Government and Administration of the United States by Westel W. Willoughby and William F. Willoughby
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Westel W. Willoughby and William F. Willoughby >> Government and Administration of the United States
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_#Method of Procedure.#_--As soon as the State and Territorial
delegations arrive in the city they each elect a member for the new
National Central Committee for the next term. Inside of this committee
is chosen an executive committee, which, in reality, does all the work
of conducting the campaign. The members of this committee are almost
always men of wealth, and are expected to contribute liberally to the
campaign fund.
The business of the National Convention is commenced by the chairman of
the National Central Committee calling the convention to order. A
temporary chairman is then chosen, who appoints a "committee on
credentials," whose duty it is to decide which delegation shall be
admitted in case two delegations are sent from the same State, both
claiming admittance as representing the party in that State. A
"committee on resolutions" is also appointed to prepare the party
platform. The next day the permanent chairman is appointed. The platform
is then read and adopted, or amended and adopted. There is next an
alphabetical roll-call of the States, when names are proposed and
seconded for nomination as candidates for President. The average number
of names proposed is seven or eight, though sometimes as many as twelve
are offered. As each man is proposed the delegate presenting his name
extols him in a laudatory speech, and gives reasons why his man will
make a strong candidate and an able President. Voting then commences.
Each delegate has one vote. In the Republican convention a majority of
the whole number of the delegates voting for one man is required before
a nomination is reached, while the Democrats require a two-thirds vote.
Sometimes a nomination is made on the first ballot, while at other
times the convention has been so divided that as many as 53 ballots have
been required, as was the case when the Whigs nominated Scott.
Forty-nine ballots were needed when Pierce was nominated by the
Democrats. In 1888 Cleveland was nominated by the Democrats by
acclamation, no vote being necessary to show the wishes of the
delegates. Harrison was nominated by the Republicans on the eighth
ballot.
A candidate for President having been selected, a Vice President is
nominated in a similar manner, though generally with much less trouble,
and the work of the convention is ended.
The candidates are now put before the people by their respective
parties. The people, of course, do not vote directly for them, but what
amounts to the same thing, vote for electors, who are pledged to vote
for them. A vigorous campaign of four months then follows, until
election day, in the first week in November.
Each candidate, a short time after his nomination, is expected to
publish a letter of acceptance, in which he expresses his full
confidence and belief in the platform which his party has adopted,
discloses his views, and outlines what his future policy will be if he
is elected.
To recapitulate, then, in a few words, let us see how a President is
nominated and elected.
In nominating the President each voter in caucus or primary meeting
shares in choosing delegates to the ward convention, which chooses
delegates to the city or county convention, which in turn sends
delegates to the district conventions. In these, delegates are chosen
for the State conventions, where Presidential electors are appointed,
and also the delegates sent to the National Convention.
In the National Convention, composed of delegates sent from the State
conventions and Territories, the Presidential candidate is nominated.
The electors are elected by the people, who in turn elect the nominees
of their National Convention. If State officers, as Governor,
Attorney-General, Secretary of State, Treasurer, etc., are to be
elected, they are nominated in the State conventions and elected by the
people.
Besides counties, townships, and cities, States have other subdivisions
for political purposes. Thus the whole State is divided into senatorial
districts, each one of which sends one Senator to the State legislature,
and also into smaller districts, each one of which sends one member to
the lower house of the State legislature. Usually a senatorial district
is one or more counties, except in the case of large cities, which may
in itself contain two or more senatorial districts.
CHAPTER XXIII.
Introduction to the Study of the History of Political Parties in the
United States.
A knowledge of the nature of our federal government, and its relations
to the State Governments, of which it is composed, is a prerequisite to
an understanding of the history of our political parties.
The government of the United States is a federal republic, first formed
by the voluntary union of thirteen commonwealths. At present it is
composed of forty-four united States. It is a government of enumerated
powers, and in this respect differs radically from the governments of
the individual States. As all agree, the Federal Government possesses
only those powers specifically granted to it by the constitution. The
States possess all powers except those granted to the National
Government, and those not prohibited to them by the terms of the
constitution. When the government of the United States desires to
exercise a power, it must be proven that it was the intention of the
framers of the constitution, and so expressed in that instrument, that
it should possess such a power. The States in the exercise of their
powers need only show that they have not resigned that power. If there
be any dispute as to the constitutionality of an act of either Congress
or a State legislature, the point is decided in the final instance by
the Supreme Court of the United States.
In the political history of our country since the adoption of the
constitution, there have been ever present two great constitutional
questions, in the conflicting answers to which we must seek the origin
and creeds of our great political parties. If we can gain a proper
conception of the character of these two questions, we shall have taken
a long step towards the understanding of the reasons for the conduct of
the various opposing parties, and the basis of the disputes arising
between them. These have been the two questions. First, What is the
extent of the powers granted by the constitution to the National
Government? Second, What is the real nature of our Union; and, arising
under this problem, What is the extent to which the States are justified
in opposing what they believe to be unconstitutional acts on the part of
the National Government; and, Can a State or States, as a last resort,
withdraw from the Union? The remainder of this chapter will be mainly
devoted to a more particular examination of these questions.
