The Winning of the West, Volume Two by Theodore Roosevelt

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The tories were already on the alert. Some of them had been harassing
Cleavland, and they had ambushed his advance guard, and shot his
brother, crippling him for life. But they did not dare try to arrest the
progress of so formidable a body of men as had been gathered together at
Quaker Meadows; and contented themselves with sending repeated warnings
to Ferguson.

On October 1st the combined forces marched past Pilot Mountain, and
camped near the heads of Cane and Silver creeks. Hitherto each colonel
had commanded his own men, there being no general head, and every
morning and evening the colonels had met in concert to decide the day's
movements. The whole expedition was one of volunteers, the agreement
between the officers and the obedience rendered them by the soldiers
simply depending on their own free-will; there was no legal authority on
which to go, for the commanders had called out the militia without any
instructions from the executives of their several States. [Footnote:
Gates MSS. Letter of Campbell, Shelby, Cleavland, etc., Oct. 4, 1780.]
Disorders had naturally broken out. The men of the different companies
felt some rivalry towards one another; and those of bad character, sure
to be found in any such gathering, could not be properly controlled.
Some of Cleavland's and McDowell's people were very unruly; and a few of
the Watauga troops also behaved badly, plundering both whigs and tories,
and even starting to drive the stolen stock back across the mountains.
[Footnote: Deposition of Col. Matthew Willoughby (who was in the fight),
April 30, 1823, _Richmond Enquirer_, May 9, 1823.]

At so important a crisis the good-sense and sincere patriotism of the
men in command made them sink all personal and local rivalries. On the
2d of October they all gathered to see what could be done to stop the
disorders and give the army a single head; for it was thought that in a
day or two they would close in with Ferguson. They were in Col. Charles
McDowell's district, and he was the senior officer; but the others
distrusted his activity and judgment, and were not willing that he
should command. To solve the difficulty Shelby proposed that supreme
command should be given to Col. Campbell, who had brought the largest
body of men with him, and who was a Virginian, whereas the other four
colonels were North Carolinians. [Footnote: Though by birth three were
Virginians, and one, Shelby, a Marylander. All were Presbyterians.
McDowell, like Campbell, was of Irish descent; Cleavland of English,
Shelby of Welsh, and Sevier of French Huguenot. The families of the
first two had originally settled in Pennsylvania.] Meanwhile McDowell
should go to Gates' army to get a general to command them, leaving his
men under the charge of his brother Joseph, who was a major. This
proposition was at once agreed to; and its adoption did much to ensure
the subsequent success. Shelby not only acted wisely, but magnanimously;
for he was himself of superior rank to Campbell, and moreover was a
proud, ambitious man, desirous of military glory.

The army had been joined by two or three squads of partisans, including
some refugee Georgians. They were about to receive a larger
reinforcement; for at this time several small guerilla bands of North
and South Carolina whigs were encamped at Flint Hill, some distance west
of the encampment of the mountain men. These Flint Hill bands numbered
about four hundred men all told, under the leadership of various militia
colonels--Hill, Lacey, Williams, Graham, and Hambright. [Footnote:
Hambright was a Pennsylvania German, the father of eighteen children.
Hill, who was suffering from a severe wound, was unfit to take an active
part in the King's Mountain fight. His MS. narrative of the campaign is
largely quoted by Draper.] Hill and Lacey were two of Sumter's
lieutenants, and had under them some of his men; Williams, [Footnote:
Bancroft gives Williams an altogether undeserved prominence. As he had a
commission as brigadier-general, some of the British thought he was in
supreme command at King's Mountain; in a recent magazine article Gen. De
Peyster again sets forth his claims. In reality he only had a small
subordinate or independent command, and had no share whatever in
conducting the campaign, and very little in the actual battle, though he
behaved with much courage and was killed.] who was also a South
Carolinian, claimed command of them because he had just been
commissioned a brigadier-general of militia. His own force was very
small, and he did not wish to attack Ferguson, but to march southwards
to Ninety-Six. Sumter's men, who were more numerous, were eager to join
the mountaineers, and entirely refused to submit to Williams. A hot
quarrel, almost resulting in a fight, ensued; Hill and Lacey accusing
Williams of being bent merely on plundering the wealthy tories and of
desiring to avoid a battle with the British. Their imputation on his
courage was certainly unjust; but they were probably quite right when
they accused him of a desire to rob and plunder the tories. A succession
of such quarrels speedily turned this assemblage of militia into an
armed and warlike rabble. Fortunately Hill and Lacey prevailed, word was
sent to the mountaineers, and the Flint Hill bands marched in loose
order to join them at the Cowpens. [Footnote: Gates MSS. Letter of Gen.
Wm. Davidson, Oct. 3, 1780. Also Hill's Narrative.]

