The Constitutional Development of Japan 1863 1881 by Toyokichi Iyenaga
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Toyokichi Iyenaga >> The Constitutional Development of Japan 1863 1881
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
HERBERT B. ADAMS, Editor
History is past Politics and Politics present History.--_Freeman_
NINTH SERIES
IX
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, 1853-1881
BY TOYOKICHI IYENAGA, PH. D.
Professor of Political Science in Tokio Senmon-Gakko
September, 1891
CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTORY
CHAP. I. (1853-1868). BEGINNING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT
THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT GAVE RISE TO THE MOVEMENT
THE ACCOUNT OF COMMODORE PERRY'S ARRIVAL BY THE AUTHOR OF GENJE YUME
MONOGATARI
DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRINCE OF MITO AND THE TOKUGAWA OFFICIALS AT
THE COURT OF YEDO
CONCLUSION OF TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
THE OLD PRINCE OF MITO, NARIAKI
II KAMON NO KAMI
BOMBARDMENTS OF KAGOSHIMA AND SHIMONOSHEKI
THE EFFECTS OF THE BOMBARDMENT
1. Showed the Weakness of the Daimios and the Strength of foreigners
2. Showed the Necessity of National Union, and of the Reconstruction
of the Administrative Machinery of the Empire
GREAT COUNCILS OF KUGES AND DAIMIOS.
1. Their Nature and Organization
2. How they originated
3. In them lay the Germ of the future Constitutional Parliament of
Japan
CHAP. II. (1868-1869). THE RESTORATION
CAUSES OF THE DOWNFALL OF THE SHOGUNATE
1. Revival of Learning
2. Revival of Shintoism
3. Jealousy and Cupidity of the Southern Daimios
THE RESIGNATION OF THE SHOGUN
THE MOTIVE OF HIS RESIGNATION
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RESTORATION
1. Its Organization
2. Its Departments
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT
REMOVAL OF THE CAPITAL TO TOKIO
THE CHARTER OATH OF THE EMPEROR, APRIL 17, 1869
THE KOGISHO
1. Its Origin
2. Its Composition
3. Its Nature
CHAP. III. (1869-1871). THE ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM.
MEMORIAL OF PRESIDENT OF THE KOGISHO
ABOLITION SCHEME OF SCHOLARS IS BACKED BY THE SOUTHERN DAIMIOS
MEMORIAL OF THE SOUTHERN DAIMIOS
IMPERIAL DECREE OF 1871, ABOLISHING FEUDALISM
CAUSES OF THE OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISM
CHAP. IV. INFLUENCES THAT SHAPED THE GROWTH OF THE REPRESENTATIVE IDEA
OF GOVERNMENT
JOHN STEWART MILL'S ENUMERATION OF THE SOCIAL CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR
THE SUCCESS OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
JAPAN OF 1871 NOT YET READY FOR THE ADOPTION OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT
POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF A NATION NOT ISOLATED FROM OTHER SPHERES OF ITS
ACTIVITIES
JAPAN'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT GREATLY AIDED BY HER SOCIAL,
EDUCATIONAL, INDUSTRIAL AND RELIGIOUS CHANGES
SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE NON-POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FROM
1868 TO 1881
1. Means of Communication
a. Telegraph
b. Postal System
c. Railroad
d. Steamers and the Coasting Trade
2. Educational Institutions
3. Newspapers
CHANGES IN LAW AND RELIGION
CHAP. V. (1871-1881). PROGRESS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT FROM THE
ABOLITION OF FEUDALISM TO THE PROCLAMATION OF OCTOBER 12, 1881
LEADERS OF THE RESTORATION
EFFECT OF THE OVERTHROW OF FEUDALISM
THE IWAKURA EMBASSY
IWAKURA, ITO, INOUYE
FUKUZAWA
THE PRESS AND ITS INFLUENCES
RI-SHI-SHA AND COUNT ITAGAKI
MEMORIALS OF RI-SHI-SHA TO THE EMPEROR
ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL ASSEMBLIES
THE PROCLAMATION OF OCTOBER 12, 1881, TO ESTABLISH A PARLIAMENT IN
1890
INTRODUCTORY.
The power which destroyed Japanese feudalism and changed in that
country an absolute into a constitutional monarchy was a resultant
of manifold forces. The most apparent of these forces is the foreign
influence. Forces less visible but more potent, tending in this
direction, are those influences resulting from the growth of commerce
and trade, from the diffusion of western science and knowledge among
the people, and from the changes in social habits and religious
beliefs. The truth of the solidarity of the varied interests of a
social organism is nowhere so well exemplified as in the history of
modern Japan. Her remarkable political development would have been
impossible had there been no corresponding social, educational,
religious, economic and industrial changes. In order to trace the
constitutional development of New Japan, it is therefore necessary:
1. To ascertain the political condition of the country at and after
the advent of foreigners in 1853.
2. To describe the form of government of the Restoration.
3. To examine the state of commerce, industry, education and social
life of Japan at each stage of her political transformations.
4. To recount the constitutional changes from the Restoration to the
Promulgation of the New Constitution.
As a novice in travel marks the broad outlines, the general features
and more important products of the country he visits for the first
time, so I shall dwell upon the historic landmarks of Japanese
constitutional development. This development no writer, native or
foreign, has yet attempted to trace. I shall withstand as much as
possible the temptation to refer to the multitude of events which
are more or less associated with the constitutional movement. I shall
endeavor to ascertain from the edicts, decrees, and proclamations of
the Emperor, from the orders and manifestos of the Shogun, from the
native authors and journals, from the memorials and correspondence
of prominent men, both native and foreign, the trend of our
constitutional development. I shall also endeavor to note the leading
ideas and principles which, after manifesting themselves in various
forms, have at last crystallized into the New Constitution of Japan.
CHAPTER I.
BEGINNING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT.
The constitutional movement of Japan began in a spontaneous agitation
of the whole body politic when the nation was irritated by the sudden
contact with foreigners. The sense of national weakness added a force
to this agitation. Had not the foreigners come, the Restoration might
have been effected, feudalism might have been abolished, but the
new Japanese constitution would hardly have seen the day. Had the
government of Japan at the time of the advent of foreigners been in
the strong hand of a Taiko or an Iyeyasu, the rulers might have been
greatly exercised by the extraordinary event, but public opinion
for reform would hardly have been called forth, and the birth of
constitutional liberty would long have been delayed. As the vices of
King John and the indifference and ignorance of the first two Georges
of England begat the strength and hope of the English Parliament, so
the public opinion of Japan sprouted out of the ruins of the Shogunate
regime. We must therefore seek for the beginning of the Constitutional
Movement of Japan in the peculiar circumstances in which she found
herself between 1853 and 1868.
The advent of Commodore Perry in 1853 was to Japan like the intrusion
of a foreign queen into a beehive. The country was stirred to
its depth. Let us note what a native chronicler[1] says about the
condition of Japan at the arrival of Perry:
"It was in the summer of 1853 that an individual named Perry, who
called himself the envoy of the United States of America, suddenly
arrived at Uraga, in the Province of Sagami, with four ships of war,
declaring that he brought a letter from his country to Japan and that
he wished to deliver it to the sovereign. The governor of the place,
Toda Idzu No Kami, much alarmed by this extraordinary event, hastened
to the spot to inform himself of its meaning. The envoy stated, in
reply to questions, that he desired to see a chief minister in order
to explain the object of his visit and to hand over to him the letter
with which he was charged. The governor then despatched a messenger
on horseback with all haste to carry this information to the castle
of Yedo, where a great scene of confusion ensued on his arrival. Fresh
messengers followed, and the Shogun Iyeyoshi, on receiving them, was
exceedingly troubled, and summoned all the officials[2] to a council.
At first the affair seemed so sudden and so formidable that they were
too alarmed to open their mouths, but in the end orders were issued to
the great clans to keep strict watch at various points on the shore,
as it was possible that the 'barbarian' vessels might proceed to
commit acts of violence. Presently a learned Chinese scholar was sent
to Uraga, had an interview with the American envoy, and returned
with the letter, which expressed the desire of the United States to
establish friendship and intercourse with Japan, and said, according
to this account, that if they met with a refusal they should commence
hostilities. Thereupon the Shogun was greatly distressed, and again
summoned a council. He also asked the opinion of the Daimios. The
assembled officials were exceedingly disturbed, and nearly broke their
hearts over consultations which lasted all day and all night. The
nobles and retired nobles in Yedo were informed that they were at
liberty to state any ideas they might have on the subject, and,
although they all gave their opinions, the diversity of propositions
was so great that no decision was arrived at. The military class
had, during a long peace, neglected military arts; they had given
themselves up to pleasure and luxury, and there were very few who had
put on armor for many years, so that they were greatly alarmed at the
prospect that war might break out at a moment's notice, and began to
run hither and thither in search of arms. The city of Yedo and the
surrounding villages were in a great tumult. And there was such a
state of confusion among all classes that the governors of the city
were compelled to issue a notification to the people, and this in the
end had the effect of quieting the general anxiety. But in the castle
never was a decision further from being arrived at, and, whilst time
was being thus idly wasted, the envoy was constantly demanding an
answer. So at last they decided that it would be best to arrange the
affair quietly, to give the foreigners the articles they wanted, and
to put off sending an answer to the letter--to tell the envoy that in
an affair of such importance to the state no decision could be arrived
at without mature consideration, and that he had better go away; that
in a short time he should get a definite answer. The envoy agreed, and
after sending a message to say that he should return in the following
spring for his answer, set sail from Uraga with his four ships."[3]
Thus was the renowned commander kept away for awhile. He went,
however, of his own accord. Perry was an astute diplomatist. He knew
that time was needed for the impressions which he and his magnificent
fleet had made upon the country to produce their natural effect.
The news of Perry's visit and demands spread far and wide with
remarkable rapidity. The government and the people were deeply
stirred. Soon the song of the "red-bearded barbarians" and of the
black ships was in everybody's mouth. The question "What shall Japan
do when the barbarians come next spring?" became the absorbing theme
of the day.
There was now but one of two policies which Japan could pursue, either
to shut up the country or to admit the foreigners' demand. There was
no middle course left. The American envoy would no longer listen to
the dilatory policy with which the Japanese had just bought a few
months' respite from anxiety.
The majority of the ruling class, the Samurai, were in favor of the
exclusion policy. So was the court of Kioto. But the views of the
court of Yedo were different. The court of Yedo had many men of
intelligence, common sense and experience--men who had seen the
American envoy and his squadron, equipped with all the contrivances
for killing men and devastating the country. These men knew too well
that resistance to the foreigners was futile and perilous.
Thus was the country early divided into two clearly defined parties,
the Jo-i[4] party and the Kai-Koku party.
Meanwhile, the autumn and winter of 1853 passed. The spring of 1854
soon came, and with it the intractable "barbarians." Let us hear the
author of Genje Yume Monogatari relate the return of Perry and the
great discussion that ensued at the court of Yedo:
"Early in 1854 Commodore Perry returned, and the question of acceding
to his demands was again hotly debated. The old prince of Mito was
opposed to it, and contended that the admission of foreigners
into Japan would ruin it. 'At first,' said he, 'they will give us
philosophical instruments, machinery and other curiosities; will take
ignorant people in, and, trade being their chief object, they will
manage bit by bit to impoverish the country, after which they will
treat us just as they like--perhaps behave with the greatest rudeness
and insult us, and end by swallowing up Japan. If we do not drive them
away now we shall never have another opportunity. If we now resort to
a dilatory method of proceeding we shall regret it afterwards when it
will be of no use.'
"The officials (of the Shogun), however, argued otherwise and
said: 'If we try to drive them away they will immediately commence
hostilities, and then we shall be obliged to fight. If we once get
into a dispute we shall have an enemy to fight who will not be easily
disposed of. He does not care how long a time he must spend over it,
but he will come with myriads of men-of-war and surround our shores
completely; he will capture our junks and blockade our ports, and
deprive us of all hope of protecting our coasts. However large a
number of ships we might destroy, he is so accustomed to that sort
of thing that he would not care in the least. Even supposing that our
troops were animated by patriotic zeal in the commencement of the war,
after they had been fighting for several years their patriotic zeal
would naturally become relaxed, the soldiers would become fatigued,
and for this we should have to thank ourselves. Soldiers who have
distinguished themselves are rewarded by grants of land, or else
you attack and seize the enemy's territory and that becomes your own
property; so every man is encouraged to fight his best. But in a war
with foreign countries a man may undergo hardships for years, may
fight as if his life were worth nothing, and, as all the land in this
country already has owners, there will be none to be given away as
rewards; so we shall have to give rewards in words or money. In time
the country would be put to an immense expense and the people be
plunged into misery. Rather than allow this, as we are not the equals
of foreigners in the mechanical arts, let us have intercourse with
foreign countries, learn their drill and tactics, and when we have
made the nation as united as one family, we shall be able to go abroad
and give lands in foreign countries to those who have distinguished
themselves in battle. The soldiers will vie with one another in
displaying their intrepidity, and it will not be too late then to
declare war. Now we shall have to defend ourselves against these
foreign enemies, skilled in the use of mechanical appliances, with
our soldiers whose military skill has considerably diminished during
a long peace of three hundred years, and we certainly could not feel
sure of victory, especially in a naval war.'"[5]
The Kai-Koku party, the party in favor of opening the country,
triumphed, and the treaty was finally concluded between the United
States and Japan on the 31st of March, 1854. After the return of
Commodore Perry to America, Townsend Harris was sent by the United
States Government as Consul-General to Japan. He negotiated the
commercial treaty between the United States and Japan on July 29,
1858.
At the heels of the Americans followed the English, French, Russians,
Dutch, and other nations. Japan's foreign relations became more and
more complicated and therefore difficult to manage.
The discussion quoted above is a type of the arguments used by the
Jo-i party and the Kai-Koku party. The history of Japanese politics
from 1853 to 1868 is the history of the struggle between these two
parties, each of which soon changed its name. As the Jo-i party allied
itself with the court of Kioto, it became the O-sei or Restoration
party. As the Kai-Koku party was associated with the court of Shogun,
it became the Bakufu party. The struggle ended in the triumph of the
Restoration party. But by that time the Jo-i party, from a cause which
I shall soon mention, had been completely transformed and converted to
the Western ideas.
Among the leaders of the Jo-i party was Nariaki, the old prince of
Mito. He belonged to one of the San Kay (three families), out of which
Iyeyasu ordered the Shogun to be chosen. He was connected by marriage
with the families of the Emperor and the highest Kuges in Miako, and
with the wealthiest Daimios. In power the Mito family thus ranked high
among the Daimios. Among the scholars the Prince of Mito was popular.
The prestige of his great ancestor, the compiler of Dai-Nihon-Shi, had
not yet died out. The Prince of Mito was thus naturally looked up to
by the scholars as the man of right principles and of noble ideas. A
shrewd, clever, and scheming old man, the Prince of Mito now became
the defender of the cause of the Emperor and the mouthpiece of the
conservative party.
At the head of the Bakufu party was a man of iron and fertile
resources, Ii Kamon No Kami. He was the Daimio of Hikone, a castled
town and fief on Lake Biwa, in Mino. His revenue was small, being only
three hundred and fifty thousand koku. But in position and power none
in the empire could rival him. He was the head of the Fudai Daimios.
His family was called the Dodai or foundation-stone of the power
of the Tokugawa dynasty. His ancestor, Ii Nawo Massa, had been
lieutenant-general and right-hand man of Iyeyas. Ii Kamon No Kami,
owing to the mental infirmity of the reigning Shogun, had lately
become his regent. Bold, ambitious, able, and unscrupulous, Ii was the
Richelieu of Japan. From this time on till his assassination on March
23, 1860, he virtually ruled the empire, and, in direct contravention
to the imperial will, negotiated with foreign nations, as we have
seen, for the opening of ports for trade with them. He was styled the
"swaggering prime minister," and his name was long pronounced with
contempt and odium. Lately, however, his good name has been rescued
and his fame restored by the noble effort of an able writer, Mr.
Saburo Shimada.[6] But this able prime minister fell on March 23,
1860, by the sword of Mito ronins, who alleged, as the pretext of
their crime, that "Ii Kamon No Kami had insulted the imperial
decree and, careless of the misery of the people, but making foreign
intercourse his chief aim, had opened ports." "The position of
the government upon the death of the regent was that of helpless
inactivity. The sudden removal of the foremost man of the empire was
as the removal of the fly-wheel from a piece of complicated machinery.
The whole empire stood aghast, expecting and fearing some great
political convulsion."[7]
The Shogun began to make a compromise to unite the Emperor's power and
the Shogun's, by taking the sister of the Emperor for his wife.
Meanwhile great events were taking place in the southern corner of
Kiushiu and on the promontory of Shikoku, events which were to effect
great changes in men's ideas. These were the bombardments of Kagoshima
and of Shimonosheki, the first on August 11, 1863, the second on
September 5, 1864. I shall not dwell here on the injustice of these
barbarous and heathenish acts of the so-called civilized and Christian
nations; for I am not writing a political pamphlet. But impartially
let us note the great effects of these bombardments.
