Knights of Malta, 1523 1798 by R. Cohen
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R. Cohen >> Knights of Malta, 1523 1798
One gleam of light came to cheer the gloom at Malta. The third
dismemberment of Poland had brought the Polish Priory into the hands
of the Tsar Paul I. Among other eccentricities of that monarch was a
passionate admiration for chivalry, which he displayed by changing
the Polish into a Russian Priory, increasing its revenues to 300,000
florins, and incorporating it in the Anglo-Bavarian langue; he also
assumed the title of "Protector of the Order of Malta."
In 1797, at Ancona, Napoleon had intercepted a message from the Tsar
to the Grand Master containing this news. Plans for the capture of
Malta took shape in Bonaparte's mind, and he sent a cousin of the
French consul at Malta, Poussielgue by name, to spy out the condition
of the island, at the same time ordering Admiral Brueys, on his
journey from Corfu to Toulon, to examine the situation of Malta. When
the expedition to Egypt was decided upon, the capture of Malta formed
part of the instructions to Napoleon.
Bonaparte, relying on the demoralisation of the island, intended the
capture to be a swift piece of work, and Poussielgue had helped him
by winning over some natives and French Knights to his side. The
Grand Master, Von Hompesch, seems to have been utterly unnerved by the
bewildering problems before him, and the cowardice and irresolution
he displayed were a disgrace to the traditions of the Order. Speed was
essential to the French army, as discovery by Nelson would be fatal
to Bonaparte's plans, but had Von Hompesch been an utter traitor
the capitulation could not have been more sudden and disgraceful and
beneficial to the enemy.
On June 6 the vanguard of the French appeared off the island, and on
the 9th it was joined by the main fleet, the whole now numbering about
450 sail, of which 14 were ships of the line and 30 were frigates;
the Grand Master had about 300 Knights and 6,000 men, chiefly
Maltese, under arms. Had this garrison been resolute and united,
the fortifications of Valetta could have held the French for a
considerable time. But the natives were divided, many regarding
the French, despite their doubtful career of the last few years, as
liberators from a detestable tyranny. Two-thirds of the Knights
were French, and many of them had become infected with republican
principles, though the French langues also contained the fiercest
opponents to the invaders.
Bonaparte sent for permission for his fleet to enter the harbour for
water and for his soldiers to land--a request which was tantamount to
a demand for surrender. Von Hompesch sent back a conciliatory letter,
saying that treaty obligations forbade the entrance of more than four
vessels at a time. Napoleon thereupon threw off the mask, and during
the night landed troops at seven different parts of the island. A
slight resistance was encountered from a few detached forts, but by
the evening of the 10th Valetta was closely invested. The mob was
encouraged by hired emissaries to attack as traitors the Knights, who
were really the most bitter enemies of the invaders. While Napoleon's
agents were busy throughout the town, Von Hompesch sat motionless in
his palace, and no subordinate commander would take the responsibility
of firing on the besiegers. Finally, a party of citizens interviewed
Von Hompesch and threatened to surrender the town if he refused to
capitulate.
At this point a mutiny broke out in the garrison, and the Grand Master
and his Council, seeing the hopelessness of the situation, sent for an
armistice preliminary to surrender. The armistice was concluded on the
11th, and on the 12th Napoleon entered Valetta, full of amazement at
the might of the fortress he had so easily captured. On the 12th the
capitulation was drawn up, of which the main clauses were:
1. The Knights surrendered Malta and its
sovereignty to the French army.
2. The French Republic would try to secure
to the Grand Master an equivalent principality
and would meanwhile pay him an annual pension
of 300,000 livres.
3. The French would use their influence with
the different Powers assembled at Rastadt to
allow the Knights who were their subjects to
control the property of their respective langues.
4. French Knights were allowed to return to
France.
5. French Knights in Malta were to receive a
pension from the French Government of 700
livres per annum; if over sixty years old, 1,000
livres.
Such was the end of the Order at Malta. Napoleon treated the Knights
and the Grand Master with extreme harshness. Most of them were
required to leave within three days, and some even within twenty-four
hours.
On June 18, Von Hompesch, taking with him the three most venerable
relics of the Order--all that the conqueror allowed him from the
treasures at Valetta--left for Trieste, whence he withdrew to
Montpellier, dying there in obscurity in 1805. Most of the homeless
Knights proceeded to Russia, where, on October 27, 1798, Paul I. was
elected Grand Master, though Von Hompesch still held the post.
But on the Tsar's death in 1801 the Order lost the one man who might
have been powerful enough to bring about a restoration, and the
survival of some scattered relics could not conceal the fact that
vanished for ever was the Order of the Hospital of St. John of
Jerusalem.
APPENDIX I
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ORDER
There can be no doubt whatever that, after 1530, the Order was no
longer independent and sovereign, and that L'Isle Adam, despite all
his efforts, had become a feudatory, though the service demanded was
very slight. The Act of Donation of Malta put them definitely into the
position of feudal vassals of Charles V. as King of the two Sicilies.
This is plain to everyone who examines the Charter itself (Vertot,
III., p. 494, or Codice Diplomatico, II., p. 194). The tenure on
which the Knights held the island from the King of the Sicilies may be
classed as a form of serjeanty--the annual payment of a falcon being
the only feudal service demanded. There were other conditions in the
Charter concerning the Bishop of Malta and the Grand Admiral of the
Order, but they were not strictly feudal. The chroniclers of the Order
were naturally reluctant to admit this, and as the feudal tie was very
weak, they glossed it over. But the Sovereign of the island, strictly
speaking, was the King of the two Sicilies, and the Knights were never
more than tenants. When the Order had been expelled by Napoleon we
can see this universally admitted. While the fate of the island was
in doubt--that is, before the preliminary peace between England and
France in 1801--both natives and English regarded the King of Naples
as lord of the island (Hardman, 111, 142. Foreign Office Records,
Sicily, 11). When the Maltese wanted to be put under the protection of
England, either temporarily or, later, permanently (Hardman, 185,
193, 204), they applied to the King of the Sicilies, as their lawful
Sovereign, to grant their request. Events soon made Malta a question
of great importance in the relations between France and England,
and the renewal of war, in 1803, left Great Britain in _de facto_
possession of the island, until the treaty of May 30, 1814, gave
England full right and sovereignty over Malta.
APPENDIX II
CONNECTION BETWEEN KNIGHTS OF MALTA AND THE MODERN ORDER OF ST. JOHN
During the Napoleonic wars the surviving Knights were too scattered
and too helpless to be able to improve their condition. But from 1815
onwards we find various attempts of the Order to obtain from Europe
another _chef-lieu_, and representatives of the Knights at the
Congress of Vienna (1815) and at the Congress of Verona (1822) tried
in vain to persuade the Allies to grant them an island. The French
Knights were by far the largest and most powerful section of the
Order, and in 1814 they had established a capitular commission in
which they vested plenary powers to treat on their behalf. During the
various negotiations for a _chef-lieu_ the question of reviving the
English langue was started, and the French Commission entered into
communication with the Rev. Sir Robert Peat, Chaplain to King
George IV., and other distinguished Englishmen. The outcome was the
reconstitution of the English langue on January 24, 1831, with Sir
Robert Peat as Grand Prior.
The English branch of the Order of St. John has devoted itself for the
last ninety years to the succour of the sick and wounded, setting
up cottage and convalescent hospitals, aiding the sick in other
hospitals, and establishing ambulance litters in dangerous industrial
centres, such as coal-mines and railway-stations, which at last
developed into the St. John Ambulance Association, which rendered such
magnificent service during the Great War. The German branch of the
Order was the first to start ambulance work in the field in the Seven
Weeks' War of 1866, work which was continued in the Franco-Prussian
War of 1870. Since that date the mitigation of the sufferings of war
has been a conspicuous part of the work of the Order of St. John,
and nowhere has the Order's magnificent spirit of international
comradeship been more fully displayed.
BOOKS CONSULTED
PRIMARY AUTHORITIES
Statuta Ordinis Domus Hospitalis Hierusalem. Edited by Fr. Didacus
Rodriguez. Rome. 1556.
Statuti della religione de Cavalieri Gierosolimitani. Florence. 1567.
Statuta Hospitalis Hierusalem. Rome. 1588.
Collection of Statutes in Volume IV. of Vertot's Histoire de
Chevaliers de Malte. Paris. 1726.
[As there was no Chapter-General between 1631 and 1776, all the above
collections are practically complete, Vertot's containing little more
than the others.]
Codice Diplomatico del sacro militare ordine Gierosolimitano oggi di
Malta. Fr. Sebastiano Pauli. Lucca. 1737.
Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic. 1523-1547.
Calendar of State Papers. (Foreign.) 1547-1585.
Calendar of State Papers. (Venetian.)
Calendar of State Papers. (Spanish.)
Les Archives de S. Jean de Jerusalem a Malte. Delaville Le Roulx.
Paris. 1883.
Report of Philip de Thame. Grand Prior of England. 1338. Camden
Society. Volume LXV. 1857.
Armoury of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem at Malta. Edited by
G.F. Laking. London. 1903.
Carta y verdadera relacion escrita por il eminentissimo Senor Gran
Maestre al Commendador Fr. Don Joseph Vidal. 1669.
E Tanner. Notitia Monastica. Ed. James Nasmith. Cambridge. 1787.
Malte. Par un Voyageur francais. Anonymous. 1791.
Le Monete e Medaglie del S. Ordine Gierosolimitano. C. Taggiasco.
Camerino. 1883.
Relation du Voyage et Description exacte de Malte. Paris. 1779.
Malta illustrata. Giovanni Abela. Malta. 1772-1780. 2 Volumes.
Liste de Chevaliers des Langues de Provence, Auvergne et France.
Malta. 1772.
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES
GIACOMO BOSIO: Dell' Istoria della sacra religione et ill'ma Militia
di San Giovanni Gierosolimitano. Rome. 1594. 2 volumes.
ABBE DE VERTOT: Histoire des Chevaliers de Malte. Paris. 1726. 4
volumes.
CHEVALIER DE BOISGELIN: Malta Ancient and Modern. English edition. 2
volumes. 1804.
PRESCOTT: Life of Philip II. Volume II.
MAJOR-GENERAL PORTER: History of the Knights of Malta. Revised
edition. 1 volume. London. 1883.
DE GOUSSANCOURT: Le Martyrologe des Chevaliers de S. Jean de
Hierusalem. Paris. 1643.
ANONYMOUS: Memoire de' Gran Maestri del sacro militare ordine
Gierosolimitano. Parma. 1780.
L. HERITTE: Essai sur l'Ordre des Hospitaliers de S. Jean de
Jerusalem. Paris. 1912.
HARDMAN: History of Malta, 1798-1815. Edited by J. Holland Rose.
London. 1909.
REV. W.K.R. BEDFORD: Malta and the Knights Hospitallers. London. 1894.
REV. W.K.R. BEDFORD: The Hospital at Malta. Edinburgh. 1882.
J. TAAFE: History of the Order of S. John. 4 volumes. London. 1852.
A.T. DRANE: History of the Order of St. John. London. 1881.
MIEGE: Histoire de Malte. 3 volumes. Paris. 1846.
M.M. BALLOU: Story of Malta. Boston and New York. 1893.
REV. W.K.R. BEDFORD AND R. HOLBECHE: Order of the Hospital of St. John
of Jerusalem. London. 1902.
ADMIRAL JURIEN DE LA GRAVIERE: (1) Les Chevaliers de Malte et la
Marine de Philippe II. Paris. 1887. (2) Les Corsaires barbaresques et
la Marine de Solyman le Grand. Paris. 1884. (3) Les Marins du XV'e
et XVI'e siecles. Paris. 1879. (4) Les derniers Jours de la Marine a
Rames. Paris. 1885.
COMMANDER E.H. CURREY: Sea Wolves of the Mediterranean. London. 1913.
SIR JULIAN CORBETT: England in the Mediterranean, 1603-1713. 2
volumes. London. 1904.
S. LANE-POOLE: Barbary Corsairs. (Stories of the Nations.) 1886.
E. DRIAULT: La Question d'Orient. Paris. 1898.
J.A.R. MARRIOT: The Eastern Question. Oxford. 1917.
G. VIULLIER: Le Tour du Monde. Malte et les Maltais.
P.J.O. DOUBLET: L'lnvasion et I'Occupation de Malte. Paris. 1883.
C.T.E. DE TOULGOET: Les Responsabilites de la Capitulation de Malte en
1798. (Revue des Questions Historiques. 1900.)
DE LA JONQUIERE: L'Expedition d'Egypte. Paris. 1901.
NOTE ON THE AUTHORITIES
For the Statutes of the Order we possess the Italian edition of 1567,
two Latin editions of 1556 and 1588, and the collection at the end of
Vertot's fourth volume, which is later and more complete. The Codice
Diplomatico of Fr. Pauli is the only collection of Charters to my
knowledge which covers practically the whole history of the Order: the
magnificent Cartulaire of Delaville Le Roulx only covers the Syrian
period in the Knights' history. Many valuable hints can be found in
the Calendars of State Papers issued by the Record Office, but they
fail us at the beginning of the seventeenth century.
Of the various historians above mentioned, Bosio, for the period he
covers, is by far the best and completest. Vertot only goes down to
1565: after the siege he treats the subject in a bare annalistic form.
Boisgelin, who was a Knight himself and wrote his history after his
expulsion from Malta, is valuable for his elaborate excursus on the
financial system of the Order. All three--who are our completest
authorities--wrote from the point of view of the Order, and
consequently are very unreliable in some matters. The treatment that
the Maltese received from the Order is very inadequately dealt with,
and none of them can seriously estimate the Mediterranean background
to the history of the Knights, and especially their relations with the
Barbary pirates. General Porter, whose history is the only English
one at all worthy of mention, possesses the same faults. Though his
knowledge of the island is thorough, his ignorance of European history
makes him neglect the importance of the external activities of the
Knights, and he follows the Order's chroniclers too slavishly to claim
authority as an independent investigator. Miege, who was a French
Consul at Malta, is interesting as a bitter opponent of the Order and
all its work; and he practically confines himself to the treatment of
the Maltese at the hands of the Knights.
The best authority on sixteenth-century sea power in the Mediterranean
is Admiral Jurien de la Graviere, while Commander Currey's book is
very sound and interesting.