Knights of Malta, 1523 1798 by R. Cohen
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R. Cohen >> Knights of Malta, 1523 1798
At this point--June 2--Dragut arrived with his galleys and expressed
nothing but disapproval for the Turkish operations. He pointed out
that the besiegers should have isolated the fortifications from the
rest of the island before proceeding to attack St. Elmo; but, as
the siege had started, he insisted on continuing it as vigorously
as possible. He erected a powerful battery on the summit of Mount
Sceberras, which swept both Fort St. Angelo and Fort St. Elmo, and
erected another on the headland opposite St. Elmo on the other side of
the Marsa Muscetto, which was henceforth known as Point Dragut.
As soon as this was done the bombardment restarted with relentless
fury. The Knights made a sortie to destroy some of the Turkish guns,
but were driven back, and the Turks then captured and held a covered
way leading up to a ravelin; a few days later, taking advantage of the
negligence of the garrison, they surprised the ravelin itself, and,
but for the efforts of a Spanish officer, would have captured the
fort. After desperate fighting the Knights were still holding the
fort, but had been unable to recapture the ravelin. The next day
another attack was made by Mustapha, but without avail; the ravelin
remained in Turkish hands, but it had cost them 2,000 men.
It was a great gain, however; two guns were mounted on it, and all the
Turkish artillery, including that of the galleys, began to play on the
hapless fort. It was no question of a breach; the walls were gradually
destroyed till there was nothing left of the enceinte but a mass of
ruins. Every part of the fort was directly exposed to the fire of
the two guns on the ravelin, and this exposure made the strain on the
Knights intolerable.
The garrison sent a Knight, renowned for his bravery, to report these
conditions to the Grand Master and to ask for permission to withdraw.
La Valette, feeling it imperative that the fort should hold out to the
last minute, sent him back with orders that it was to be defended to
the end. The garrison, amazed by his reply, sent a prayer for relief,
failing which they would sally forth, sword in hand, to meet their
death in open fight rather than be buried like dogs beneath the ruins.
The Grand Master received the request with the stern comment that, not
only were their lives at the disposal of the Order, but the time and
manner of their death; but to make sure that their complaints were
justified he would send three Knights to investigate the condition
of the fort. One of the three (probably in collusion with La Valette)
maintained the fort could be held, and offered himself to hold it with
volunteers, who were immediately forthcoming in large numbers; but
when the message arrived at St. Elmo announcing that the garrison was
to be relieved, there was consternation among the defenders, who, now
realising the ignominy of their prayer, sent out yet another request
to St. Angelo, this time to be allowed to hold St. Elmo to the death.
After some delay the Grand Master granted the permission.
This was June 14; on the 16th the Ottomans delivered a grand assault.
The fort was attacked on three sides, from Mount Sceberras and on each
flank. The guns of St. Angelo rendered great service all day by raking
the attacking forces in enfilade, and especially by breaking up the
flank attack from the side of the Grand Harbour. All day long the
battle went on with unabating fury; time after time the Janissaries
burst over the ruined walls, and each time they were repulsed.
Attacked on all sides, the few defenders fought with dauntless
heroism, and when the night fell the Maltese Cross still waved over
the fort.
Reinforcements were dispatched as soon as night set in, and the
volunteers far exceeded all requirements.
Now at last the Turkish commanders perceived that, to capture St.
Elmo, it must be isolated from St. Angelo. In the course of the next
few days a battery was constructed on the promontory at the entrance
of the Grand Harbour where Fort Ricasoli stood in later times, and
another was mounted on the side of Mount Sceberras to sweep the
landing place beneath the fort. Both batteries cost many Turkish
lives, but their construction and the extension of the investing
trenches to the Grand Harbour meant the complete isolation of St.
Elmo. The Turks sustained their greatest loss when Dragut, while
superintending the works, received a wound from which a week later he
died.
For three days twenty-six guns kept up the bombardment, and on the
early morning of June 22 another grand assault was made. Three times
repulsed and three times renewed, the attack failed in the end, and
the handful of surviving Knights was left at nightfall in possession
of their ruins. All attempts during the night to send reinforcements
failed under the fire of Dragut's new batteries, and La Valette saw
that his men were beyond all hope of rescue.
