History of Rome, Vol III by Titus Livius

T >> Titus Livius >> History of Rome, Vol III

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52

17. The design on Carystus was then resumed, and the fleets sailed
thither; on which the whole body of the inhabitants, before the troops
were disembarked, deserted the city and fled into the citadel, whence
they sent deputies to beg protection from the Roman general. To the
townspeople life and liberty were immediately granted; and it was
ordered, that the Macedonians should pay a ransom of three hundred
drachmas[1] a head, deliver up their arms, and quit the country. After
being ransomed for the said amount, they were transported, unarmed, to
Boeotia. The combined fleets having, in the space of a few days,
taken these two important cities of Euboea, sailed round Sunium, a
promontory of Attica, and steered their course to Cenchreae, the grand
mart of the Corinthians. In the mean time, the consul found the siege
of Atrax more tedious and severe than had been universally expected,
and the enemy resisted in the way which they had least anticipated. He
had supposed that the whole of the trouble would be in demolishing the
wall, and that if he could once open a passage for his soldiers into
the city, the consequence would then be, the flight and slaughter of
the enemy, as usually happens on the capture of towns. But when, on a
breach being made in the wall by the rams, and when the soldiers, by
mounting over the ruins, had entered the place, this proved only
the beginning, as it were, of an unusual and fresh labour. For the
Macedonians in garrison, who were both chosen men and many in number,
supposing that they would be entitled to extraordinary honour if they
should maintain the defence of the city by means of arms and courage,
rather than by the help of walls, formed themselves in a compact body,
strengthening their line by an uncommon number of files in depth.
These, when they saw the Romans entering by the breaches, drove
them back, so that they were entangled among the rubbish, and
with difficulty could effect a retreat. This gave the consul great
uneasiness; for he considered such a disgrace, not merely as it
retarded the reduction of a single city, but as likely to affect
materially the whole process of the war, which in general depends much
on the influence of events in themselves unimportant. Having therefore
cleared the ground, which was heaped up with the rubbish of the
half-ruined wall, he brought up a tower of extraordinary height,
consisting of many stories, and which carried a great number of
soldiers. He likewise sent up the cohorts in strong bodies one after
another, to force their way, if possible, through the wedge of the
Macedonians, which is called a phalanx. But in such a confined space,
(for the wall was thrown down to no great extent,) the enemy had the
advantage, both in the kind of weapons which they used, and in the
manner of fighting. When the Macedonians, in close array, stretched
out before them their long spears against the target fence which was
formed by the close position of their antagonists' shields, and when
the Romans, after discharging their javelins without effect, drew
their swords, these could neither press on to a closer combat, nor cut
off the heads of the spears; and if they did cut or break off any,
the shaft, being sharp at the part where it was broken, filled up
its place among the points of those which were unbroken, in a kind of
palisade. Besides this, the parts of the wall still standing rendered
both the flanks of the Macedonians secure, who were not obliged,
either in retreating or in advancing to an attack, to pass through
a long space, which generally occasions disorder in the ranks. An
accidental circumstance also helped to confirm their courage: for as
the tower was moved along a bank of not sufficiently solid soil, one
of the wheels sinking into a rut, made the tower lean in such a manner
that it appeared to the enemy as if falling, and threw the soldiers
posted on it into consternation and affright.

[Footnote 1: 9l. 13s. 9d.]

18. As none of his attempts met any success, the consul was very
unwilling to allow such a comparison to be exhibited between the two
classes of soldiery and their respective weapons; at the same time, he
could neither see any prospect of reducing the place speedily, nor any
means of subsisting in winter, at such a distance from the sea, and
in regions desolated by the calamities of war. He therefore raised the
siege; and as, along the whole coast of Acarnania and Aetolia, there
was no port capable of containing all the transports that brought
supplies to the army, nor any place which afforded lodgings to the
legions, he pitched on Anticyra, in Phocis on the Corinthian gulf, as
most commodiously situated for his purpose. There the legions would
be at no great distance from Thessaly, and the places belonging to
the enemy; while they would have in front Peloponnesus, separated from
them by a narrow sea; on their rear, Aetolia and Acarnania; and on
their sides, Locris and Boeotia. Phanotea in Phocis he took without
resistance at the first assault. The siege of Anticyra gave him not
much delay. Then Ambrysus and Hyampolis were taken. Daulis, being
situated on a lofty eminence, could not be reduced either by scalade
or works: he therefore provoked the garrison, by missile weapons, to
make sallies from out the town. Then by flying at one time, pursuing
at another, and engaging in slight skirmishes, he led them into such a
degree of carelessness, and such a contempt of him, that at length the
Romans, mixing with them as they ran back, entered by the gates,
and stormed the town. Six other fortresses in Phocis, of little
consequence, came into his hands, through fear rather than by force of
arms. Elatia shut its gates, and the inhabitants seemed determined
not to admit within their walls either the army or the general of the
Romans, unless compelled by force.