What are the legitimate powers of the United States Government?
The United States government was the result of the union of thirteen
independent colonies--a union voluntary on the part of the colonies, yet
forced upon them by the evident need of some central power strong enough
to enforce obedience at home and demand respect abroad. The
determination of what and how many the national powers should be, was
the work of the Constitutional Convention. Of the difficulties of this
task we have already spoken.
In forming a scheme for a central government, there was the double
necessity of creating a government strong enough to perform the duties
for which it was established, and yet not so strong as to endanger the
free self-government of the States. The delicate point to be adjusted
was to give to the Federal Government only such powers as were necessary
for the establishment of an effective National Government, and, as far
as possible, to retain in the States their full governmental powers; in
other words, to harmonize federal strength with State sovereignty.
The fear exhibited by the States in the debates preceding the adoption
and ratification of the constitution of 1787, that the National
Government might become too strong at the expense of their own powers of
government, was not set at rest by the compromises obtained in the
convention, nor by the eleven amendments adopted soon after the
inauguration of the new government. The reason for the continuance of
this fear is that the constitution is so worded that the powers of the
general government are not precisely fixed.
The statement sometimes loosely made that a description of our
government is contained in the constitution, is apt to be misleading.
The constitution has served rather as a foundation upon which to build
the government, than as an entire framework. As a distinguished writer
has termed it, "The constitution was meant only as a scheme in outline,
to be filled up afterwards, and from time to time, by legislation."
A description of our present form of government is far from being
contained in the instrument adopted in 1788. For example, the
constitution makes no mention of how business shall be transacted by the
legislature. Committee Government in Congress owes its existence to no
provision of the constitution. The only mention made in the constitution
of the Speaker of the House, to-day the most powerful officer in the
legislature, is where it is provided that "The House of Representatives
shall choose their speaker and other officers." All executive
departments--the State, War, Navy, Treasury, Post Office, Interior,
Justice, Agriculture, and Labor--have been created from time to time by
act of Congress. Regarding the structure and number of federal courts,
the constitution merely provides that "The judicial power of the United
States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts
as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Our elaborate
system of district, circuit, and territorial courts, rests solely upon
congressional enactments. So, too, the constitution gives to Congress
the control of territories, but does not provide how that control shall
be exercised.
The framers of our constitution were wise in not attempting to specify
more particularly than they did, the manner in which the several powers
granted to the Federal Government should be exercised. They realized
that they were forming a scheme that was to endure for many years, and
that if it was to be capable of meeting the needs of a changing and
rapidly growing country, it would have to be elastic, and contain within
itself the power of adapting itself to new needs and conditions. To
secure the beneficial execution of the powers granted, Congress was
given the power of selecting appropriate means. To have refused the
grant of this power, would have been to attempt to provide by
unchangeable rule for emergencies that could by no possibilities be
foreseen. Or, as Chief Justice Marshall has put it, "It would have been
to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of
experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation
to circumstances."
After enumerating the various particular powers given to the Federal
Legislature, the constitution further says (Art. I, Sec. 8) "and [shall
have power] to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or
in any department or officer thereof." This is the clause under whose
authorization all those powers have been assumed, and functions
exercised, that have made the United States government of to-day so
different from that of 1789.
The general rule is, as has been said, that the United States government
possesses only those powers granted to it by the constitution. But here,
in this clause just quoted, is a general grant of all powers necessary
or proper for carrying into effect any of the powers particularly
granted. Who or what is to decide just what powers are necessary and
proper for the accomplishment of this object? Naturally people have not
been able to agree upon the question of just what powers are
constitutional or expedient as "implied" under this title of "necessary
and proper" and this question has been largely instrumental in dividing
the people in opposing political parties. There has always been a party,
the members of which, favoring great powers for the States rather than
for the Federal Government, have been "strict constructionists," and
have advocated a close and narrow interpretation of this clause of
"implied powers." From their desire to retain in the State governments
as many powers as possible, they have been known as the "States' Rights
Party." Opposing them has been the party of "loose constructionists,"
the members of which have held to a free, liberal interpretation of the
constitution, and have endeavored to increase the power of the Federal
Government. There have never been political parties styling themselves
"Strict Constructionists" and "Loose Constructionists," for these are
terms that have been used not as titles, but as definitions of different
principles of constitutional interpretation. But by whatever name they
may have been known, there have been, during the greater part of our
history, these two political parties, the one holding to the principle
of strict construction and States' Rights, and the other to that of
loose construction and federal power.
The second fundamental question spoken of in the beginning of this
chapter as underlying national politics, is concerning the nature of our
union and the rights of state nullification and secession.