The mountain army had again begun its march on the afternoon of the
third day of the month. Before starting the colonels summoned their men,
told them the nature and danger of the service, and asked such as were
unwilling to go farther to step to the rear; but not a man did so. Then
Shelby made them a short speech, well adapted to such a levy. He told
them when they encountered the enemy not to wait for the word of
command, but each to "be his own officer," and do all he could,
sheltering himself as far as possible, and not to throw away a chance;
if they came on the British in the woods they were "to give them Indian
play," and advance from tree to tree, pressing the enemy unceasingly. He
ended by promising them that their officers would shrink from no danger,
but would lead them everywhere, and, in their turn, they must be on the
alert and obey orders.

When they set out their uncertainty as to Ferguson's movements caused
them to go slowly, their scouts sometimes skirmishing with lurking
tories. They reached the mouth of Cane Creek, near Gilbert Town, on
October 4th. With the partisans that had joined them they then numbered
fifteen hundred men. McDowell left them at this point to go to Gates
with the request for the appointment of a general to command them.
[Footnote: Gates MSS. (in New York Hist. Soc.). It is possible that
Campbell was not chosen chief commander until this time; Ensign Robert
Campbell's account (MSS. in Tenn. Hist. Soc.) explicitly states this to
be the case. The Shelby MS. and the official report make the date the
1st or 2d. One letter in the Gates MSS. has apparently escaped all
notice from historians and investigators; it is the document which
McDowell bore with him to Gates. It is dated "Oct. 4th, 1780, near
Gilbert town," and is signed by Cleavland, Shelby, Sevier, Campbell,
Andrew Hampton, and J. Winston. It begins: "We have collected at this
place 1500 good men drawn from the counties of Surrey, Wilkes, Burk,
Washington, and Sullivan counties (_sic_) in this State and Washington
County in Virginia." It says that they expect to be joined in a few days
by Clark of Ga. and Williams of S. C. with one thousand men (in reality
Clark, who had nearly six hundred troops, never met them); asks for a
general; says they have great need of ammunition, and remarks on the
fact of their "troops being all militia, and but little acquainted with
discipline." It was this document that gave the first impression to
contemporaries that the battle was fought by fifteen hundred Americans.
Thus General Davidson's letter of Oct. 10th to Gates, giving him the
news of the victory, has served as a basis for most subsequent writers
about the numbers. He got his particulars from one of Sumter's men, who
was in the fight; but he evidently mixed them up in his mind, for he
speaks of Williams, Lacey, and their companions as joining the others at
Gilbert Town, instead of the Cowpens; makes the total number three
thousand, whereas, by the official report of October 4th, Campbell's
party only numbered fifteen hundred, and Williams, Lacey, etc., had but
four hundred, or nineteen hundred in all; says that sixteen hundred good
horses were chosen out, evidently confusing this with the number at
Gilbert Town; credits Ferguson with fourteen hundred men, and puts the
American loss at only twenty killed.] For some days the men had been
living on the ears of green corn which they plucked from the fields, but
at this camping-place they slaughtered some beeves and made a feast.

The mountaineers had hoped to catch Ferguson at Gilbert Town, but they
found that he had fled towards the northeast, so they followed after
him. Many of their horses were crippled and exhausted, and many of the
footmen footsore and weary; and the next day they were able to go but a
dozen miles to the ford of Green River.

That evening Campbell and his fellow-officers held a council to decide
what course was best to follow. Lacey, riding over from the militia
companies who were marching from Flint Hill, had just reached their
camp; he told them the direction in which Ferguson had fled, and at the
same time appointed the Cowpens as the meeting-place for their
respective forces. Their whole army was so jaded that the leaders knew
they could not possibly urge it on fast enough to overtake Ferguson, and
the flight of the latter made them feel all the more confident that they
could beat him, and extremely reluctant that he should get away. In
consequence they determined to take seven or eight hundred of the least
tired, best armed, and best mounted men, and push rapidly after their
foe, picking up on the way any militia they met, and leaving the other
half of their army to follow as fast as it could.

