The Winning of the West, Volume Two by Theodore Roosevelt

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The day after the battle the Americans fell back towards the mountains,
fearing lest, while cumbered by prisoners and wounded, they should be
struck by Tarleton or perhaps Cruger. The prisoners were marched along
on foot, each carrying one or two muskets, for twelve hundred stand of
arms had been captured. The Americans had little to eat, and were very
tired; but the plight of the prisoners was pitiable. Hungry, footsore,
and heartbroken, they were hurried along by the fierce and boastful
victors, who gloried in the vengeance they had taken, and recked little
of such a virtue as magnanimity to the fallen. The only surgeon in
either force was Ferguson's. He did what he could for the wounded; but
that was little enough, for, of course, there were no medical stores
whatever. The Americans buried their dead in graves, and carried their
wounded along on horse-litters. The wounded loyalists were left on the
field, to be cared for by the neighboring people. The conquerors showed
neither respect nor sympathy for the leader who had so gallantly fought
them. [Footnote: But the accounts of indignity being shown him are not
corroborated by Allaire and Ryerson, the two contemporary British
authorities, and are probably untrue.] His body and the bodies of his
slain followers were cast into two shallow trenches, and loosely covered
with stones and earth. The wolves, coming to the carnage, speedily dug
up the carcasses, and grew so bold from feasting at will on the dead
that they no longer feared the living. For months afterwards King's
Mountain was a favorite resort for wolf hunters.

The victory once gained, the bonds of discipline over the troops were
forthwith loosened; they had been lax at the best, and only the strain
of the imminent battle with the British had kept them tense for the
fortnight the mountaineers had been away from their homes. All the men
of the different commands were bragging as to their respective merits in
the battle, and the feats performed by the different commanders.
[Footnote: Certificate of Matthew Willoughby, in _Richmond Enquirer_, as
quoted.] The general break up of authority, of course, allowed full play
to the vicious and criminal characters. Even before the mountaineers
came down the unfortunate Carolinas had suffered from the misdeeds of
different bodies of ill-disciplined patriot troops, [Footnote: Gates
MSS., Deposition of John Satty, and others, Sept. 7, 1780; of Wm.
Hamilton, Sept. 12th, etc., etc., etc.] almost as much as from the
British and tories. The case was worse now. Many men deserted from the
returning army for the especial purpose of plundering the people of the
neighborhood, paying small heed which cause the victims had espoused;
and parties continually left camp avowedly with this object. Campbell's
control was of the slightest; he was forced to entreat rather than
command the troops, complaining that they left their friends in "almost
a worse situation than the enemy would have done," and expressing what
was certainly a moderate "wish," that the soldiers would commit no
"unnecessary injury" on the inhabitants of the county. [Footnote:
Campbell's General Orders, Oct. 14th, and Oct. 26th.] Naturally such
very mild measures produced little effect in stopping the plundering.

However, Campbell spoke in stronger terms of an even worse set of
outrages. The backwoodsmen had little notion of mercy to beaten enemies,
and many of them treated the captured loyalists with great brutality,
even on the march, [Footnote: "Our captors ... cutting and striking us
in a most savage manner,"--"South Carolina Loyalist."] Col. Cleavland
himself being one of the offenders. [Footnote: Allaire's diary, entry of
Nov. 1st.] Those of their friends and relatives who had fallen into the
hands of the tories, or of Cornwallis' regulars, had fared even worse;
yet this cannot palliate their conduct. Campbell himself, when in a fit
of gusty anger, often did things he must have regretted afterwards; but
he was essentially manly, and his soul revolted at the continued
persecution of helpless enemies. He issued a sharp manifesto in
reference to the way the prisoners were "slaughtered and disturbed,"
assuring the troops that if it could not be prevented by moderate
measures, he would put a stop to it by taking summary vengeance on the
offenders. [Footnote: Campbell's General Orders, Oct. 11th.] After this
the prisoners were, on the whole, well treated. When they met a couple
of Continental officers, the latter were very polite, expressing their
sympathy for their fate in falling into such hands; for from Washington
and Greene down, the Continental troops disliked and distrusted the
militia almost as much as the British regulars did the tories.