The sixty shattered survivors prepared for death; worn out, they
betook themselves at midnight to their little chapel, where they
confessed and received the Eucharist for the last time. Dawn found
them waiting, even to the wounded, who had been placed in chairs sword
in hand to receive the last onslaught. Incredible as it may appear,
the first assault was driven back, but the attack finally broke up
the defence, and, with the exception of a few Maltese who escaped by
swimming, the garrison perished to a man.
June 24, St. John the Baptist's Day, was one of sorrow inside the
beleaguered fortress. The Turks had soiled their victory by mutilating
their dead foes and throwing them into the Grand Harbour; La Valette
took reprisals, and from that time neither side thought of quarter.
Nor were the besiegers greatly elated; the tiny Fort of St. Elmo had
delayed them for five weeks and had cost them 8,000 men and their best
general. The Order had lost 1,300 men, of whom 130 were Knights, and
the disparity of the losses shows the impatience and recklessness of
the Turkish attacks.
Mustapha now transferred the main part of his army to the other side
of the Grand Harbour, and, drawing a line of entrenchments along the
heights on its eastern side, succeeded in investing completely the two
peninsulas of Senglea and Il Borgo. Batteries were established and a
constant bombardment commenced, the main target being Fort St. Michael
at the end of Senglea, on which a converging fire was brought to bear.
Unable to bring his fleet into the Grand Harbour under the guns of St.
Angelo, Mustapha had eighty galleys dragged across the neck of Mount
Sceberras and launched on the upper waters of the Grand Harbour. This
was a blow to the besieged, as it meant an attack by sea as well as
by land, and La Valette made all the preparations possible to meet the
danger. Along the south-west side of Senglea, where the beach is low,
he constructed, with the aid of his Maltese divers, a very firm and
powerful stockade to prevent the enemy galleys from running ashore,
and he also linked up Il Borgo and Senglea with a floating bridge.
On July 15 the Turks delivered a grand assault by sea and by land. The
attack by sea, under the command of the renegade Candellissa, proved
the more formidable. At the critical moment the defenders were thrown
into confusion by an explosion on the ramparts, during which the
Turks were able to make their way through the stockade and into the
fortress, being checked with difficulty by the desperate resistance of
the garrison and finally driven out by a timely reinforcement sent
by La Valette. Ten boatloads of troops sent by Mustapha incautiously
exposed themselves to the guns of St. Angelo and were almost all sunk,
while the attack on the land side, led by Hassan, Viceroy of Algiers
and son of Khaired-Din Barbarossa, proved an utter failure.
As at the siege of Rhodes, so at Malta, a distinct part of the
fortifications had been allotted to each langue to defend. The langue
of Castile held the north-east section of Il Borgo, which was destined
to be the scene of most desperate fighting.
On August 7 a joint attack was made on the land side of Senglea and on
the bastion of Castile. On that day the Turks came nearer success than
ever before or after. Mustapha's desperate attacks on Senglea were
at last successful: masters of the breach made by their guns, the
assailants' weight of numbers began to tell, and slowly the defenders
were being pushed back inside the fortress. At this moment, to
everyone's amazement, Mustapha sounded the retreat. The little
garrison of the Citta Notabile, which had been left alone by the
Turks, had been raiding the enemy's lines as usual, and, hearing the
grand assault was in progress, had made a determined attack on the
Turkish entrenchments from behind, burning and slaying all they could
find. The confusion arising from this started the rumour that Sicilian
reinforcements had landed and were attacking the Turkish army.
Mustapha, in fear of being surrounded, drew off his troops in the
moment of victory.
Meanwhile,[3] farther north, the Bastion of Castile had been almost
captured by Piali. The rock at that part of the fortification was
extremely hard, and the possibility of mines had occurred to none of
the garrison. Piali, however, with great labour, had dug a mine which
had been sprung that morning and had blown a huge gap in the ramparts.
This unexpected attack threw the whole of Il Borgo into confusion,
and, but for the Grand Master's promptitude and coolness of mind, the
enemy had been masters of the fortress. Seizing a pike, La Valette
rushed into the fight, and, inspired by his example, the Knights
succeeded in driving the enemy out of the breach. He ordered the
garrison to remain there all night, as he expected an attack under
the cover of darkness, and insisted on taking the command himself. His
subordinates protested against this reckless exposure of a valuable
life, but his precautions were justified when a Turkish attack made in
the darkness was defeated by his prompt resistance.