At daybreak on the morning of the sixth the picked men set out, about
seven hundred and fifty in number. [Footnote: MS. narrative of Ensign
Robert Campbell (see also Draper, 221) says seven hundred; and about
fifty of the footmen who were in good training followed so quickly after
them that they were able to take part in the battle. Lenoir says the
number was only five or six hundred. The modern accounts generally fail
to notice this Green River weeding out of the weak men, or confuse it
with what took place at the Cowpens; hence many of them greatly
exaggerate the number of Americans who fought in the battle.] In the
afternoon they passed by several large bands of tories, who had
assembled to join Ferguson; but the Holston men were resolute in their
determination to strike at the latter, and would not be diverted from
it, nor waste time by following their lesser enemies.

Riding all day they reached the Cowpens when the sun had already set, a
few minutes after the arrival of the Flint Hill militia under Lacey,
Hill, and Williams. The tired troops were speedily engaged in skinning
beeves for their supper, roasting them by the blazing camp-fires; and
fifty acres of corn, belonging to the rich tory who owned the Cowpens,
materially helped the meal. Meanwhile a council was held, in which all
the leading officers, save Williams, took part. Campbell was confirmed
as commander-in-chief, and it was decided to once more choose the
freshest soldiers, and fall on Ferguson before he could either retreat
or be reinforced. The officers went round, picking out the best men, the
best rifles, and the best horses. Shortly after nine o'clock the choice
had been made, and nine hundred and ten [Footnote: The official report
says nine hundred; Shelby, in all his earlier narratives, nine hundred
and ten; Hill, nine hundred and thirty-three. The last authority is
important because he was one of the four hundred men who joined the
mountaineers at the Cowpens, and his testimony confirms the explicit
declaration of the official report that the nine hundred men who fought
in the battle were chosen after the junction with Williams, Lacey, and
Hill. A few late narratives, including that of Shelby in his old age,
make the choice take place before the junction, and the total number
then amount to thirteen hundred; evidently the choice at the Cowpens is
by these authors confused with the choice at Green River. Shelby's
memory when he was old was certainly very treacherous; in similar
fashion he, as has been seen, exaggerated greatly his numbers at the
Enoree. On the other hand, Robert Campbell puts the number at only seven
hundred, and Lenoir between six and seven hundred. Both of these thus
err in the opposite direction.] picked riflemen, well mounted, rode out
of the circle of flickering firelight, and began their night journey. A
few determined footmen followed, going almost as fast as the horse, and
actually reached the battle-field in season to do their share of the
fighting.

Ferguson Makes Ready.

All this time Ferguson had not been idle. He first heard of the advance
of the backwoodsmen on September 30th, from the two tories who deserted
Sevier on Yellow Mountain. He had furloughed many of his loyalists, as
all formidable resistance seemed at an end; and he now sent out
messengers in every direction to recall them to his standard. Meanwhile
he fell slowly back from the foot-hills, so that he might not have to
face the mountaineers until he had time to gather his own troops. He
instantly wrote for reinforcements to Cruger, at Ninety-Six. Cruger had
just returned from routing the Georgian Colonel Clark, who was besieging
Augusta. In the chase a number of Americans were captured, and thirteen
were hung. The British and tories interpreted the already sufficiently
severe instructions of their commander-in-chief with the utmost
liberality, even the officers chronicling the hanging with exultant
pleasure, as pointing out the true way by which to end the war.
[Footnote: Draper, p. 201, quotes a printed letter from a British
officer to this effect.]

Cruger, in his answer to Ferguson, explained that he did not have the
number of militia regiments with which he was credited; and he did not
seem to quite take in the gravity of the situation, [Footnote: Probably
Ferguson himself failed to do so at this time.] expressing his pleasure
at hearing how strongly the loyalists of North Carolina had rallied to
Ferguson's support, and speaking of the hope he had felt that the North
Carolina tories would by themselves have proved "equal to the mountain
lads." However, he promptly set about forwarding the reinforcements that
were demanded; but before they could reach the scene of action the fate
of the campaign had been decided.

Ferguson had not waited for outside help. He threw himself into the work
of rallying the people of the plains, who were largely loyalists,
[Footnote: Gates MSS. Letter of Davidson, September 14th, speaks of the
large number of tories in the counties where Ferguson was operating.]
against the over-mountain men, appealing not only to their royalist
sentiments, but to their strong local prejudices, and to the dread many
of them felt for the wild border fighters. On the 1st of October he sent
out a proclamation, of which copies were scattered broadcast among the
loyalists. It was instinct with the fiery energy of the writer, and well
suited to goad into action the rough tories, and the doubtful men, to
whom it was addressed. He told them that the Back Water men had crossed
the mountains, with chieftains at their head who would surely grant
mercy to none who had been loyal to the king. He called on them to grasp
their arms on the moment and run to his standard, if they desired to
live and bear the name of men; to rally without delay, unless they
wished to be eaten up by the incoming horde of cruel barbarians, to be
themselves robbed and murdered, and to see their daughters and wives
abused by the dregs of mankind. In ending, he told them scornfully that
if they chose to be spat [Footnote: The word actually used was still
stronger.] upon and degraded forever by a set of mongrels, to say so at
once, that their women might turn their backs on them and look out for
real men to protect them.

Hoping to be joined by Cruger's regiments, as well as by his own
furloughed men, and the neighboring tories, he gradually drew off from
the mountains, doubling and turning, so as to hide his route and puzzle
his pursuers. Exaggerated reports of the increase in the number of his
foes were brought to him, and, as he saw how slowly they marched, he
sent repeated messages to Cornwallis, asking for reinforcements;
promising speedily to "finish the business," if three or four hundred
soldiers, part dragoons, were given him, for the Americans were
certainly making their "last push in this quarter." [Footnote: See
letter quoted by Tarleton.] He was not willing to leave the many loyal
inhabitants of the district to the vengeance of the whigs [Footnote:
Ferguson's "Memoir," p. 32.]; and his hopes of reinforcements were well
founded. Every day furloughed men rejoined him, and bands of loyalists
came into camp; and he was in momentary expectation of help from
Cornwallis or Cruger. It will be remembered that the mountaineers on
their last march passed several tory bands. One of these alone, near the
Cowpens, was said to have contained six hundred men; and in a day or two
they would all have joined Ferguson. If the whigs had come on in a body,
as there was every reason to expect, Ferguson would have been given the
one thing he needed--time; and he would certainly have been too strong
for his opponents. His defeat was due to the sudden push of the mountain
chieftains; to their long, swift ride from the ford of Green River, at
the head of their picked horse-riflemen.

The British were still in the dark as to the exact neighborhood from
which their foes--the "swarm of backwoodsmen," as Tarleton called them
[Footnote: "Tarleton's Campaigns," p. 169.]--really came. It was
generally supposed that they were in part from Kentucky, and that Boon
himself was among the number. [Footnote: British historians to the
present day repeat this. Even Lecky, in his "History of England," speaks
of the backwoodsmen as in part from Kentucky. Having pointed out this
trivial fault in Lecky's work, it would be ungracious not to allude to
the general justice and impartiality of its accounts of these
revolutionary campaigns--they are very much more trustworthy than
Bancroft's, for instance. Lecky scarcely gives the right color to the
struggle in the south; but when Bancroft treats of it, it is not too
much to say that he puts the contest between the whigs and the British
and tories in a decidedly false light. Lecky fails to do justice to
Washington's military ability, however; and overrates the French
assistance.] However, Ferguson probably cared very little who they were;
and keeping, as he supposed, a safe distance away from them, he halted
at King's Mountain in South Carolina on the evening of October 6th,
pitching his camp on a steep, narrow hill just south of the North
Carolina boundary. The King's Mountain range itself is about sixteen
miles in length, extending in a southwesterly course from one State into
the other. The stony, half isolated ridge on which Ferguson camped was
some six or seven hundred yards long and half as broad from base to
base, or two thirds that distance on top. The steep sides were clad with
a growth of open woods, including both saplings and big timber. Ferguson
parked his baggage wagons along the northeastern part of the mountain.
The next day he did not move; he was as near to the army of Cornwallis
at Charlotte as to the mountaineers, and he thought it safe to remain
where he was. He deemed the position one of great strength, as indeed it
would have been, if assailed in the ordinary European fashion; and he
was confident that even if the rebels attacked him, he could readily
beat them back. But as General Lee, "Light-Horse Harry," afterwards
remarked, the hill was much easier assaulted with the rifle than
defended with the bayonet.

The backwoodsmen, on leaving the camp at the Cowpens, marched slowly
through the night, which was dark and drizzly; many of the men got
scattered in the woods, but joined their commands in the morning--the
morning of October 7th. The troops bore down to the southward, a little
out of the straight route, to avoid any patrol parties; and at sunrise
they splashed across the Cherokee Ford. [Footnote: "Am. Pioneer," II.,
67. An account of one of the soldiers, Benj. Sharp, written in his old
age; full of contradictions of every kind (he for instance forgets they
joined Williams at the Cowpens); it cannot be taken as an authority, but
supplies some interesting details.] Throughout the forenoon the rain
continued but the troops pushed steadily onwards without halting,
[Footnote: Late in life Shelby asserted that this steadiness in pushing
on was due to his own influence. The other accounts do not bear him
out.] wrapping their blankets and the skirts of their hunting-shirts
round their gun-locks, to keep them dry. Some horses gave out, but their
riders, like the thirty or forty footmen who had followed from the
Cowpens, struggled onwards and were in time for the battle. When near
King's Mountain they captured two tories, and from them learned
Ferguson's exact position; that "he was on a ridge between two
branches," [Footnote: _I. e._, brooks.] where some deer hunters had
camped the previous fall. These deer hunters were now with the oncoming
backwoodsmen, and declared that they knew the ground well. Without
halting, Campbell and the other colonels rode forward together, and
agreed to surround the hill, so that their men might fire upwards
without risk of hurting one another. It was a bold plan; for they knew
their foes probably outnumbered them; but they were very confident of
their own prowess, and were anxious to strike a crippling blow. From one
or two other captured tories, and from a staunch whig friend, they
learned the exact disposition of the British and loyalist force, and
were told that their noted leader wore a light, parti-colored
hunting-shirt; and he was forthwith doomed to be a special target for
the backwoods rifles. When within a mile of the hill a halt was called,
and after a hasty council of the different colonels--in which Williams
did not take part,--the final arrangements were made, and the men, who
had been marching in loose order, were formed in line of battle. They
then rode forward in absolute silence, and when close to the west slope
of the battle-hill, beyond King's Creek, drew rein and dismounted. They
tied their horses to trees, and fastened their great coats and blankets
to the saddles, for the rain had cleared away. A few of the officers
remained mounted. The countersign of the day was "Buford," the name of
the colonel whose troops Tarleton had defeated and butchered. The final
order was for each man to look carefully at the priming of his rifle,
and then to go into battle and fight till he died.

The Battle.