19. While the consul was employed in the siege of Elatia, a prospect
opened to him of effecting a business of much more importance; namely,
of drawing away the Achaeans from their alliance with Philip to that
of the Romans. Cycliades, the head of the faction that favoured the
interest of Philip, they had now banished; and Aristaenus, who wished
for a union between his countrymen and the Romans, was praetor. The
Roman fleet, with Attalus and the Rhodians, lay at Cenchreae, and were
preparing to lay siege to Corinth with their whole combined force. The
consul therefore judged it prudent, that, before they entered on
that affair, ambassadors should be sent to the Achaean state, with
assurances, that if they came over from the king to the side of the
Romans, the latter would consign Corinth to them, and annex it to
the old confederacy of their nation. Accordingly, by the consul's
direction, ambassadors were sent to the Achaeans, by his brother
Lucius Quinctius, by Attalus, and by the Rhodians and Athenians--a
general assembly being summoned to meet at Sicyon to give them
audience. Now, the state of feeling of the Achaeans was by no means
uniform. Nabis the Lacedaemonian, their constant and inveterate enemy,
was the object of their dread; they dreaded the arms of the Romans;
they were under obligations to the Macedonians, for services both
of ancient and recent date; but the king himself, on account of his
perfidy and cruelty, they looked upon with jealous fear, and not
judging from the behaviour which he then assumed for the time, they
knew that, on the conclusion of the war, they should find him a more
tyrannical master. So that every one of them was not only at a loss
what opinion he should support in the senate of his own particular
state, or in the general diets of the nation; but, even when they
deliberated within themselves, they could not, with any certainty,
determine what they ought to wish, or what to prefer. Such was the
unsettled state of mind of the members of the assembly, when the
ambassadors were introduced and liberty of speaking afforded them. The
Roman ambassador, Lucius Calpurnius, spoke first; next the ambassadors
of king Attalus; after them those of the Rhodians; and then Philip's.
The Athenians were heard the last, that they might refute the
discourses of the Macedonians. These inveighed against the king with
the greatest acrimony of any, for no others had suffered from him so
many and so severe hardships. So great a number of speeches of the
ambassadors succeeding each other took up the whole of the day; and
about sun-set the council was adjourned.

20. Next day the council was convened again; and when the magistrates,
according to the custom of the Greeks, gave leave, by their herald,
to any person who chose to offer advice, not one stood forth; but they
sat a long time, looking on each other in silence. It was no wonder
that men, revolving in their minds matters of such contradictory
natures, and who found themselves puzzled and confounded, should be
involved in additional perplexity by the speeches continued through
the whole preceding day; in which the difficulties, on all sides,
were brought into view, and stated in their full force. At length
Aristaenus, the praetor of the Achaeans, not to dismiss the council
without any business being introduced, said:--"Achaeans, where are
now those violent disputes, in which, at your feasts and meetings,
whenever mention was made of Philip and the Romans, you scarcely
refrained from blows? Now, in a general assembly, summoned on that
single business, when you have heard the arguments of the ambassadors
on both sides, when the magistrates demand your opinions, when the
herald calls you to declare your sentiments, you are struck dumb.
Although your concern for the common safety be insufficient for
determining the matter, cannot the party zeal which has attached you
to one side or the other extort a word from any one of you? especially
when none is so obtuse as not to perceive, that the time for declaring
and recommending what each either wishes or thinks most advisable,
must be at the present moment; that is, before we make any decree.
When a decree shall have been once passed, every man even such as
previously may have disapproved the measure, must then support it
as good and salutary." These persuasions of the praetor, so far from
prevailing on any one person to declare his opinion, did not excite,
in all that numerous assembly, collected out of so many states, so
much as a murmur or a whisper.