The bombardment continued unceasingly, and on August 18 another
desperate assault was made, which, like the other, failed. Yet the
position of the besieged was becoming desperate: dwindling daily
in numbers, they were becoming too feeble to hold the long line of
fortifications; but, when his council suggested the abandonment of Il
Borgo and Senglea and withdrawal to St. Angelo, La Valette remained
obdurate.
Why the Viceroy of Sicily had not brought help will always remain a
mystery. Possibly the orders of his master, Philip II. of Spain, were
so obscurely worded as to put on his own shoulders the burden of a
decision; a responsibility which he was unwilling to discharge because
the slightest defeat would mean exposing Sicily to the Turk. He had
left his own son with La Valette, so he could hardly be indifferent to
the fate of the fortress, and Malta in Turkish hands would soon have
proved a curse to Sicily and Naples. Whatever may have been the cause
of his delay, the Viceroy hesitated till the indignation of his own
officers forced him to move, and then the battle had almost been won
by the unaided efforts of the Knights. On August 23 came yet
another grand assault, the last serious effort, as it proved, of the
besiegers; it was thrown back with the greatest difficulty, even the
wounded taking part in the defence. The plight of the Turkish forces,
however, was now desperate. With the exception of St. Elmo, the
fortifications were still intact. By working night and day the
garrison had repaired the breaches, and the capture of Malta seemed
more and more impossible. Those terrible summer months with the
burning sirocco had laid many of the troops low with sickness in their
crowded quarters; ammunition and food were beginning to run short, and
the troops were becoming more and more dispirited at the failure of
their numerous attacks and the unending toll of lives. The death of
Dragut, on June 23, had proved an incalculable loss, and the jealousy
between Mustapha and Piali prevented their co-operation. The whole
course of the siege had been marked by a feverish haste and a fear of
interruption, which showed itself in ill-drawn plans. Dragut himself,
early in the siege, had pointed out the necessity of more foresight,
but his warnings went unheeded. The Turkish commanders took few
precautions, and, though they had a huge fleet, they never used it
with any effect except on one solitary occasion. They neglected their
communications with the African coast and made no attempt to watch and
intercept Sicilian reinforcements.
On September 1 Mustapha made his last effort, but all his threats and
cajoleries had but little effect on his dispirited troops, who refused
any longer to believe in the possibility of capturing those terrible
fortresses. The feebleness of the attack was a great encouragement to
the besieged, who now began to see hopes of deliverance. Mustapha's
perplexity and indecision were cut short by the news of the arrival
of Sicilian reinforcements in Melleha Bay. Hastily evacuating his
trenches, he embarked his army; but, on learning that the new troops
numbered but some 8,000, was overcome by shame and put ashore to fight
the reinforcements. It was all in vain, however, for his troops would
not stand the fierce charge of the new-comers, and, helped by the
determination of his rearguard, safely re-embarked and sailed away on
September 3.
At the moment of departure the Order had left 600 men capable of
bearing arms, but the losses of the Ottomans had been yet more
fearful. The most reliable estimate puts the number of the Turkish
army at its height at some 40,000 men, of which but 15,000 returned
to Constantinople. It was a most inglorious ending to the reign of
Solyman the Magnificent.
[Footnote 1: A reminiscence of the Syrian days of the Order.]
[Footnote 2: The name given to the different estates of the
Hospitallers scattered throughout Europe: they were so called because
they were each in charge of a "commander," sometimes also named a
"preceptor," from his duty of receiving and training novices.]
[Footnote 3: Most historians make this event part of the attack of
August 18. But Prescott (_Philip II_., vol. ii., p. 428) points out
that Balbi, who is undoubtedly the best authority for the siege as he
was one of the garrison, places it on August 7.]
CHAPTER III
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORDER OF ST. JOHN
Before proceeding to trace the history of the last two centuries
of the Knights at Malta it will perhaps be advisable to examine the
organisation of an Order which was the greatest and most long-lived
of all the medieval Orders of Chivalry. The siege of 1565 was its last
great struggle with its mortal foe; after that there is but little
left for the historian but to trace its gradual decadence and fall.