There was one dark deed of vengeance. It had come to be common for the
victors on both sides to hang those whom they regarded as the chief
offenders among their conquered opponents. As the different districts
were alternately overrun, the unfortunate inhabitants were compelled to
swear allegiance in succession to Congress and to king; and then, on
whichever side they bore arms, they were branded as traitors. Moreover,
the different leaders, both British and American, from Tarleton and
Ferguson to Sumter and Marion, often embodied in their own ranks some of
their prisoners, and these were of course regarded as deserters by their
former comrades. Cornwallis, seconded by Rawdon, had set the example of
ordering all men found in the rebel ranks after having sworn allegiance
to the king, to be hung; his under-officers executed the command with
zeal, and the Americans, of course, retaliated. Ferguson's troops
themselves had hung some of their prisoners. [Footnote: Allaire's Diary,
entry for Aug. 20th; also see Aug. 2d. He chronicles these hangings with
much complacency, but is, of course, shocked at the "infamous" conduct
of the Americans when they do likewise.]

All this was fresh in the minds of the Americans who had just won so
decisive a victory. They were accustomed to give full vent to the
unbridled fury of their passions; they with difficulty brooked control;
they brooded long over their own wrongs, which were many and real, and
they were but little impressed by the misdeeds committed in return by
their friends. Inflamed by hatred and the thirst for vengeance, they
would probably have put to death some of their prisoners in any event;
but all doubt was at an end when on their return march they were joined
by an officer who had escaped from before Augusta, and who brought word
that Cruger's victorious loyalists had hung a dozen of the captured
patriots. [Footnote: Shelby MS.] This news settled the doom of some of
the tory prisoners. A week after the battle a number of them were tried,
and thirty were condemned to death. Nine, including the only tory
colonel who had survived the battle, were hung; then Sevier and Shelby,
men of bold, frank nature, could no longer stand the butchery, and
peremptorily interfered, saving the remainder. [Footnote: _Do._] Of the
men who were hung, doubtless some were murderers and marauders, who
deserved their fate; others, including the unfortunate colonel, were
honorable men, executed only because they had taken arms for the cause
they deemed right.

Leaving the prisoners in the hands of the lowland militia, the
mountaineers returned to their secure fastnesses in the high
hill-valleys of the Holston, the Watauga, and the Nollchucky. They had
marched well and fought valiantly, and they had gained a great victory;
all the little stockaded forts, all the rough log-cabins on the
scattered clearings, were jubilant over the triumph. From that moment
their three leaders were men of renown. The legislatures of their
respective states thanked them publicly and voted them swords for their
services. Campbell, next year, went down to join Greene's army, did
gallant work at Guilford Courthouse, and then died of camp-fever. Sevier
and Shelby had long lives before them. [Footnote: Thirty years after the
battle, when Campbell had long been dead, Shelby and Sevier started a
most unfortunate controversy as to his conduct in the battle. They
insisted that he had flinched, and that victory was mainly due to them.
Doubtless they firmly believed what they said; for as already stated,
the jealousies and rivalries among the backwoods leaders were very
strong; but the burden of proof, after thirty years' silence, rested on
them, and they failed to make their statements good--nor was their act a
very gracious one. Shelby bore the chief part in the quarrel, Campbell's
surviving relatives, of course, defending the dead chieftain. I have
carefully examined all the papers in the case, in the Tenn. Historical
Society, the Shelby, MSS., and the Campbell MSS., besides the files of
the _Richmond Enquirer_, etc.; and it is evident that the accusation was
wholly groundless.

Shelby and Sevier rest their case:

1st, on their memory, thirty years after the event, of some remarks of
Campbell to them in private after the close of the battle, which they
construed as acknowledgments of bad conduct. Against these memories of
old men it is safe to set Shelby's explicit testimony, in a letter
written six days after the battle (see _Virginia Argus_, Oct. 26, 1810),
to the good-conduct of the "gallant commander" (Campbell).

2d, on the fact that Campbell was seen on a black horse in the rear
during the fighting; but a number of men of his regiment swore that he
had given his black horse to a servant who sat in the rear, while he
himself rode a bay horse in the battle. See their affidavits in the
_Enquirer_.

3d, on the testimony of one of Shelby's brothers, who said he saw him in
the rear. This is the only piece of positive testimony in the case. Some
of Campbell's witnesses (as Matthew Willoughby) swore that this brother
of Shelby was a man of bad character, engaged at the time in stealing
cattle from both Whigs and Tories.

4th, on the testimony of a number of soldiers who swore they did not see
Campbell in the latter part of the battle, nor until some moments after
the surrender. Of course, this negative testimony is simply valueless;
in such a hurly burly it would be impossible for the men in each part of
the line to see all the commanders, and Campbell very likely did not
reach the places where these men were until some time after the
surrender. On the other hand, forty officers and soldiers of Campbell's,
Sevier's, and Shelby's regiments, headed by General Rutledge, swore that
they had seen Campbell valiantly leading throughout the whole battle,
and foremost at the surrender. This positive testimony conclusively
settles the matter; it outweighs that of Shelby's brother, the only
affirmative witness on the other side. But it is a fair question as to
whether Campbell or another of Shelby's brothers received De Peyster's
sword.]

CHAPTER X.

THE HOLSTON SETTLEMENTS TO THE END OF THE REVOLUTION, 1781-83.

John Sevier.
John Sevier had no sooner returned from doing his share in defeating
foes who were of his own race, than he was called on to face another set
of enemies, quite as formidable and much more cruel. These were the red
warriors, the ancient owners of the soil, who were ever ready to take
advantage of any momentary disaster that befell their hereditary and
victorious opponents, the invading settlers.

For many years Sevier was the best Indian fighter on the border. He was
far more successful than Clark, for instance, inflicting greater loss on
his foes and suffering much less himself, though he never had any thing
like Clark's number of soldiers. His mere name was a word of dread to
the Cherokees, the Chickamaugas, and the upper Creeks. His success was
due to several causes. He wielded great influence over his own
followers, whose love for and trust in "Chucky Jack" were absolutely
unbounded; for he possessed in the highest degree the virtues most
prized on the frontier. He was open-hearted and hospitable, with winning
ways towards all, and combined a cool head with a dauntless heart; he
loved a battle for its own sake, and was never so much at his ease as
when under fire; he was a first-class marksman, and as good a horseman
as was to be found on the border. In his campaigns against the Indians
he adopted the tactics of his foes, and grafted on them some important
improvements of his own. Much of his success was due to his adroit use
of scouts or spies. He always chose for these the best woodsmen of the
district, men who could endure as much, see as much, and pass through
the woods as silently, as the red men themselves. By keeping these
scouts well ahead of him, he learned accurately where the war parties
were. In the attack itself he invariably used mounted riflemen, men
skilled in forest warfare, who rode tough little horses, on which they
galloped at speed through the forest. Once in position they did the
actual fighting on foot, sheltering themselves carefully behind the
tree-trunks. He moved with extreme rapidity and attacked with
instantaneous suddenness, using ambushes and surprises wherever
practicable. His knowledge of the whereabouts and size of the hostile
parties, and the speed of his own movements, generally enabled him to
attack with the advantage of numbers greatly on his side. [Footnote: The
old Tennessee historians, headed by Haywood, base their accounts, of the
actions on statements made by the pioneers, or some of the pioneers,
forty or fifty years after the event; and they do a great deal of
bragging about the prowess of the old Indian fighters. The latter did
most certainly perform mighty deeds; but often in an entirely different
way from that generally recorded; for they faced a foe who on his own
ground was infinitely more to be dreaded than the best trained European
regulars. Thus Haywood says that after the battle of the Island Flats,
the whites were so encouraged that thenceforward they never asked
concerning their enemies, "how many are they?" but "where are they?" Of
course, this is a mere piece of barbaric boasting. If the whites had
really acted on any such theory there would have been a constant
succession of disasters like that at the Blue Licks. Sevier's latest
biographer, Mr. Kirke, in the "Rear-guard of the Revolution," goes far
beyond even the old writers. For instance, on p. 141 he speaks of
Sevier's victories being "often" gained over "twenty times his own
number" of Indians. As a matter of fact, one of the proofs of Sevier's
skill as a commander is that he almost always fought with the advantage
of numbers on his side. Not a single instance can be produced where
either he or any one else during his lifetime gained a victory over
twenty times his number of Indians, unless the sieges are counted. It is
necessary to keep in mind the limitations under which Haywood did his
work, in order to write truthfully; but a debt of gratitude will always
be due him for the history he wrote. Like Marshall's, it is the book of
one who himself knew the pioneers, and it has preserved very much of
value which would otherwise have been lost. The same holds true of
Ramsey.] He could then outflank or partially surround the Indians, while
his sudden rush demoralized them; so that, in striking contrast to most
other Indian fighters, he inflicted a far greater loss than he received.
He never fought a big pitched battle, but, by incessantly harrying and
scattering the different war bands, he struck such terror to the hearts
of the Indians that he again and again, in a succession of wars, forced
them into truces, and for the moment freed the settlements from their
ravages. He was almost the only commander on the frontier who ever
brought an Indian war, of whatever length, to an end, doing a good deal
of damage to his foes and suffering very little himself. Still, he never
struck a crushing blow, nor conquered a permanent peace. He never did
any thing to equal Clark's campaigns in the Illinois and against
Vincennes, and, of course, he cannot for a moment be compared to his
rival and successor, grim Old Hickory, the destroyer of the Creeks and
the hero of New Orleans.

Sevier's Cherokee Campaigns.

When the men of the Holston or upper Tennessee valley settlements
reached their homes after the King's Mountain expedition, they found
them menaced by the Cherokees. Congress had endeavored in vain to
persuade the chiefs of this tribe to make a treaty of peace, or at least
to remain neutral. The efforts of the British agents to embroil them
with the whites were completely successful; and in November the Otari or
Overhill warriors began making inroads along the frontier. They did not
attack in large bands. A constant succession of small parties moved
swiftly through the county, burning cabins, taking scalps, and, above
all, stealing horses. As the most effectual way of stopping such
inroads, the alarmed and angered settlers resolved to send a formidable
retaliatory expedition against the Overhill towns. [Footnote: Campbell
MSS. Letter of Gov. Thos. Jefferson, Feb. 17, 1781.] All the Holston
settlements both north and south of the Virginia line joined in sending
troops. By the first week in December, 1780, seven hundred mounted
riflemen were ready to march, under the joint leadership of Colonel
Arthur Campbell and of Sevier, the former being the senior officer. They
were to meet at an appointed place on the French Broad.

Sevier started first, with between two and three hundred of his Watauga
and Nolichucky followers. He marched down to the French Broad, but could
hear nothing of Campbell. He was on the great war trace of the southern
Indians, and his scouts speedily brought him word that they had
exchanged shots with a Cherokee war party, on its way to the
settlements, and not far distant on the other side of the river. He
instantly crossed, and made a swift march towards the would-be
marauders, camping on Boyd's Creek. The scouts were out by sunrise next
morning--December 16th,--and speedily found the Indian encampment, which
the warriors had just left. On receipt of the news Sevier ordered the
scouts to run on, attack the Indians, and then instantly retreat, so as
to draw them into an ambuscade. Meanwhile the main body followed
cautiously after, the men spread out in a long line, with the wings
advanced; the left wing under Major Jesse Walton, the right under Major
Jonathan Tipton, while Sevier himself commanded the centre, which
advanced along the trail by which the scouts were to retreat. When the
Indians were drawn into the middle, the two wings were to close in, when
the whole party would be killed or captured.

The plan worked well. The scouts soon came up with the warriors, and,
after a moment's firing, ran back, with the Indians in hot pursuit.
Sevier's men lay hid, and, when the leading warriors were close up, they
rose and fired. Walton's wing closed in promptly; but Tipton was too
slow, and the startled Cherokees ran off through the opening he had
left, rushed into a swamp impassable for horsemen, and scattered out,
each man for himself, being soon beyond pursuit. Nevertheless, Sevier
took thirteen scalps, many weapons, and all their plunder. In some of
their bundles there were proclamations from Sir Henry Clinton and other
British commanders.

The Indians were too surprised and panic-struck to offer any serious
resistance, and not a man of Sevier's force was even wounded. [Footnote:
Campbell MSS. Copy of the official report of Col. Arthur Campbell, Jan.
15, 1781. The accounts of this battle of Boyd's Creek illustrate well
the growth of such an affair under the hands of writers who place
confidence in all kinds of tradition, especially if they care more for
picturesqueness than for accuracy. The contemporary official report is
explicit. There were three hundred whites and seventy Indians. Of the
latter, thirteen were slain. Campbell's whole report shows a jealousy of
Sevier, whom he probably knew well enough was a man of superior ability
to himself; but this jealousy appears mainly in the coloring. He does
not change any material fact, and there is no reason for questioning the
substantial truth of his statements.

Forty years afterward Haywood writes of the affair, trying to tell
simply the truth, but obliged to rely mainly on oral tradition. He
speaks of Sevier's troops as only two hundred in number; and says
twenty-eight Indians were killed. He does not speak of the number of the
Indians, but from the way he describes Sevier's troops as encircling
them, he evidently knew that the white men were more numerous than their
foes. His mistake as to the number of Indian dead is easily explicable.
The official report gives twenty-nine as the number killed in the entire
campaign, and Haywood, as in the Island Flats battle, simply puts the
total of several skirmishes into one.

Thirty years later comes Ramsey. He relies on traditions that have grown
more circumstantial and less accurate. He gives two accounts of what he
calls "one of the best-fought battles in the border war of Tennessee";
one of these accounts is mainly true; the other entirely false; he does
not try to reconcile them. He says three whites were wounded, although
the official report says that in the whole campaign but one man was
killed and two wounded. He reduces Sevier's force to one hundred and
seventy men, and calls the Indians "a large body."

Thirty-four years later comes Mr. Kirke, with the "Rear-guard of the
Revolution." Out of his inner consciousness he evolves the fact that
there were "not less than a thousand" Indians, whom Sevier, at the head
of one hundred and seventy men, vanquishes, after a heroic combat, in
which Sevier and some others perform a variety of purely imaginary
feats. By diminishing the number of the whites, and increasing that of
the Indians, he thus makes the relative force of the latter about
_twenty-five times as great as it really was_, and converts a clever
ambuscade, whereby the whites gave a smart drubbing to a body of Indians
one fourth their own number, into a Homeric victory over a host six
times as numerous as the conquerors.

This is not a solitary instance; on the contrary it is typical of almost
all that is gravely set forth as history by a number of writers on these
western border wars, whose books are filled from cover to cover with
just such matter. Almost all their statements are partly, and very many
are wholly, without foundation.]Having thus made a very pretty stroke,
Sevier returned to the French Broad, where Campbell joined him on the
22d, with four hundred troops. Among them were a large number of
Shelby's men, under the command of Major Joseph Martin. The next day the
seven hundred horsemen made a forced march to the Little Tennessee; and
on the 24th crossed it unopposed, making a feint at one ford, while the
main body passed rapidly over another. The Indians did not have the
numbers to oppose so formidable a body of good fighters, and only
ventured on a little very long range and harmless skirmishing with the
vanguard. Dividing into two bodies, the troops destroyed Chota and the
other towns up and down the stream, finding in them a welcome supply of
provisions. The next day Martin, with a detachment, fell on a party of
flying Indians, killed one, and captured seventeen horses loaded with
clothing, skins, and the scanty household furniture of the cabins; while
another detachment destroyed the part of Chilhowee that was on the
nearer side of the river. On the 26th the rest of Chilhowee was burned,
three Indians killed, and nine captured. Tipton, with one hundred and
fifty men, was sent to attack another town beyond the river; but owing
to the fault of their commander, [Footnote: His "unmilitary behavior,"
says Campbell. Ramsey makes him one of the (imaginary) wounded at Boyd's
Creek. Kirke improves on this by describing him as falling "badly
wounded" just as he was about to move his wing forward, and ascribes to
his fall the failure of the wing to advance.] this body failed to get
across. The Indian woman, Nancy Ward, who in '76 had given the settlers
timely warning of the intended attack by her tribesmen here came into
camp. She brought overtures of peace from the chiefs; but to these
Campbell and Sevier would not listen, as they wished first to demolish
the Hiawassee towns, where the warriors had been especially hostile.
Accordingly, they marched thither. On their way there were a couple of
skirmishes, in which several Indians were killed and one white man. The
latter, whose name was Elliot, was buried in the Tellico town, a cabin
being burned down over his grave, that the Indians might not know where
it was. The Indians watched the army from the hills. At one point a
warrior was seen stationed on a ridge to beat a drum and give signals to
the rest; but the spies of the whites stole on him unawares, and shot
him. The Hiawassee towns and all the stores of provisions they contained
were destroyed, the work being finished on the last day of the year.

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