded to divide his force in four companies of 30 men to each, and
gave command to Miguel del Toro, the future founder of San German, to
Louis de Anasco, who later gave his name to a province, to Louis
Almanza and to Diego Salazar, whose company was made up exclusively of
the maimed and wounded, and therefore called in good-humored jest the
company of cripples.
Having learned from his scouts that Guaybana was camped with 5,000 to
6,000 men near the mouth of the river Coayuco in the territory between
the Yauco and Jacagua rivers, somewhere in the neighborhood of the
city which now bears the conqueror's name, he marched with great
precaution through forest and jungle till he reached the river. He
crossed it during the night and fell upon the Indians with such
impetus that they believed their slain enemies to have come to life.
They fled in confusion, leaving 200 dead upon the field.
The force under Ponce's command was too small to follow up his victory
by the persecution of the terror-stricken natives; nor would the
exhausted condition of the men have permitted it, so he wisely
determined to return to Caparra, cure his wounded soldiers, and await
the result of his message to la Espanola.
Oviedo and Navarro, whose narratives of these events are repeated by
Abbad, state that the Boriquen Indians, despairing of being able to
vanquish the Spaniards, called the Caribs of the neighboring islands
to their aid; that the latter arrived in groups to make common cause
with them, and that some time after the battle of Coayuco, between
Caribs and Boriquenos, 11,000 men had congregated in the Aymaco
district.
But Mr. Brau[19] calls attention to the improbability of such a
gathering. "Guaybana," he says, "had been able, after long
preparation, to bring together between 5,000 and 6,000 warriors--of
these 200 had been slain, and an equal number, perhaps, wounded and
made prisoners, so that, to make up the number of 11,000, at least as
many Caribs as the entire warrior force of Boriquen must have come to
the island in the short space of time elapsed since the first battle.
The islands inhabited by the Caribs--Santa Cruz, San Eustaquio, San
Cristobal, and Dominica--were too distant to furnish so large a
contingent in so short a time, and the author we are quoting justly
remarks that, admitting that such a feat was possible, they must have
had at their disposition a fleet of at least 200 canoes, each capable
of holding 20 men, a number which it is not likely they ever
possessed."
There is another reason for discrediting the assertions of the old
chroniclers in this respect. The idea of calling upon their enemies,
the Caribs, to make common cause with them against a foe from whom the
Caribs themselves had, as yet, suffered comparatively little, and the
ready acceptance by these savages of the proposal, presupposes an
amount of foresight and calculation, of diplomatic tact, so to speak,
in both the Boriquenos and Caribs with which it is difficult to credit
them.
The probable explanation of the alleged arrival of Caribs is that some
of the fugitive Indians who had found a refuge in the small islands
close to Boriquen may have been informed of the preparations for a
revolt and of the result of the experiment with Salcedo, and they
naturally came to take part in the struggle.
On hearing of the ominous gathering Ponce sent Louis Anasco and Miguel
del Toro with 50 men to reconnoiter and watch the Indians closely,
while he himself followed with the rest of his small force to be
present where and when it might be necessary. Their approach was soon
discovered, and, as if eager for battle, one cacique named
Mabodomaca, who had a band of 600 picked men, sent the governor an
insolent challenge to come on. Salazar with his company of cripples
was chosen to silence him. After reconnoitering the cacique's
position, he gave his men a much-needed rest till after midnight, and
then dashed among them with his accustomed recklessness. The Indians,
though taken by surprise, defended themselves bravely for three hours,
"but," says Father Abbad, "God fought on the side of the Spaniards,"
and the result was that 150 dead natives were left on the field, with
many wounded and prisoners. The Spaniards had not lost a man, though
the majority had received fresh wounds.
Ponce, with his reserve force, arrived soon after the battle and found
Salazar and his men resting. From them he learned that the main body
of the Indians, to the number of several thousand, was in the
territory of Yacueeca (now Anasco) and seemingly determined upon the
extermination of the Spaniards.
The captain resolved to go and meet the enemy without regard to
numbers. With Salazar's men and the 50 under Anasco and Toro he
marched upon them at once. Choosing an advantageous position, he gave
orders to form an entrenched camp with fascines as well, and as
quickly as the men could, while he kept the Indians at bay with his
arquebusiers and crossbowmen each time they made a rush, which they
did repeatedly. In this manner they succeeded in entrenching
themselves fairly well. The crossbowmen and arquebusiers went out from
time to time, delivered a volley among the close masses of Indians
and then withdrew. These tactics were continued during the night and
all the next day, much to the disgust of the soldiers, who, wounded,
weary, and hungry, without hope of rescue, heard the yells of the
savages challenging them to come out of their camp. They preferred to
rush among them, as they had so often done before. But Ponce would not
permit it.
Among the arquebusiers the best shot was a certain Juan de Leon. This
man had received instructions from Ponce to watch closely the
movements of Guaybana, who was easily distinguishable from the rest by
the "guanin," or disk of gold which he wore round the neck. On the
second day, the cacique was seen to come and go actively from group to
group, evidently animating his men for a general assault. While thus
engaged he came within the range of Leon's arquebus, and a moment
after he fell pierced by a well-directed ball. The effect was what
Ponce had doubtless expected. The Indians yelled with dismay and ran
far beyond the range of the deadly weapons; nor did they attempt to
return or molest the Spaniards when Ponce led them that night from the
camp and through the forest back to Caparra.
This was the beginning of the end. After the death of Guaybana no
other cacique ever attempted an organized resistance, and the partial
uprisings that took place for years afterward were easily suppressed.
The report of the arquebus that laid Guaybana low was the death-knell
of the whole Boriquen race.
The name of the island remained as a reminiscence only, and the island
itself became definitely a dependency of the Spanish crown under the
new name of San Juan Bautista de Puerto Rico.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 19: Puerto Rico y su Historia, p. 189.]
CHAPTER VII
NUMBER OF ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS AND SECOND DISTRIBUTION OF INDIANS
1511-1515
Friar Bartolome de Las Casas, in his Relation of the Indies, says with
reference to this island, that when the Spaniards under the orders of
Juan Ceron landed here in 1509, it was as full of people as a beehive
is full of bees and as beautiful and fertile as an orchard. This
simile and some probably incorrect data from the Geography of Bayaeete
led Friar Inigo Abbad to estimate the number of aboriginal inhabitants
at the time of the discovery at 600,000, a number for which there is
no warrant in any of the writings of the Spanish chroniclers, and
which Acosto, Brau, and Stahl, the best authorities on matters of
Puerto Rican history, reject as extremely exaggerated.
Mr. Brau gives some good reasons for reducing the number to about
16,000, though it seems to us that since little or nothing was known
of the island, except that part of it in which the events related in
the preceding chapters took place, any reasoning regarding the
population of the whole island, based upon a knowledge of a part of
it, is liable to error. Ponce's conquest was limited to the northern
and western littoral; the interior with the southern and eastern
districts were not settled by the Spaniards till some years after the
death of Guaybana; and it seems likely that there were caciques in
those parts who, by reason of the distance or other impediments, took
no part in the uprising against the Spaniards. For the rest, Mr.
Brau's reasonings in support of his reduction to 16,000 of the number
of aborigines, are undoubtedly correct. They are: First. The
improbability of a small island like this, _in an uncultivated state_,
producing sufficient food for such large numbers. Second. The fact
that at the first battle (that of Jacaguas), in which he supposes the
whole available warrior force of the island to have taken part, there
were 5,000 to 6,000 men only, which force would have been much
stronger had the population been anything near the number given by
Abbad; and, finally, the number of Indians distributed after the
cessation of organized resistance was only 5,500, as certified by
Sancho Velasquez, the judge appointed in 1515 to rectify the
distributions made by Ceron and Moscoso, and by Captain Melarejo in
his memorial drawn up in 1582 by order of the captain-general, which
number would necessarily have been much larger if the total aboriginal
population had been but 60,000, instead of 600,000.
* * * * *
The immediate consequence to the natives of the panic and partial
submission that followed the death of their leader was another and
more extensive distribution. The first distributions of Indians had
been but the extension to San Juan of the system as practised in la
Espanola, which consisted in granting to the crown officers in
recompense for services or as an inducement to settle in the island, a
certain number of natives.[20] In this way 1,060 Boriquenos had been
disposed of in 1509 to 9 persons. The ill usage to which they saw them
subjected drove the others to rebellion, and now, vae victis, the king,
on hearing of the rebellion, wrote to Ceron and Diaz (July, 1511): "To
'pacify' the Indians you must go well armed and terrorize them. Take
their canoes from them, and if they refuse to be reduced with reason,
make war upon them by fire and sword, taking care not to kill more
than necessary, and send 40 or 50 of them to 'la Espanola' to serve us
as slaves, etc." To Ponce he wrote on October 10th: "I give you credit
for your labors in the 'pacification' and for having marked with an F
on their foreheads all the Indians taken in war, making slaves of them
and selling them to the highest bidders, separating the fifth part of
the product for Us."
This time not only the 120 companions of Ponce came in for their share
of the living spoils of war, but the followers of Ceron claimed and
obtained theirs also.
The following is the list of Indians distributed after the battle of
Yacueeca (if battle it may be called) as given by Mr. Brau, who
obtained the details from the unpublished documents of Juan Bautista
Munoz:
Indians
To the estates (haciendas) of their royal Highnesses 500
Baltasar de Castro, the factor 200
Miguel Diaz, the chief constable 200
Juan Ceron, the mayor 150
Diego Morales, bachelor-at-law 150
Amador de Lares 150
Louis Soto Mayor 100
Miguel Diaz, Daux-factor 100
the (municipal) council 100
the hospitals 100
Bishop Manso 100
Sebastian de la Gama 90
Gil de Malpartida 70
Juan Bono (a merchant) 70
Juan Velasquez 70
Antonio Rivadeneyra 60
Gracian Cansino 60
Louis Aqueyo 60
the apothecary 60
Francisco Cereceda 50
40 other individuals 40 each 1,600
_____
4,040
Distributed in 1509 1,060
_____
Total 5,100
These numbers included women and children old enough to perform some
kind of labor. They were employed in the mines, or in the rivers
rather (for it was alluvium gold only that the island offered to the
greed of the so-called conquerors); they were employed on the
plantations as beasts of burden, and in every conceivable capacity
under taskmasters who, in spite of Ferdinand's revocation of the order
to reduce them to slavery (September, 1514), had acted on his first
dispositions and believed themselves to have the royal warrant to work
them to death.
The king's more lenient dispositions came too late. They were
powerless to check the abuses that were being committed under his own
previous ordinances. The Indians disappeared with fearful rapidity.
Licentiate Sancho Velasquez, who had made the second distribution,
wrote to the king April 27, 1515: " ... Excepting your Highnesses'
Indians and those of the crown officers, there are not 4,000 left." On
August 8th of the same year the officers themselves wrote: " ... The
last smeltings have produced little gold. Many Indians have died from
disease caused by the hurricane as well as from want of food...."
To readjust the proportion of Indians according to the position or
other claims of each individual, new distributions were resorted to.
In these, some favored individuals obtained all they wanted at the
expense of others, and as the number of distributable Indians grew
less and less, reclamations, discontent, strife and rebellion broke
out among the oppressors, who thus wreaked upon each other's heads the
criminal treatment of the natives of which they were all alike guilty.
Such had been the course of events in la Espanola. The same causes had
the same effects here. Herrera relates that when Miguel de Pasamente,
the royal treasurer, arrived in the former island, in 1508, it
contained 60,000 aboriginal inhabitants. Six years later, when a new
distribution had become necessary, there were but 14,000 left--the
others had been freed by the hand of death or were leading a
wandering life in the mountains and forests of their island. In this
island the process was not so rapid, but none the less effective.
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