And, as might be expected in a decadent society, though outwardly
the constitution changed but little in the last two centuries, yet
gradually the Statutes of the Order and the actual facts became more
and more divergent.
There were three classes of members in the Hospitallers, who were
primarily distinguished from each other by their birth, and who were
allotted different functions in the Order. The Knights of Justice[1]
were the highest class of the three and were the only Knights
qualified for the Order's highest distinctions. Each langue had its
own regulations for admitting members, and all alike exercised severe
discrimination. Various kinds of evidence were necessary to prove the
pure and noble descent of the candidate. The German was the strictest
and most exacting of the langues, demanding proof of sixteen quarters
of nobility and refusing to accept the natural sons of Kings into the
ranks of its Knights. Italy was the most lenient, since banking and
trade were admitted as no stain on nobility, while most of the other
langues insisted on military nobility only.
The chaplains, who formed the second class of the Order, were required
to be of honest birth and born in wedlock of families that were
neither slaves nor engaged in base or mechanical trades. The
same regulations were in force for the third class--that of
servants-at-arms, who served under the Knights both on land and sea.
As the military character of the Order became less and less marked
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these servants-at-arms
became fewer and fewer, but in earlier days they were of considerable
importance. The chaplains performed their duties at the Convent or on
the galleys; the priests at the various commanderies throughout Europe
were a class apart, known as Priests of Obedience, and never came to
Malta, but resided permanently in their respective countries. A number
of commanderies was allotted to the two inferior classes.
The Order, as we know, was an international one, and for purposes of
administration was divided into sections or langues. In the sixteenth
century there were eight of these divisions, which, in order of
seniority, were Provence, Auvergne, France, Italy, Aragon, England,
Germany, and Castile. When Henry VIII. suppressed the English langue
in 1540, the Knights, with a reluctance to face the facts which was
characteristic of a proud Order of Chivalry, kept up the fiction
of its existence. In 1782, when the Elector of Bavaria secured the
establishment of a Bavarian langue, it was united to the dormant
langue of England and named the Anglo-Bavarian.
Each langue had its own quarters at the Convent known as the
"Auberge," presided over by a "conventual bailiff," who in all matters
was the head of the langue. Each conventual bailiff had an important
office in the hierarchy of the Order which was permanently appurtenant
to the headship of that langue. Thus the conventual bailiff of the
langue of France was always the Grand Hospitaller in charge of the
Hospital of the Order, while that of England was Turcopolier, or
commander of the light cavalry--a survival from the Syrian days. The
possessions of each langue in its native land were divided into grand
priories and bailiwicks. Thus England, which meant the possessions
throughout the British Isles, was divided into the Grand Priory of
England at Clerkenwell, the Grand Priory of Ireland at Kilmainham, and
the Bailiwick of the Eagle, which was situated near Lincoln and had
originally belonged to the Templars. These Grand Priors and Bailiffs
of each langue, as well as its conventual bailiff, were all Knights
Grand Cross, and, as such, entitled to seats in the Chapter-General of
the Order.
The supreme control of the Order was vested in the Chapter-General,
consisting of all the Knights Grand Cross. Though these
Chapters-General were often convened in the early history of the
Order, their difficulty of assembly and their clumsy method of
procedure made them less and less frequently summoned, as the Grand
Master had it in his power to convoke it when he pleased, though an
interval of five years--later extended to ten--had been sanctioned
by custom. In the seventeenth century the institution fell into utter
disuse, and there was no meeting of the Chapter-General from 1631 to
1776, when its uselessness was finally demonstrated.
When the Chapter-General was not sitting the government of the Order
was carried on by the Grand Master and the Councils, known as the
Ordinary, Complete, Secret, and Criminal. The Ordinary Council
consisted of the Grand Master, the conventual bailiffs, together with
any Grand Cross residing at the Convent. This Council, as its name
indicates, transacted the ordinary business of government, which
mainly consisted of appointing to these offices and making those
arrangements which were not definitely assigned to the Grand Master
himself. The Secret and Criminal Councils, respectively, dealt with
foreign affairs and offences against the Statutes, while the Complete,
consisting of the Ordinary Council with the addition of two Knights
from each langue of more than five years' residence at the Convent,
dealt with appeals from the other Councils. In the later days of the
Order the pernicious practice of appealing to the Pope destroyed all
semblance of authority in this Council.