21. Then the praetor, Aristaenus, again spoke as follows:--"Chiefs of
Achaea, you are not more at a loss for advice, than you are for words;
but every one is unwilling to promote the interest of the public at
a risk of danger to himself. Were I in a private character, perhaps I
too should be silent; but, as praetor, it is my duty to declare, that
I see evidently, either that an audience of the council ought not to
have been accorded to the ambassadors, or that they ought not to
be dismissed from it without an answer. Yet how can I give them an
answer, unless by a decree of yours? And, since not one of you who
have been called to this assembly either chooses or dares to make
known his sentiments, let us examine (as if they were opinions
proposed to our consideration) the speeches of the ambassadors
delivered yesterday; supposing the speakers not to have required what
was useful to themselves, but to have recommended what they thought
most conducive to our advantage. The Romans, the Rhodians and Attalus,
request an alliance and friendship with us; and they demand to be
assisted by us in the war in which they are now engaged against
Philip. Philip reminds us of our league with him, and of the
obligation of our oath; he requires only, that we declare ourselves on
his side; and says, he will be satisfied if we do not intermeddle in
the operations of the war. Does not the reason occur to the mind of
any one of you why those, who are not yet our allies, require more
than he who is? This arises not from modesty in Philip, nor from
the want of it in the Romans. It is fortune, which, while it bestows
confidence to requisitions on one side, precludes it on the other. We
see nothing belonging to Philip but his ambassador: the Roman fleet
lies at Cenchreae, exhibiting to our view the spoils of the cities
of Euboea. We behold the consul and his legions, at the distance of a
small tract of sea, overrunning Phocis and Locris. You were surprised
at Philip's ambassador, Cleomedon, showing such diffidence yesterday
in his application to us to take arms on the side of the king against
the Romans. But if we, in pursuance of the same treaty and oath, the
sacredness of which he inculcated on us, were to ask of him, that
Philip should protect us, both from Nabis and his Lacedaemonians, and
also from the Romans, he would be utterly unable to find, not only a
force with which to protect us, but even an answer to return. As much
so in truth as was Philip himself, who endeavoured, by promises of
waging war against Nabis, to draw away our youth into Euboea; but
finding that we would neither decree such assistance to him, nor
choose to be embroiled in a war with Rome, forgot that alliance
on which he now lays such stress, and left us to Nabis and the
Lacedaemonians to be spoiled and plundered. Besides, to me the
arguments of Cleomedon appeared utterly inconsistent. He made light of
the war with the Romans; and asserted, that the issue of it would be
similar to that of the former, which they waged against Philip. If
such the case, why does he, at a distance, solicit our assistance;
rather than come hither in person, and defend us, his old allies, both
from Nabis and from the Romans? Us, do I say? Why, on this showing,
has he suffered Eretria and Carystus to be taken? Why so many cities
of Thessaly? Why Locris and Phocis? Why does he at present suffer
Elatia to be besieged? Did he, either through compulsion, or fear, or
choice, quit the straits of Epirus, and those impregnable fastnesses
on the river Aous; and why, abandoning the pass which he was
occupying, did he retire altogether into his own kingdom? If of his
own will he gave up so many allies to the ravages of the enemy, what
objection can he make to these allies consulting for their own safety?
If through fear, he ought to pardon the like fear in us. If he retired
defeated by force of arms, let me ask you, Cleomedon, shall we,
Achaeans, be able to withstand the Roman arms, which you, Macedonians,
have not withstood? Are we to give credit to your assertion, that the
Romans do not employ, in the present war, greater forces or greater
strength than they did in the former, rather than regard the facts
themselves? In the first instance, they aided the Aetolians with a
fleet; they sent not to the war either a consul as commander, or a
consular army. The maritime cities of Philip's allies were in terror
and confusion; but the inland places were so secure against the Roman
arms, that Philip ravaged the country of the Aetolians, while they in
vain implored succour from those arms. Whereas, in the present case,
the Romans, after bringing to a final conclusion the Punic war, which
they had supported for sixteen years in the bowels, as it were, of
Italy, sent not auxiliaries to the Aetolians in their quarrels, but,
being themselves principals, made a hostile invasion on Macedonia with
land and sea forces at once. Their third consul is now pushing forward
the war with the utmost vigour. Sulpicius, engaging the king within
the territory of Macedonia itself, has overthrown and put him to
flight; and afterwards despoiled the most opulent part of his kingdom.
Then, again, when he was in possession of the strait of Epirus, where,
from the nature of the ground, his fortifications, and the strength
of his army, he thought himself secure, Quinctius drove him out of his
camp; pursued him, as he fled into Thessaly; and, almost in the view
of Philip himself, stormed the royal garrisons and the cities of
his allies. Supposing that there were no truth in what the Athenian
ambassadors mentioned yesterday, respecting the cruelty, avarice, and
lust of the king; supposing the crimes committed, in the country of
Attica, against the gods, celestial and infernal, concerned us not
all; that we had less to complain of than what the people of Cius and
Abydos, who are far distant from us, have endured: let us then, if
you please, forget even our own wounds; let the murders and ravages
committed at Messana, and in the heart of Peloponnesus, the killing of
his host Garitenes at Cyparissia, almost in the very midst of a feast,
in contempt of laws divine and human; the murder of the two Aratuses
of Sicyon, father and son, though he was wont to call the unfortunate
old man his parent; his carrying away the son's wife into Macedonia
for the gratification of his vicious appetites, and all his violations
of virgins and matrons;--let all these, I say, be consigned to
oblivion. Let us suppose our business were not with Philip, through
dread of whose cruelty you are all thus struck dumb; for what other
cause could keep you silent, when you have been summoned to a council?
Let us imagine that we are treating with Antigonus, a prince of the
greatest mildness and equity, to whose kindness we have all been
highly indebted; would he require us to perform what at the time was
impossible? Peloponnesus is a peninsula, united to the continent by
the narrow passage of an isthmus particularly exposed and open to the
attacks of naval armaments. Now, if a hundred decked ships, and fifty
lighter open ones, and thirty Issean barks, shall begin to lay waste
our coasts, and attack the cities which stand exposed, almost on the
very shore, shall we then retreat into the inland towns, as if we were
not afflicted with an intestine war, though in truth it is rankling
in our very bowels? When Nabis and the Lacedaemonians by land, and the
Roman fleet by sea, shall press us, whence must I implore the support
due from the king's alliance, whence the succours of the Macedonians?
Shall we ourselves, with our own arms, defend, against the Roman
forces, the cities that will be attacked? Truly, in the former war,
we defended Dymae excellently well! The calamities of others afford
us abundant examples; let us not seek how we may render ourselves an
example to others. Do not, because the Romans voluntarily desire your
friendship, contemn that which you ought to have prayed for, nay,
laboured with all your might to obtain. But, it is insinuated, that
they are impelled by fear, in a country to which they are strangers;
and that, wishing to shelter themselves under your assistance, they
have recourse to your alliance in the hope of being admitted into your
harbours, and of there finding supplies of provisions. Now, at sea
they are absolute masters; and instantly reduce to subjection every
place at which they land. What they request, they have power to
enforce. Because they wish to treat you with tenderness they do not
allow you to take steps that must lead you to ruin. Cleomedon lately
pointed out, as the middle and safest way, to remain inactive, and
abstain from taking up arms But that is not a middle way; it is no way
at all. For, besides the necessity of either embracing or rejecting
the Roman alliance, what other consequence can ensue from such
conduct, than that, while we show no steady attachment to either
side, as if we waited the event with design to adapt our counsels to
fortune, we shall become the prey of the conqueror? Contemn not then,
when it is spontaneously offered to your acceptance, what you ought to
have solicited with your warmest prayers. The free option between
the two, which you have this day, you will not always have. The same
opportunity will not last long, nor will it frequently recur. You have
long wished to deliver yourselves out of the hands of Philip, although
you have not dared to make the attempt. Those have now crossed the
sea, with large fleets and armies, who are able to rescue you to a
state of freedom, without any trouble or danger to yourselves. If you
reject such persons as allies, you can scarcely be of sane mind; but
you must unavoidably have to deal with them, either as allies or as
enemies."

22. This speech of the praetor was followed by a general murmur; some
declaring their approbation, and others vehemently rebuking those who
did so. And now, not only individuals, but whole states were engaged
in altercation among themselves; and at length among the magistrates,
called Demiurgi, who are ten in number, the dispute was taken up with
as much warmth as among the multitude. Five of them declared, that
they would propose the question concerning an alliance with Rome,
and would take the votes on it; while five insisted, that it had been
provided by law that neither the magistrates should have power to
propose nor the council to pass any decree injurious to the alliance
with Philip. This day, also, was spent in contention, and there
remained now but one day more of the regular time of sitting; for,
according to the rule, the decree must be passed on the third day: and
as that approached, the zeal of the parties was kindled into such a
flame, that scarcely did parents refrain from offering violence to
their own sons. There was present a man of Pallene, named Rhisiasus,
whose son, Memnon, was a demiurgus, and was of that party which
opposed the reading of the decree and taking the votes. This man, for
a long time, entreated his son to allow the Achaeans to take proper
measures for their common safety, and not, by his obstinacy, to bring
ruin on the whole nation; but, finding that his entreaties had no
effect, he swore that he would treat him, not as a son, but as an
enemy, and would put him to death with his own hand. By these threats
he forced him, next day, to join the party that voted for the question
being proposed. These, having now become the majority, proposed the
question accordingly, while almost every one of the states, openly
approving the measure, showed plainly on which side they would vote.
Whereupon the Dymaeans, Megalopolitans, with several of the Argives,
rose up, and withdrew from the council; which step excited neither
wonder nor disapprobation. For when, in the memory of their
grandfathers, the Megalopolitans had been expelled their country by
the Lacedaemonians, Antigonus had reinstated them in their native
residence; and, at a later period, when Dymae was taken and sacked by
the Roman troops, Philip ordered that the inhabitants, wherever they
were in servitude, should be ransomed, and not only restored them to
their liberty, but their country. As to the Argives, besides believing
that the royal family of Macedonia derived its origin from them, the
greater part were attached to Philip by personal acts of kindness
and familiar friendship. For these reasons, when the council appeared
disposed to order an alliance to be concluded with Rome, they
withdrew; and their secession was readily excused, in consideration of
the many and recent obligations by which they were bound to the king
of Macedon.

23. The rest of the Achaean states, on their opinions being demanded,
ratified, by an immediate decree, the alliance with Attalus and the
Rhodians. That with the Romans, as it could not be perfected without
an order from the people, they deferred until such time as ambassadors
could be sent to Rome. For the present, it was resolved, that three
ambassadors should be sent to Lucius Quinctius; and that the whole
force of the Achaeans should be brought up to Corinth, which city
Quinctius, after taking Cenchreae, was then besieging. The Achaeans
accordingly pitched their camp opposite to the gate that leads to
Sicyon. The Romans made their approaches on the side of the city which
faces Cenchreae; Attalus having drawn his army across the isthmus,
towards Lechaeum, the port on the opposite sea. At first, they did not
push forward their operations with any great degree of vigour, because
they had hopes of a dissension breaking out between the townsmen and
the king's troops. But afterwards, learning that they all were of
one mind; that the Macedonians exerted themselves as if in defence of
their common country; and that the Corinthians submitted to the
orders of Androsthenes, commander of the garrison, as if he were their
countryman, and elected by their own suffrages; the assailants had
no other hopes but in force, arms, and their works. They therefore
brought up their mounds to the walls, though by very difficult
approaches. On that side where the Romans attacked, their ram had
demolished a considerable part of the wall; and the Macedonians having
run together to defend the place thus stripped of its works, a furious
conflict ensued between themselves and the Romans. At first, by
reason of the enemy's superiority in number, the Romans were quickly
repulsed; but being joined by the auxiliary troops of Attalus and the
Achaeans, they restored the fight to an equality; so that there was
no doubt that they would easily drive the Macedonians and Greeks from
their ground. But there were in the town a great multitude of Italian
deserters; some of whom, having been in Hannibal's army, had, through
fear of being punished by the Romans, followed Philip; others, having
been sailors, had lately quitted the fleets, and gone over, in hopes
of more honourable employment: despair of safety, therefore, in case
of the Romans getting the better, inflamed these to a degree which
might rather be called madness than courage. Opposite to Sicyon is the
promontory of Juno Acraea, as she is called, stretching out into the
main, the passage to Corinth being about seven miles. To this place
Philocles, one of the king's generals, led, through Boeotia, fifteen
hundred soldiers; and there were barks from Corinth ready to take
these troops on board, and carry them over to Lechaeum. Attalus, on
this, advised to burn the works, and raise the siege immediately;
Quinctius was for persisting more obstinately in the attempt. However,
when he saw the king's troops posted at the gates, and that the
sallies of the besieged could not easily be withstood, he came over
to the opinion of Attalus. Thus, their design proving fruitless, they
dismissed the Achaeans, and returned to their ships. Attalus steered
to Piraeus, the Romans to Corcyra.