I. These conflicts showed on a grand but sad scale the weakness of the
Daimios, even the most powerful of them, and, on the other hand, the
power of the foreigners and their rifled cannon and steamers. The
following Japanese memorandum expresses this point: "Satsuma's eyes
were opened since the fight of Kagoshima, and affairs appeared to him
in a new light; he changed in favor of foreigners, and thought now of
making his country powerful and completing his armaments."[8]
The Emperor also wrote in a rather pathetic tone to the Shogun
touching the relative strength of the Japanese and the foreigners: "I
held a council the other day with my military nobility (Daimios and
nobles), but unfortunately inured to the habits of peace, which for
more than two hundred years has existed in our country, we are unable
to exclude and subdue our foreign enemies by the forcible means of
war....
"If we compare our Japanese ships of war and cannon to those of the
barbarians, we feel certain that they are not sufficient to inflict
terror upon the foreign barbarians, and are also insufficient to make
the splendor of Japan shine in foreign countries. I should think
that we only should make ourselves ridiculous in the eyes of the
barbarians."[9]
From the time of the bombardment, Satsuma and Choshiu began to
introduce European machinery and inventions, to employ skilled
Europeans to teach them, and to send their young men to Europe and
America.
II. These bombardments showed the necessity of national union. Whether
she would repel or receive the foreigner, Japan must present a united
front. To this end, great change in the internal constitution of the
empire was needed; the internal resources of the nation had to be
gathered into a common treasury; the police and the taxes had to be
recognized as national, not as belonging to petty local chieftains;
the power of the feudal lords had to be broken in order to
reconstitute Japan as a single strong state under a single head. These
are the ideas which led the way to the Restoration of 1868. Thus the
bombardments of Kagoshima and Shimonosheki may be said to have helped
indirectly in the Restoration of that year. But before we proceed to
the history of the Restoration, let us examine what were the great
Councils of Kuges and Daimios, which were sometimes convened during
the period from 1857 to 1868.
The Council of Kuges was occasionally convened by the order of the
Emperor. It was composed of the princes of the blood, nobles, and
courtiers. The Council of Daimios was now and then summoned either by
the Emperor or by the Shogun. It was composed mostly of the Daimios.
These councils were like the Witenagemot of England, formed of the
wise and influential men of the kingdom. As the Daimios had far more
weight in the political scale of the realm than the Kuges, so the
council of the Daimios was of far more importance than that of the
Kuges. But it must not be understood that these councils were regular
meetings held in the modern parliamentary way; nor that they had
anything like the powers of the British Parliament or of the American
Congress. These councils of Japan were called into spasmodic life
simply by the necessity of the time. They were held either at the
court of Kioto or that of Yedo, or at other places appointed for the
purpose. The Kuges or Daimios assembled rather in an informal way,
measured by modern parliamentary procedure, but in accordance with the
court etiquette of the time, whose most minute regulations and rules
have often embarrassed and plagued the modern ministers accredited to
the court of the Emperor. Then these councils proceeded to discuss the
burning questions of the day, among which the most prominent was, of
course, the foreign policy. The earliest instance of the meeting of
the Council of Kuges was immediately after the news of Perry's arrival
had reached the court of Kioto. "Upon this," says the author of
Genje Yume Monogatari, "the Emperor was much disturbed, and called a
council, which was attended by a number of princes of the blood and
Kuges, and much violent language was uttered."
From this time on we meet often with the record of these councils.[10]
A native chronicler records that on the 29th day of the 12th month
of 1857 "a meeting of all Daimios (present in Yedo) was held in the
Haku-sho-in, a large hall in the castle of Yedo. The deliberations
were not over till two o'clock on the morning of the 30th."
Soon after this the Emperor ordered the Shogun to come to Kioto with
all the Daimios and ascertain the opinion of the country. But the
Shogun did not come, so the Emperor sent his envoy, Ohara Sammi, and
called the meeting of the Daimios at Yedo in 1862, in which the noted
Shimadzu Saburo was also present.
In 1864 the council of Daimios was again held, and Minister Pruyn,
in his letter to Mr. Seward, bears witness of the proceeding: "It is
understood the great council of Daimios is again in session; that
the question of the foreign policy of the government is again under
consideration, and that the opposite parties are pretty evenly
balanced."[11]
From this time the council of Daimios was held every year, sometimes
many times in the year, till the Revolution of 1868. These examples
will suffice to show the nature and purpose of these councils of Kuges
and Daimios. Let us next consider how these councils originated.
The political development of Japan gives another illustration of one
of the truths which Mr. Herbert Spencer unfolds in his Principles
of Sociology. "Everywhere the wars between societies," says he,
"originate governmental structures, and are causes of all such
improvements in those structures as increase the efficiency of
corporate action against environing societies."[12]