Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XI., April, 1863, No. LXVI. by Various

V >> Various >> Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XI., April, 1863, No. LXVI.

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[Footnote A: _Richmond Examiner_, January 20th, 1863.]

"It is not altogether an empty boast on the part of the Yankees, that
they hold all that they have ever held, and that another year or two of
such progress as they have already made will find them masters of the
Southern Confederacy. They who think independence is to be achieved by
brilliant but inconsequential victories would do well to look at the
magnitude of Yankee possessions in our country. Maryland, Kentucky, and
Missouri are claimed as constituent parts of the Confederation: they are
as much in the power of Lincoln as Maine and Minnesota. The pledge once
deemed foolish by the South, that he would 'hold, occupy, and possess'
all the forts belonging to the United States Government, has been
redeemed almost to the letter by Lincoln. Forts Pickens, [Sumter?] and
Morgan we still retain; but, with these exceptions, all the strongholds
on the seaboard, from Fortress Monroe to the Rio Grande, are in the
hands of the enemy. Very consoling and very easy to say that it was
impossible to prevent all this, and that the occupation of the outer
edge of the Republic amounts to nothing. Drowry's Bluff and Vicksburg
give the lie to the first assertion; and the onward movement of
Rosecrans towards Alabama, the presence of Grant in North Mississippi
and of Curtis in Middle Arkansas, to say nothing of Banks at New Orleans
and Baton Rouge, set at rest the silly dream that a thin strip of
sea-coast only is in possession of our foes. The truth is, the Yankees
are in great force in the very heart of the Confederacy; they swarm on
all our borders; they threaten every important city yet belonging to us;
and nearly two hundred thousand of them are within two days' march of
the Confederate capital. This is no fiction. It is a fact so positive
that no one can deny it."

But this reluctant recital by no means exhausts the record of our
successes. We have put into the field a volunteer force, fully armed and
equipped, which, whether we consider its magnitude, the rapidity with
which it has been raised, its fighting qualities, its patient endurance
of unaccustomed hardships, or its intelligent appreciation of the
principles involved in the contest, is without a counterpart in history.
And yet more, from the invention and achievements of our iron-clads
dates a new era in naval warfare, while in the value and variety of our
ordnance we have taken the lead of all civilized nations. Can you find
in all this nothing to quicken the pulse of your patriotism? Is here no
ground for encouragement, no incitement to renewed effort?

But you complain of corruption among contractors, and of knavery among
politicians. Will you point me to a single war, ever waged on the face
of the earth, where all the rulers were above reproach and all their
subordinates unselfish? But what will you do about it? Grant that many
contractors have made dishonest fortunes out of the calamities of their
country, and that there are officeholders with whom "Stand by the
Constitution!" means, Stand by the public crib from which we are
richly and regularly fed, and "Uphold the Administration!" should be
translated, Give us our full four years' enjoyment of the loaves and
fishes. What then? Shall a few worthless straws here, and a few heaps
of offal there, arrest or check the onward march of a mighty army,
the steady progression of a great principle? Away with such trumpery
considerations! Punish with the utmost severity of the law every public
plunderer whose crimes can be dragged into the light of day; send to the
Coventry of universal contempt every lagging and lukewarm official; but,
in the name of all that is holy in purpose and noble in action, _move
on!_ To hesitate is worse than folly; to delay is more than madness.
The salvation of our country trembles in the balance. The fate of free
institutions for--who shall say how long?--may hang upon the issue of
the struggle.

Your catalogue of grievances, however, is still incomplete. You are
dissatisfied with our generalship as displayed in the field, and with
the wisdom of our policy as developed by the cabinet. Unquestionably you
have a constitutional right to grumble to your heart's content; but are
you not aware that such complaints are as old as the history of the
human race? Do you believe this to be the first war that was ever
mismanaged, and that our undoubted blunders are either novel or peculiar
to Republics? There never was a greater mistake. If there were brave men
before Agamemnon, and wise counsellors before Ulysses, there certainly
have been incompetent commanders before Major-General A., and shallow
statesmen before Secretary B. We do not monopolize executive imbecility,
nor are our military blunders without parallel or precedent. To
attribute our occasional reverses and our indecisive victories, our
inaction in the field and our confusion in the cabinet, to our peculiar
form of government, is as inconsequential as it would be to trace all
our disasters to the color of President Lincoln's hair or the number of
General Halleck's children.