The election of the Grand Master was an exceedingly complicated
affair, the intention being to prevent intrigue. Each langue solemnly
elected three Knights to represent it, and this body of twenty-four
chose a triumvirate, which consisted of a Knight, a chaplain, and a
servant-at-arms. These three co-opted a fourth, and the four a fifth,
and so on, till the number of sixteen was reached, and this body of
sixteen elected the Grand Master. Every stage of the proceedings
was hedged about with meticulous precautions to prevent intrigue and
corruption, and it was a thoroughly typical medieval attempt to secure
an honest election.
The framers of the Order's Statutes had taken the precaution of
limiting the authority of the Grand Master by a minute enumeration
of all his rights. But, as the Order developed into a purely military
body, even officially his powers became greater. No subject for
discussion could be introduced at the Councils except by himself; he
had a double vote, and, in case of an equal division, a casting vote
also; he had the right of nomination to many administrative posts
besides all those of his own household, and in each priory there was
a commandery in his own gift whose revenues went to himself. But even
such wide powers were less than the reality. While the Order was at
Rhodes, and during the first half-century at Malta, it was obviously
necessary that the Grand Master should possess the powers of a
commander-in-chief. As a purely military body, surrounded by powerful
foes, the Order was in the position of an army encamped in enemy
territory. Further, the absolute possession of Rhodes, and later
of Malta, tended to give the Grand Masters the rank of independent
Sovereigns, and the outside world regarded them as territorial
potentates rather than as heads of an Order of aristocratic Knights.
But when the Order's existence was no longer threatened the Grand
Master's position was assailed from many sides. No one, while reading
the history of the Knights, can fail to be impressed by the numerous
disturbances among them during the last 200 years of the Order. Drawn
from the highest ranks of the nobility, young, rich, and with very
little to occupy their time (except when on their "caravans"), the
Knights were perpetually quarrelling among themselves or defying the
constituted authorities of the Order.
Charles V. had insisted on keeping in his own hands the nomination
of the bishopric of Malta, and the custom grew up that the Bishop of
Malta and the Prior of St. John--the two most important ecclesiastics
in the Order--should be chosen from the chaplains who were natives of
the island. This was intended as a compensation for an injury which
had been inflicted on the Maltese. To prevent the Grand Mastership
falling into the hands of a native, the Maltese members of the Order
were unable to vote at the election. The Bishop was often engaged
in quarrels with the Grand Master, and the disputes were generally
carried to the Pope, who, as the Head of Christendom, was regarded as
having supremacy over all Religious Orders. But the Pope himself often
encroached upon the rights of the Order, not only by sending nuncios
to Malta with large and undefined powers, but by arrogating to himself
the patronage of the langue of Italy when he wished to bestow gifts
upon his relatives and friends. This led to bitter resentment among
the Italian Knights, who saw all the lucrative posts of their langue
given away to strangers. The introduction of the Inquisition in 1574
and the Jesuits in 1592, brought additional disputes about the chief
authority in the island, and these different ecclesiastical personages
had no hesitation in interfering in matters which should have been
entirely beyond their province. Many a Grand Master of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries had his time occupied in efforts to assert
his authority.
The Grand Mastership was also weakened by the practice of electing
very old men to the post, as the short tenure of the office and
the feebleness of its holder meant a lax control over the turbulent
Knights. This practice became very common in the last two centuries
of the Order's existence. But many of the Grand Masters, though over
seventy at the time of election, disappointed expectation by living
till eighty or even ninety.
We possess detailed accounts of the financial system of the Order in
the work of two Knights, Boisgelin and Boisredon de Ransijat, accounts
which agree almost entirely.
The average revenue of the Order before the French Revolution was
L136,000 per annum--i.e., the revenue which definitely reached Malta.
It is to be remembered that this sum only represented the residue
which was sent to the _chef-lieu_. The Knights possessed over
600 estates throughout Europe, each of which, besides sending
contributions to Malta, maintained several members of the Order,
gave a liberal income to its commander, and contributed towards the
revenues of the Grand Priory in which it was situated. The chief items
of the above sum were: