History of Rome, Vol III by Titus Livius

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2. Things being thus adjusted in the senate, excepting the assignment
of his particular province to each of the magistrates, the consuls
were ordered to cast lots. Greece fell to Acilius, Italy to Cornelius.
The lot of each being now determined, the senate passed a decree, that
"inasmuch as the Roman people had, at that time, ordered war to
be declared against king Antiochus, and those who were under his
government, the consuls should command a supplication to be performed,
on account of that business; and that Manius Acilius, the consul,
should vow the great games to Jupiter, and offerings at all the
shrines." This vow was made by the consul in these words, which were
dictated by Publius Licinius, chief pontiff: "If the war, which the
people has ordered to be undertaken against king Antiochus, shall be
concluded agreeably to the wishes of the senate and people of Rome,
then, O Jupiter, the Roman people will, through ten successive days,
exhibit the great games in honour of thee, and offerings shall be
presented at all the shrines, of such value as the senate shall
direct. Whatever magistrate shall celebrate those games, and at
whatever time and place, let the celebration be deemed proper, and the
offerings rightly and duly made." The two consuls then proclaimed
a supplication for two days. When the consuls had determined their
provinces by lot, the praetors, likewise, immediately cast lots for
theirs. The two civil jurisdictions fell to Marcus Junius Brutus;
Bruttium, to Aulus Cornelius Mammula; Sicily, to Marcus Aemilius
Lepidus; Sardinia, to Lucius Oppius Salinator; the fleet, to Caius
Livius Salinator; and Farther Spain, to Lucius Aemilius Paullus. The
troops for these were settled thus:--to Aulus Cornelius were assigned
the new soldiers, raised last year by Lucius Quinctius, the consul,
pursuant to the senate's decree; and he was ordered to defend the
whole coast near Tarentum and Brundusium. Lucius Aemilius Paullus was
directed to take with him into Farther Spain, (to fill up the numbers
of the army, which he was to receive from Marcus Fulvius, propraetor,)
three thousand new-raised foot and three hundred horse, of whom
two-thirds should be Latin allies, and the other third Roman citizens.
An equal reinforcement was sent to Hither Spain to Caius Flaminius,
who was continued in command. Marcus Aemilius Lepidus was ordered to
receive both the province and army from Lucius Valerius, whom he was
to succeed; and, if he thought proper, to retain Lucius Valerius, as
propraetor, in the province, which he was to divide with him in such
a manner, that one division should reach from Agrigentum to Pachynum,
and the other from Pachynum to Tyndarium, and the sea-coasts whereof
Lucius Valerius was to protect with a fleet of twenty ships of war.
The same praetor received a charge to levy two-tenths of corn, and to
take care that it should be carried to the coast, and thence conveyed
into Greece. Lucius Oppius was likewise commanded to levy a second
tenth in Sardinia; but it was resolved that it should be transported,
not into Greece, but to Rome. Caius Livius, the praetor, whose lot was
the command of the fleet, was ordered to sail, at the earliest time
possible, to Greece with thirty ships, which were ready, and to
receive the other fleet from Atilius. The praetor, Marcus Junius,
was commissioned to refit and arm the old ships which were in the
dock-yards; and, for this fleet, to enlist the sons of freemen as
crews.

3. Commissaries were sent into Africa, three to Carthage, and a like
number to Numidia, to procure corn to be carried into Greece; for
which the Roman people were to pay the value. And so attentive was the
state to the making of every preparation and provision necessary
for the carrying on of this war, that the consul, Publius Cornelius,
published an edict, that "no senator, nor any who had the privilege of
giving an opinion in the senate, nor any of the inferior magistrates,
should go so far from the city of Rome as that they could not return
the same day; and that five senators should not be absent from the
city at the same time." A dispute which arose with the maritime
colonies, for some time retarded Caius Livius, the praetor, when
actively engaged in fitting out the fleet. For, when they were
impressed for manning the ships, they appealed to the tribunes of
the people, by whom the cause was referred to the senate. The senate,
without one dissenting voice, resolved, that those colonies were
not entitled to exemption from the sea-service. The colonies which
disputed with the praetor on the subject of exemption were, Ostia,
Fregenae, Castrumnovum, Pyrgi, Antium, Tarracina, Minturnae, and
Sinuessa. The consul, Manius Acilius, then, by direction of the
senate, consulted the college of heralds, "whether a declaration of
war should be made to Antiochus in person, or whether it would be
sufficient to declare it at some garrison town; whether they directed
a separate declaration against the Aetolians, and whether their
alliance and friendship ought not to be renounced before war was
declared." The heralds answered, that "they had given their judgment
before, when they were consulted respecting Philip, that it was of no
consequence whether the declaration were made to himself in person, or
at one of his garrisons. That, in their opinion, friendship had been
already renounced; because, after their ambassadors had so often
demanded restitution, the Aetolians had not thought proper to make
either restitution or apology. That these, by their own act, had made
a declaration of war against themselves, when they seized, by force,
Demetrias, a city in alliance with Rome; when they laid siege to
Chalcis by land and sea; and brought king Antiochus into Europe,
to make war on the Romans." Every preparatory measure being now
completed, the consul, Manius Acilius, issued an edict, that
the "soldiers enlisted, or raised from among the allies by Titus
Quinctius, and who were under orders to go with him to his province;
as, likewise, the military tribunes of the first and third legions,
should assemble at Brundusium, on the ides of May.[1]" He himself,
on the fifth before the nones of May,[2] set out from the city in his
military robe of command. At the same time the praetors, likewise,
departed for their respective provinces.

[Footnote 1: 15th May.]

[Footnote 2: 3rd May.]

4. A little before this time, ambassadors came to Rome from the two
kings, Philip of Macedonia and Ptolemy of Egypt, offering aid of
men, money, and corn towards the support of the war. From Ptolemy was
brought a thousand pounds' weight of gold, and twenty thousand pounds'
weight of silver. None of this was accepted. Thanks were returned to
the kings. Both of them offered to come, with their whole force,
into Aetolia. Ptolemy was excused from that trouble; and Philip's
ambassadors were answered, that the senate and people of Rome would
consider it as a kindness if he should lend his assistance to
the consul, Manius Acilius. Ambassadors came, likewise from the
Carthaginians, and from king Masinissa. The Carthaginians made an
offer of sending a thousand pecks[1] of wheat, and five hundred
thousand of barley to the army, and half that quantity to Rome; which
they requested the Romans to accept from them as a present. They
also offered to fit out a fleet at their own expense, and to give in,
immediately, the whole amount of the annual tribute-money which they
were bound to pay for many years to come. The ambassadors of Masinissa
promised, that their king should send five hundred thousand pecks of
wheat, and three hundred thousand of barley, to the army in Greece,
and three hundred thousand of wheat, and two hundred and fifty
thousand of barley, to Rome; also five hundred horse, and twenty
elephants, to the consul Acilius. The answer given to both, with
regard to the corn, was, that the Roman people would make use of it,
provided they would receive payment for the same. With regard to the
fleet offered by the Carthaginians, no more was accepted than such
ships as they owed by treaty; and, as to the money, they were told,
that none would be taken before the regular days of payment.

[Footnote 1: Here is, doubtless, some word dropped in the original;
so small a quantity could never have been deemed an object for one
powerful state to offer to another. Commentators suppose it to have
been _one hundred_ thousand.]

5. While these things were occurring at Rome, Antiochus, during the
winter season at Chalcis, endeavoured to bring over several of the
states by ambassadors sent among them; while many of their own accord
sent deputies to him; as the Epirots, by the general voice of the
nation, and the Eleans from Peloponnesus. The Eleans requested aid
against the Achaeans; for they supposed, that, since the war had been
declared against Antiochus contrary to their judgment, the Achaeans
would first turn their arms against them. One thousand foot were sent
to them, under the command of Euphanes, a Cretan. The embassy of the
Epirots showed no mark whatever of a liberal or candid disposition.
They wished to ingratiate themselves with the king; but, at the
same time, to avoid giving cause of displeasure to the Romans. They
requested him, "not hastily to make them a party in the dispute,
exposed, as they were, opposite to Italy, and in the front of Greece,
where they must necessarily undergo the first assaults of the Romans.
If he himself, with his land and sea forces, could take charge of
Epirus, the inhabitants would eagerly receive him in all their ports
and cities. But if circumstances allowed him not to do that, then they
earnestly entreated him not to subject them, naked and defenceless, to
the arms of the Romans." Their intention in sending him this message
evidently was, that if he declined going into Epirus, which they
rather supposed would be the case, they were not implicated with
relation to the Roman armies, while they sufficiently recommended
themselves to the king by their willingness to receive him on his
coming; and that, on the other hand, if he should come, even then they
would have hopes of being pardoned by the Romans, for having yielded
to the strength of a prince who was present among them, without
waiting for succour from them, who were so far distant. To this so
evasive embassy, as he did not readily think of a proper answer, he
replied, that he would send ambassadors to them to confer upon such
matters as were of common concernment both to him and them.

6. Antiochus went himself into Boeotia, holding out ostensibly
those causes of resentment against the Romans which I have already
mentioned,--the death of Brachyllas, and the attack made by Quinctius
on Coronea, on account of the massacre of the Roman soldiers; while
the real ones were, that the former excellent policy of that nation,
with respect both to public and private concerns, had, for several
generations, been on the decline; and that great numbers were in such
circumstances, that they could not long subsist without some change
in affairs. Through multitudes of the principal Boeotians, who
every where flocked out to meet him, he arrived at Thebes. There,
notwithstanding that he had (both at Delium, by the attack made on the
Roman troops, and also at Chalcis) already commenced hostilities, by
enterprises of neither a trifling nor of a dubious nature, yet, in
a general council of the nation, he delivered a speech of the same
import with that which he delivered in the first conference at
Chalcis, and that used by his ambassadors in the council of the
Achaeans; that "what he required of them was, to form a league of
friendship with him, not to declare war against the Romans." But not
a man among them was ignorant of his meaning. However, a decree,
disguised under a slight covering of words, was passed in his favour
against the Romans. After securing this nation also on his side, he
returned to Chalcis; and, having despatched letters, summoning the
chief Aetolians to meet him at Demetrias, that he might deliberate
with them on the general plan of operations, he came thither with his
ships on the day appointed for the council. Amynander, likewise,
was called from Athamania to the consultation; and Hannibal the
Carthaginian, who, for a long time before, had not been asked
to attend, was present at this assembly. The subject of their
deliberation was in reference to the Thessalian nation; and every one
present was of opinion, that their concurrence ought to be sought.
The only points on which opinions differed were, that some thought the
attempt ought to be made immediately; while others judged it better to
defer it for the winter season, which was then about half spent,
until the beginning of spring. Some advised to send ambassadors only;
others, that the king should go at the head of all his forces, and if
they hesitated, terrify them into compliance.

7. Although the present debate turned chiefly on these points,
Hannibal, being called on by name to give his opinion, led the king,
and those who were present, into the consideration of the general
conduct of the war, by a speech to this effect:--"If I had been
employed in your councils since we came first into Greece, when you
were consulting about Euboea, the Achaeans, and Boeotians, I would
have offered the same advice which I shall offer you this day, when
your thoughts are employed about the Thessalians. My opinion is, that,
above all things, Philip and the Macedonians should by some means or
other be brought into a participation in this war. For, as to Euboea,
as well as the Boeotians and Thessalians, who can doubt that, having
no strength of their own, they will ever court the power that is
present; and will make use of the same fear, which governs their
councils, as an argument for obtaining pardon? That, as soon as
they shall see a Roman army in Greece, they will turn away to that
government to which they have been accustomed? Nor are they to blame,
if, when the Romans were at so great a distance, they did not choose
to try your force, and that of your army, who were on the spot. How
much more advisable, therefore, and more advantageous would it be, to
unite Philip to us, than these; as, if he once embarks in the cause,
he will have no room for retreat, and as he will bring with him such
a force, as will not only be an accession to a power at war with Rome,
but was able, lately, of itself, to withstand the Romans! With such an
ally, (I wish to speak without offence,) how could I harbour a doubt
about the issue; when I should see the very persons through whom the
Romans prevailed against Philip, now ready to act against them?
The Aetolians, who, as all agree, conquered Philip, will fight
in conjunction with Philip against the Romans. Amynander and the
Athamanian nation, who, next to the Aetolians, performed the greatest
services in that war, will stand on our side. Philip, at the time when
you remained inactive, sustained the whole burden of the war. Now, you
and he, two of the greatest kings, will, with the force of Asia and
Europe, wage war against one state; which, to say nothing of my own
fortune with them, either prosperous or adverse, was certainly, in
the memory of our fathers, unequal to a dispute with a single king of
Epirus; what then, I say, must it be in competition with you two? But
it may be asked. What circumstances induce me to believe that Philip
may be brought to a union with us? First, common utility, which is the
strongest cement of union; and next, you, Aetolians, are yourselves
my informants. For Thoas, your ambassador, among the other arguments
which he used to urge, for the purpose of drawing Antiochus into
Greece, always above all things insisted upon this,--that Philip
expressed extreme indignation that the conditions of servitude had
been imposed on him under the appearance of conditions of peace:
comparing the king's anger to that of a wild beast chained, or shut
up, and wishing to break the bars that confined it. Now, if his temper
of mind is such, let us loose his chains; let us break these bars,
that he may vent, upon the common foe, this anger so long pent up. But
should our embassy fail of producing any effect on him, let us then
take care, that if we cannot unite him to ourselves, he may not be
united to our enemies. Your son, Seleucus, is at Lysimachia; and if,
with the army which he has there, he shall pass through Thrace, and
once begin to make depredations on the nearest parts of Macedonia, he
will effectually divert Philip from carrying aid to the Romans, to
the protection, in the first place, of his own dominions. Such is my
opinion respecting Philip. With regard to the general plan of the war,
you have, from the beginning, been acquainted with my sentiments: and
if my advice had been listened to, the Romans would not now hear that
Chalcis in Euboea was taken, and a fort on the Euripus reduced, but
that Etruria, and the whole coast of Liguria and Cisalpine Gaul, were
in a blaze of war; and, what is to them the greatest cause of alarm,
that Hannibal was in Italy. Even as matters stand at present, I
recommend it to you, to call home all your land and sea forces; let
storeships with provisions follow the fleet; for, as we are here too
few for the exigencies of the war, so are we too many for the scanty
supplies of necessaries. When you shall have collected together the
whole of your force, you will divide the fleet, and keep one division
stationed at Corcyra, that the Romans may not have a clear and safe
passage; and the other you will send to that part of the coast of
Italy which is opposite Sardinia and Africa; while you yourselves,
with all the land forces, will proceed to the territory of Bullium. In
this position you will hold the command of all Greece; you will give
the Romans reason to think, that you intend to sail over to Italy;
and you will be in readiness so to do, if occasion require. This is
my advice; and though I may not be the most skilful in every kind of
warfare, yet surely I must have learned, in a long series of both good
and bad fortune, how to wage war against the Romans. For the execution
of the measures which I have advised, I promise you my most faithful
and zealous endeavours. Whatever plan you shall consider the best, may
the gods grant it their approbation."

8. Such, nearly, was the counsel given by Hannibal, which the hearers
rather commended at the time, than actually executed. For not one
article of it was carried into effect, except the sending Polyxenidas
to bring over the fleet and army from Asia. Ambassadors were sent to
Larissa, to the diet of the Thessalians. The Aetolians and Amynander
appointed a day for the assembling of their troops at Pherae, and the
king with his forces came thither immediately. While he waited there
for Amynander and the Aetolians, he sent Philip, the Megalopolitan,
with two thousand men, to collect the bones of the Macedonians round
Cynoscephalae, where the final battle had been fought with king
Philip; being advised to this, either in order to gain favour with the
Macedonians and draw their displeasure on the king for having left
his soldiers unburied, or having of himself, through the spirit of
vain-glory incident to kings, conceived such a design,--splendid
indeed in appearance, but really insignificant. There is a mount there
formed of the bones which had been scattered about, and were then
collected into one heap. Although this step procured him no thanks
from the Macedonians, yet it excited the heaviest displeasure of
Philip; in consequence of which, he who had hitherto intended to
regulate his counsels by the fortune of events, now sent instantly a
message to the propraetor, Marcus Baebius, that "Antiochus had made
an irruption into Thessaly; that, if he thought proper, he should move
out of his winter quarters, and that he himself would advance to meet
him, that they might consider together what was proper to be done."

9. While Antiochus lay encamped near Pherae, where the Aetolians
and Amynander had joined him, ambassadors came to him from Larissa,
desiring to know on account of what acts or words of theirs he had
made war on the Thessalians; at the same time requesting him to
withdraw his army; and that if there seemed to him any necessity for
it he would discuss it with them by commissioners. In the mean time,
they sent five hundred soldiers, under the command of Hippolochus, to
Pherae, as a reinforcement; but these, being debarred of access by the
king's troops, who blocked up all the roads, retired to Scotussa. The
king answered the Larissan ambassadors in mild terms, that "he came
into their country, not with a design of making war, but of protecting
and establishing the liberty of the Thessalians." He sent a person
to make a similar declaration to the people of Pherae; who,
without giving him any answer, sent to the king, in the capacity of
ambassador, Pausanias, the first magistrate of their state. He offered
remonstrances of a similar kind with those which had been urged in
behalf of the people of Chalcis, at the first conference, on the
strait of the Euripus, as the cases were similar, and urged some with
a greater degree of boldness; on which the king desired that they
would consider seriously before they adopted a resolution, which,
while they were overcautious and provident of futurity, would give
them immediate cause of repentance, and then dismissed him. When the
Pheraeans were acquainted with the result of this embassy, without the
smallest hesitation they determined to endure whatever the fortune of
war might bring on them, rather than violate their engagements with
the Romans. They accordingly exerted their utmost efforts to provide
for the defence of their city; while the king, on his part, resolved
to assail the walls on every side at once; and considering, what was
evidently the case, that it depended on the fate of this city, the
first which he had besieged, whether he should for the future be
despised or dreaded by the whole nation of the Thessalians, he put in
practice every where all possible means of striking them with terror.
The first fury of the assault they supported with great firmness;
but in some time, great numbers of their men being either slain
or wounded, their resolution began to fail. Having soon been
so reanimated by the rebukes of their leaders, as to resolve on
persevering in their resistance, and having abandoned the exterior
circle of the wall, as their numbers now began to fail, they withdrew
to the interior part of the city, round which had been raised a
fortification of less extent. At last, being overcome by distress, and
fearing that if they were taken by storm they might meet no mercy from
the conqueror, they capitulated. The king then lost no time; but while
the alarm was fresh, sent four thousand men against Scotussa, which
surrendered without delay, observing the recent example of those in
Pherae; who, at length compelled by sufferings, had done that which
at first they had obstinately refused. Together with the town,
Hippolochus and the Larissan garrison were yielded to him, all of whom
were dismissed uninjured by the king; who hoped that such behaviour
would operate powerfully towards conciliating the esteem of the
Larissans.

10. Having accomplished all this within the space of ten days after
his arrival at Pherae, he marched with his whole force to Cranon,
which he took immediately on his arrival. He then took Cypaera and
Metropolis, and the forts which lay around them; and now every town
in all that tract was in his power, except Atrax and Gyrton. He next
resolved to lay siege to Larissa, for he thought that (either through
dread inspired by the storming of the other towns, or in consideration
of his kindness in dismissing the troops of their garrison, or being
led by the example of so many cities surrendering themselves) they
would not continue longer in their obstinacy. Having ordered the
elephants to advance in front of the battalions, for the purpose of
striking terror, he approached the city with his army in order of
battle, on which the minds of a great number of the Larissans became
irresolute and perplexed, between their fears of the enemy at
their gates, and their respect for their distant allies. Meantime,
Amynander, with the Athamanian troops, seized on Pellinaeus; while
Menippus, with three thousand Aetolian foot and two hundred horse,
marched into Perrhaebia, where he took Mallaea and Cyretiae by
assault, and ravaged the lands of Tripolis. After executing these
enterprises with despatch, they returned to the king at Larissa just
when he was holding a council on the method of proceeding with regard
to that place. On this occasion there were opposite opinions: for some
thought that force should be applied; that there was no time to be
lost, but that the walls should be immediately attacked with works
and machines on all sides at once; especially as the city stood in a
plain, the entrances open, and the approaches every where level.
While others represented at one time the strength of the city, greater
beyond comparison than that of Pherae; at another, the approach of
the winter season, unfit for any operation of war, much more so for
besieging and assaulting cities. While the king's judgment was in
suspense between hope and fear, his courage was raised by ambassadors
happening to arrive just at the time from Pharsalus, to make surrender
of their city. In the mean time Marcus Baebius had a meeting with
Philip in Dassaretia; and, in conformity to their joint opinion, sent
Appius Claudius to reinforce Larissa, who, making long marches through
Macedonia, arrived at that summit of the mountains which overhang
Gonni. The town of Gonni is twenty miles distant from Larissa,
standing at the opening of the valley called Tempe. Here, by laying
out his camp more widely than his numbers required, and kindling more
fires than were necessary, he imposed on the enemy the opinion which
he wished, that the whole Roman army was there, and king Philip along
with them. Antiochus, therefore, pretending the near approach of
winter as his motive, staid but one day longer, then withdrew from
Larissa, and returned to Demetrias. The Aetolians and Athamanians
retired to their respective countries. Appius, although he saw
that, by the siege being raised, the purpose of his commission was
fulfilled, yet resolved to go down to Larissa, to strengthen the
resolution of the allies against future contingencies. Thus the
Larissans enjoyed a twofold happiness, both because the enemy had
departed from their country, and because they saw a Roman garrison
within their city.