The enemies of free institutions, hardly yet recovered from their
astonishment at beholding an army of volunteers, superior in number
and quality to any the world ever saw, spring into existence with such
marvellous rapidity as to eclipse, in sober fact, the fabulous birth
of Minerva full-armed from the head of Jove, or their still greater
surprise at seeing the immense expenses of so gigantic a war readily met
without assistance from abroad, by large loans cheerfully made and heavy
taxation patiently borne, are reduced to the necessity of exulting over
what they term our "total want of military genius," and our "incapacity
to conduct a campaign successfully."

It is useless to deny that we may have challenged criticism and provoked
a smile by our large promise and our smaller performance. But are we the
sole and exclusive proprietors of this experience? Where in the past or
the present shall we find a great and powerful nation much addicted to
modesty or self-depreciation? Least of all, should we have expected such
venomous criticism and such unsparing ridicule from England. To be sure,
we have long since ceased to look for sympathy or even justice at her
hands. We have come to understand and appreciate the tone and temper of
her ruling classes towards this country. In addition to their inherited
antipathy to Republics, they believe in sober earnest what one of their
greatest wits said jocosely, that "the great object for which the
Anglo-Saxon race appears to have been created is the making of calico."
And whatever interferes, or threatens to interfere, with this ennobling
occupation is sure to incur their passive displeasure, if not their
active hostility. We expect nothing, therefore, from their good-will;
but we have a right to demand, as a matter of good taste, that, in
criticizing our campaigns, they shall not wholly ignore their own
military blunders, especially those so recent as to be fresh in the
recollection of every third-form school-boy in the kingdom. For, if
campaigns carried on with the smallest possible result in proportion to
the magnitude of the sacrifice of money and life,--if a succession of
incompetent generals in command,--if critical military opportunities
neglected and enormous strategic blunders committed,--if indecision,
nepotism, and red tape at home, envy, want of unity, and incapacity
among officers, and unnecessary and inexcusable hardship among the
privates,--if all this declares the decadence of a Government, then was
the sun of England hastening to its setting during the Crimean War.

We hear much said abroad about our indecisive battles, our barren
victories, our failure to take advantage of the crippled condition of
a defeated enemy, and our unaccountable disinclination to follow up a
successful attack by a prompt pursuit. Now, not for the sake of excusing
or palliating the numerous and grave errors into which we have fallen
during our own unhappy struggle, nor yet to exonerate from censure
any civil officers or military leaders who may be wholly or in part
responsible for these errors, but simply to demonstrate that they are
liable to occur under any form of government, and, indeed, have recently
befallen the very Government whose rulers now hold us to the strictest
account, and are most eager to convict us of extraordinary misconduct
and incapacity, we propose, very briefly, and without further
introduction, to examine the record of the English army during the
Crimean War.

The first important battle fought on the Peninsula was that of the Alma.
We will give, as concisely as possible, so much of the history of this
engagement, compiled from authentic English sources, as will present a
correct picture of the plans formed and the results accomplished.

"The 15th of August, 1854, was the date first fixed for the sailing of
the allied forces from Varna to the Crimea. It was postponed until the
20th, then till the 22d, then the 26th,--then successively to the 1st,
2d, and 7th of September; that is, the French fleet left Varna on the
5th, and the English sailed from the neighboring port of Baltschik
on the 7th." It is admitted that "these delays hazarded not only the
success, but even the practicability of the whole design, as between the
15th and 25th of September the great equinoctial gales sweep over the
Black Sea, and lash it into tempests of the most destructive nature."

The voyage, however, was accomplished in safety, and on the 14th of
September the Allies arrived at the Crimea, off a place called the "Old
Fort," only about thirty miles north of Sebastopol. The whole army was
composed of 27,000 English, 24,000 French, and 8,000 Turks. The landing
occupied the 14th, 15th, and 16th of September. At nine o'clock, A.M.,
of September 19th, the army began the advance, and on the evening of
the same day rested for the night within sight of the Russian forces,
strongly intrenched on the banks of the Alma, about twelve miles distant
from the "Old Fort." Early in the afternoon of the following day the
Allies attacked the stronghold of the enemy, and in less than three
hours the Russian intrenchments were successfully stormed, and the
Russian army was in full retreat. The English and French troops fought
with determined and distinguished bravery, and their victory was
complete. But what was decided by this bloody struggle? Bad generalship
on the part of the Russians, certainly; but what else? Mr. Russell
says,--"This great battle was not decisive, so far as the fate of
Sebastopol was concerned, merely because we lacked either the means or
the military genius to make it so." The victory was not followed up, the
retreating foe were not pursued, ample time was given to the enemy to
reorganize and retrieve their losses, and the evening of the eventful
20th of September found the allied forces no nearer the capture of
Sebastopol than they were before the battle.

Did "the Alma" crown the allied generals with fresh and well-earned
laurels? We appeal once more to Mr. Russell:--"I may inquire, Was there
any generalship shown by any of the allied generals at the Alma? We have
Lord Raglan painted by one of his staff, trotting in front of his army,
amid a shower of balls, 'just as if he were riding down Rotten Row,'
with a kind nod for every one, and leaving his generals to fight it
out as best they could; riding across the stream through the French
Riflemen, not knowing where he was going to, or where the enemy were,
till fate led him to a little knoll, from which he saw some of the
Russian guns on his flank; whereupon he sent an order to Turner's
battery for guns, and seemed surprised that they could not be dragged
across a stream and up a hill which presented some difficulties to an
unencumbered horseman; then cantering off to join the Guards just ere
they made their charge, and finding it all over while he was in a
hollow of the ground." Lord Raglan, let it be remembered, was the
Commander-in-Chief of the English forces. And again:--"The Light
Division was strangely handled. Sir George Brown, whose sight was so
indifferent that he had to get one of his officers to lead his horse
across the river, seemed not to know where his division was.... If the
conduct of a campaign be a succession of errors, the Crimean expedition
was certainly carried on _secundum artem_." Once more, on the same
point, and quoting from the same authority:--"All the Russian officers
with whom I have conversed, all the testimony I have heard or read,
coincide on these two points: first, that, if, on the 25th, we had moved
to Bakschiserai in pursuit of the Russians, we should have found their
army in a state of the most complete demoralization, and might have
forced the great majority of them to surrender as prisoners of war, in a
sort of _cul-de-sac,_ from which but few could have escaped; secondly,
that, had we advanced directly against Sebastopol, the town would have
surrendered, after some slight show of resistance to save the honor of
the officers." Certainly, such generalship as this did not promise very
well for the results of the campaign.

Let us follow the movements of the Allies a little farther. On the
morning of September 25th, the combined forces took up their line of
march southward. On the 26th, they reached and occupied the town of
Balaklava, about six miles distant from Sebastopol. On the 28th of the
same month, Lord Raglan wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, then Secretary
of War, "We are busily engaged in disembarking our siege-train and
provisions, and we are most desirous of undertaking the attack of
Sebastopol _without the loss of a day_." And yet it is not until October
10th that the Allies commence digging their trenches before the town.
Meanwhile the allied army was anxious and impatient. "'When will the
siege commence?' was the constant inquiry of the wearied and expectant
troops. 'To-morrow,' was the usual response, 'most probably to-morrow.'
But day after day came and went, and the Allies still rusted in
inaction, while the Russians worked day and night at strengthening their
defences." "The time dragged heavily on; still the Russians worked with
incredible industry, and still the cannon of the Allies had not yet
opened their thunders upon Sebastopol." On the 17th of October,
twenty-one days after the occupation of Balaklava, the allied forces
commenced fire by land and sea on the stronghold of the enemy. The
bombardment continued from half-past six, A.M., until nightfall, but is
conceded to have been a complete and mortifying failure. From this time
until the 5th of November, it will not be contended that any substantial
advantage was gained by the invading forces, or that material progress
was made towards the reduction of the Russian Gibraltar.

Then came the Battle of Inkerman, a gallant and desperate sortie of the
Russians, bravely and successfully resisted by the besiegers. The loss
of life on both sides was terrible. To what extent was _this_ battle
decisive? Mr. Russell shall give his own testimony on this point:--"We
had nothing to rejoice over, and almost everything to deplore, in the
Battle of Inkerman. We defeated the enemy, indeed, but had not advanced
one step nearer the citadel of Sebastopol." In other words, the Allies
had repulsed the Russians, but had barely escaped annihilation, while,
from having been the besiegers, they became the besieged, and remained
so until largely reinforced from home. "A heavy responsibility," says
Mr. Russell, "rests on those whose neglect enabled the enemy to attack
us where we were least prepared for it, and whose indifference led them
to despise precautions which, taken in time, might have saved us many
valuable lives, and have trebled the loss of the enemy." The English
not only committed the serious error of underrating the enemy, and
neglecting the most ordinary precautions against surprise, but, during
the whole of the desperate and bloody fight, they gave no proof whatever
of generalship. The stubborn, unyielding bravery of the troops was
the salvation of the army. "We owed the victory, such as it was, to
strength, not to superior intelligence and foresight. It was a soldiers'
battle, in which we were saved by the muscle, nerve, and courage of our
men." Humanity shudders and the heart sickens over the sufferings
of that gallant army of martyrs to cabinet incapacity and military
imbecility during the long and dreary winter of 1854-55.

On the 9th of April, 1855, commenced the second grand bombardment of
Sebastopol, which, though continuing for twelve days, resulted, like the
first, in mortifying failure, no serious or irreparable injuries being
caused to the main defences of the enemy. "The real strength of the
place remained unimpaired. That which was injured during the day the
Russians repaired as if by magic during the night. The particulars of
this twelve days' bombardment are wearisome. The same wasted energy, the
same night-skirmishes without effect, the same battering and repairing,
the same unwearied exertions On the part of the Allies and wonderful
endurance and resistance on the part of the Russians, together with, on
each side, the same loss of life and frightful mutilations."

Two months were passed in comparative inaction, the sad monotony being
varied only by ineffective sorties and indecisive skirmishes. On the
18th of June, the first grand assault of the Malakhoff and Redan was
attempted. The allied troops displayed the utmost gallantry, and did all
that brave men could do under disgracefully incompetent commanders, but
were repulsed with horrible slaughter. No one can read the details of
the fruitless massacre, without fully confirming the indignant testimony
of an intelligent eye-witness, writing from the camp:--

"I know not what may have been the feelings of your home public, on
reading the telegraphic news of our defeat, (for I presume the scribes
at head-quarters made no attempt to conceal the naked truth, that our
repulse was neither more nor less than a defeat,) but here mingled shame
and indignation were general throughout the camp. Officers and men alike
felt that disgrace had been incurred, and that solely in consequence
of the unredeemed mismanagement of their generals. Remembering the
confusion which characterized the commencement of our movement, and
coupling this with the murderous preparations made by the enemy, you
will be at no loss to understand that success was most improbable.
During the whole affair, Lord Raglan and Sir George Brown were ensconced
within our eight-gun battery; but, though this afforded a good view of
the scene of the struggle, and of the disorders which marked it,
they appeared to be unable to give any efficient directions for the
correction of our multiplied blunders. When the whole sad scene was
ended, our men straggled back to the camp in a state of dispirited
confusion, well in keeping with the mob-like disorder in which they had
been throughout the assault."

The final bombardment of Sebastopol took place on the 5th of September,
followed on the 8th by the renewed assault of the French on the
Malakhoff and of the English on the Redan. Skilful generalship, adequate
forces, and desperate bravery gave victory to the French, and "the key
to Sebastopol" remained in their hands. Meanwhile the English assault
upon the Redan was repulsed with frightful sacrifice of life. It will
not be contended that the French owed any part of their success to
superior good-fortune. Indeed, all the extrinsic advantages were on the
side of the English. The French were to lead off in the assault, and the
tricolor waving over the captured fortification was to be the signal for
the advance of the English. If the French succeeded, every sentiment of
personal ambition and national pride would stimulate their allies to
achieve an equal victory. If the French failed, the English had only to
remain in their trenches.

Now let us examine the comparative generalship displayed in the two
assaults. We are quite willing that English authority should draw the
contrast. "The preparations of the French were actually scientific in
their vigorous attention to every matter calculated to lead to victory:
nothing appeared to have been forgotten, nothing neglected. Even the
watches of the leading officers had been regulated, that there might not
be the smallest error with regard to time. It is a painful reflection
that this carefulness of preparation, and prescience with respect to
probabilities, was not shown by the English general and his associates
in arranging the mode of attack. When the orders were promulgated, on
the 7th, many officers shook their heads doubtingly, and observed,
in deprecating tones, 'This looks like another 18th of June.' It was
generally observed that the attacking columns were not strong enough,
that they were too far behind, and that the trenches did not afford room
for a sufficient number of men."

The signal for the French assault was given: thirty thousand men, weary
of long inactivity, and burning to add new lustre to the bright record
of their country's military glory,--drums and trumpets meanwhile
sounding the charge, and the air resounding with shouts of _"Vive
l'Empereur,"_--darted from their trenches, swarmed up the embankments,
dashed over the parapet, swept the enemy like chaff before them; and the
Malakhoff was won. Hours of the fiercest fighting found the French still
masters of the situation; at nightfall the Russian general sullenly drew
off his defeated forces, and the victory was complete.

It is painful to turn from this brilliant picture to the sombre coloring
and the dreary details of the attack on the Redan. To three thousand
doomed men was assigned the perilous undertaking. Incredible as it
may appear, in view of previous failure, there seems to have been no
adequate preparation, no intelligible plan, no competent leader. It
was simply brute force assailing brute force. The few men who actually
entered the Redan neglected to spike the guns; no reinforcements came to
their aid; everything was blind excitement, and headlong, undisciplined
haste. "The men of the different regiments became mingled together in
inextricable confusion. The Nineteenth men did not care for the officers
of the Eighty-Eighth, nor did the soldiers of the Twenty-Third heed the
command of an officer who did not belong to their regiment. The officers
could not find their men,--the men lost sight of their officers." But
why dwell on what soon became mere butchery? The loss of the storming
party, in killed, wounded, and missing, was 2447.

Considered as a military movement, it would seem to be conceded that no
grosser blunder could have been made than the selection of so small a
force for so desperate an undertaking. There was no chance of success
but by attacking simultaneously both flanks and the salient of the
Redan. The storming party was barely large enough for the assault of the
salient, thus exposing the handful of men to a murderous and fatally
destructive fire from the flanks. This was bad enough, certainly, but
worse remains behind. English critics have most severely censured
our generals for sometimes placing new recruits in posts of danger,
requiring cool heads, steady nerves, and the habit of discipline.
Perhaps they have forgotten the following incident. Among the picked men
selected out of the entire British forces as this very storming party
were raw recruits from the Ninety-Seventh Regiment, who were designated
for this perilous service as a punishment for their cowardice in a
recent skirmish!--and to make this punishment still more severe, they
were ordered to _lead off_ in the assault! An historian of the war
says,--"The inexperience of some of these recruits seems almost
incredible. One young fellow, who came to the field-hospital with a
broken arm and a bullet in his shoulder, carried his firelock with him,
but confessed that he had never fired it off, _as he was unable to do
so_. The piece, upon being examined, was found to be in perfect order.
Such poor undisciplined lads, fresh from the plough, ought never on
any occasion to have been pitted against the well-drilled soldiers of
Russia; but it was something worse than blundering to lead them on
to the assault of a formidable work like the Redan. Such generalship
recalls to our mind the remark of the Russian officer with regard to
the military force of England, that 'it was an army of lions led by
donkeys.'" Mr. Russell states that many of these recruits "had only been
enlisted a few days, and had never fired a rifle in their lives."

Now will it be believed that General Codrington, to whom was committed
the planning and directing of this ill-starred and disastrous
enterprise, succeeded Sir James Simpson as Commander-in-Chief of Her
Majesty's forces in the Crimea? How must the shade of Admiral Byng have
haunted Her Majesty's Government, unless it was a most forgiving ghost!
If General Codrington's promotion could have been delayed a little
more than eighteen months, it might have occurred appropriately on the
centennial anniversary of the death of that ill-fated naval commander,
convicted by court-martial and shot for "not doing his utmost"!

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