The foes were now face to face. On the one side were the American
backwoodsmen, under their own leaders, armed in their own manner, and
fighting after their own fashion, for the freedom and the future of
America; on the opposite side were other Americans--the loyalists, led
by British officers, armed and trained in the British fashion, and
fighting on behalf of the empire of Britain and the majesty of the
monarchy. The Americans numbered, all told, about nine hundred and fifty
men. [Footnote: Nine hundred and ten horsemen (possibly nine hundred, or
perhaps nine hundred and thirty-three) started out; and the footmen who
kept up were certainly less than fifty in number. There is really no
question as to the American numbers; yet a variety of reasons have
conspired to cause them to be generally greatly overstated, even by
American historians. Even Phelan gives them fifteen hundred men,
following the ordinary accounts. At the time, many outsiders supposed
that all the militia who were at the Cowpens fought in the battle; but
this is not asserted by any one who knew the facts. General J. Watts
DePeyster, in the _Mag. of Am. Hist._ for 1880,--"The Affair at King's
Mountain,"--gives the extreme tory view. He puts the number of the
Americans at from thirteen hundred to nineteen hundred. His account,
however, is only based on Shelby's later narratives, told thirty years
after the event, and these are all that need be considered. When Shelby
grew old, he greatly exaggerated the numbers on both sides in all the
fights in which he had taken part. In his account of King's Mountain, he
speaks of Williams and the four hundred Flint Hill men joining the
attacking body _after_, not _before_, the nine hundred and ten picked
men started. But his earlier accounts, including the official report
which he signed, explicitly contradict this. The question is thus purely
as to the time of the junction; as to whether it was after or before
this that the body of nine hundred actual fighters was picked out.
Shelby's later report contains the grossest self-contradictions. Thus it
enumerates the companies which fought the battle in detail, the result
running up several hundred more than the total he gives. The early and
official accounts are in every way more worthy of credence; but the
point is settled beyond dispute by Hill's narrative. Hill was one of the
four hundred men with Williams, and he expressly states that after the
junction at the Cowpens the force, from both commands, that started out
numbered nine hundred and thirty-three. The question is thus definitely
settled. Most of the later accounts simply follow the statements Shelby
made in his old age.] The British forces were composed in bulk of the
Carolina loyalists--troops similar to the Americans who joined the
mountaineers at Quaker Meadows and the Cowpens [Footnote: There were
many instances of brothers and cousins in the opposing ranks at King's
Mountain; a proof of the similarity in the character of the forces.];
the difference being that besides these low-land militia, there were
arrayed on one side the men from the Holston, Watauga, and Nolichucky,
and on the other the loyalist regulars. Ferguson had, all told, between
nine hundred and a thousand troops, a hundred and twenty or thirty of
them being the regulars or "American Volunteers," the remainder tory
militia. [Footnote: The American official account says that they
captured the British provision returns, according to which their force
amounted to eleven hundred and twenty-five men. It further reports, of
the regulars nineteen killed, thirty-five wounded and left on the ground
as unable to march, and seventy-eight captured; of the tories two
hundred and six killed, one hundred and twenty-eight wounded and left on
the ground unable to march, and six hundred and forty-eight captured.
The number of tories killed must be greatly exaggerated. Allaire, in his
diary, says Ferguson had only eight hundred men, but almost in the same
sentence enumerates nine hundred and six, giving of the regulars
nineteen killed, thirty-three wounded, and sixty-four captured (one
hundred and sixteen in all, instead of one hundred and thirty-two, as in
the American account), and of the tories one hundred killed, ninety
wounded, and "about" six hundred captured. This does not take account of
those who escaped. From Ramsey and De Peyster down most writers assert
that every single individual on the defeated side were killed or taken;
but in Colonel Chesney's admirable "Military Biography" there is given
the autobiography or memoir of a South Carolina loyalist who was in the
battle. His account of the battle is meagre and unimportant, but he
expressly states that at the close he and a number of others escaped
through the American lines by putting sprigs of white paper in their
caps, as some of the whig militia did--for the militia had no uniforms,
and were dressed alike on both sides. A certain number of men who
escaped must thus be added.] The forces were very nearly equal in
number. What difference there was, was probably in favor of the British
and tories. There was not a bayonet in the American army, whereas
Ferguson trusted much to this weapon. All his volunteers and regulars
were expert in its use, and with his usual ingenuity he had trained
several of his loyalist companies in a similar manner, improvising
bayonets out of their hunting-knives. The loyalists whom he had had with
him for some time were well drilled. The North Carolina regiment was
weaker on this point, as it was composed of recruits who had joined him
but recently. [Footnote: There were undoubtedly very many horse-thieves,
murderers, and rogues of every kind with Ferguson, but equally
undoubtedly the bulk of his troops were loyalists from principle, and
men of good standing, especially those from the seaboard. Many of the
worst tory bandits did not rally to him, preferring to plunder on their
own account. The American army itself was by no means free from
scoundrels. Most American writers belittle the character of Ferguson's
force, and sneer at the courage of the tories, although entirely unable
to adduce any proof of their statements, the evidence being the other
way. Apparently they are unconscious of the fact that they thus wofully
diminish the credit to be given to the victors. It may be questioned if
there ever was a braver or finer body of riflemen than the nine hundred
who surrounded and killed or captured a superior body of well posted,
well led, and courageous men, in part also well drilled, on King's
Mountain. The whole world now recognizes how completely the patriots
were in the right; but it is especially incumbent on American historians
to fairly portray the acts and character of the tories, doing justice to
them as well as to the whigs, and condemning them only when they deserve
it. In studying the Revolutionary war in the Southern States, I have
been struck by the way in which the American historians alter the facts
by relying purely on partisan accounts, suppressing the innumerable whig
excesses and outrages, or else palliating them. They thus really destroy
the force of the many grave accusations which may be truthfully brought
against the British and tories. I regret to say that Bancroft is among
the offenders. Hildreth is an honorable exception. Most of the British
historians of the same events are even more rancorous and less
trustworthy than the American writers; and while fully admitting the
many indefensible outrages committed by the whigs, a long-continued and
impartial examination of accessible records has given me the belief that
in the districts where the civil war was most ferocious, much the
largest number of the criminal class joined the tories, and the misdeeds
of the latter were more numerous than those of the whigs. But the
frequency with which both whigs and tories hung men for changing sides,
shows that quite a number of the people shifted from one party to the
other; and so there must have been many men of exactly the same stamp in
both armies. Much of the nominal changing of sides, however, was due to
the needless and excessive severity of Cornwallis and his lieutenants.]

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