A final answer to these questions cannot of course be here attempted,
but that which can be done, is to state in a few words just what their
meaning is, and the points upon which they have turned. When we come to
the consideration of the course of politics in the United States we
shall see the answers that history has given to them.
The government of the United States is the judge of its own powers, for
it is in its own supreme judicial tribunal that the constitutionality of
both State and Federal laws is finally determined. More than once has a
practical answer been demanded to the question What is to be done by a
State or States when, in their estimation, the National Government has
transcended its powers and legislated in an unconstitutional manner?
Obedience, nullification, or, in the last resort, secession from the
Union, have been the various alternatives that have offered themselves
to the States. Different views of the nature of our Union have sustained
the propriety of the selection of different ones of these alternatives.
According to the nullification theory, the constitution is held to be of
the nature of a compact between the States as one party and the Federal
Government as the other; and that, as in all contracts, if the
agreements contained therein are broken by the one party, the other
party has the right to refuse its assent thereto. Therefore, if the
United States government attempts the exercise of powers not granted in
the compact, the States have the right to interpose the "rightful
remedy" of "nullification." That is to say, that each State has the
right to determine for itself when an unwarranted power has been assumed
by the general government, and in such a case to declare the obnoxious
law null and of no force within her own boundaries.
In considering the question of nullification, it is necessary to
distinguish between the theory or rather method of nullification
propounded by Madison and Jefferson in the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions, from that of Calhoun brought forward at the time of South
Carolina's resistance to, and attempted nullification of, the Tariff
laws of 1828, and 1832. In the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions the
Alien and Sedition Acts were solemnly declared to be unconstitutional,
that the Union was a compact, and the States had the right to interpose
the remedy of nullification; but open resistance was not proposed. By
the Jeffersonian theory, it was proposed to obtain the opinion of
three-fourths of the States that the acts were unconstitutional, and
thus to "nullify" them after the manner of a constitutional amendment.
Until such nullification, the laws were to be obeyed.
The Calhoun doctrine was something entirely different from this.
According to his doctrine, any single State might order at once a
suspension of the law within her borders, and not until three-fourths of
the States in national convention had overruled the nullification could
the State be forced to obey the obnoxious law. To use Calhoun's own
words, his theory was, that "it belongs to the State, as a member of the
Union, in her sovereign capacity in convention, to determine definitely,
as far as her citizens are concerned, the extent of the obligation which
she has _contracted_; and if, in her opinion, the act exercising the
power in dispute be unconstitutional, to declare it null and void, which
declaration would be obligatory on her citizens." The sum and substance
of this was, as Von Holst has pointed out,[1] to give to one-fourth of
the States the power if they saw fit to deprive the Federal Government
of every power entrusted to it, that is, to alter the constitution at
will.
[Footnote 1: _Constitutional History of the United States_, Vol. I, p.
474, note.]
The right of secession follows as a logical outcome of the theory of
nullification rigidly carried out. Federal laws are general in their
nature, and if binding anywhere, must be binding everywhere. If then, a
minority of States insist on their right of nullification, the federal
government will be obliged either to admit that every act of Congress is
without any force in a State until it has obtained the tacit approval of
the people of that State, or else it will be driven to the necessity of
obtaining the enforcement of the law by arms. Such employment of force
would of course be but the prelude to secession. Indeed, South Carolina,
in her Ordinance of Nullification, declared that she would secede, if
the United States did not repeal the obnoxious laws, or if she should
attempt to enforce the collections of the tariff duties provided for by
the acts in dispute. According to the Unionist view, it is held that in
no case has the individual State the right to resist the operation of a
federal law, much less does it possess the actual power to pass a law
affecting its relation to, or continuance in, the Union. This view is
supported by an interpretation of the constitution that denies to that
instrument the character of a compact between the States and the
National Government. The constitutional theory of this school is that
the National Government was formed _by the people_ as a whole, and not
by the States. That the States accepted this government, but were in no
sense parties to an agreement between them and the Nation. According to
this view, the Union began with the first acts of resistance taken in
common by the colonies, and is thus, in a sense, older than the state
governments, which were not formed until after the Declaration of
Independence. Also, that when the States gave in 1788 their consent to
the constitution, their consent was irrevocable. Two quotations from
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States will make
clear the arguments and theory of the Unionists.
Said Chief Justice Marshall:[1] "The convention which promulgated the
constitution was indeed elected by the state legislatures, but the
instrument when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal, without
obligations or pretentious to it. It was reported to the then existing
Congress of the United States, with a request that it might 'be
submitted to a convention of delegates chosen in each State by the
people thereof, under recommendation of its legislature for their assent
and ratification.' This mode of proceeding was adopted, and by the
conventions, by Congress, and by the state legislatures, the instrument
was submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only way in which
they can act safely, effectually, and wisely on such a subject, by
assenting in convention. It is true they assembled in their several
States, an where could they have assembled? From these conventions the
constitution derives its whole authority. The government proceeds
directly from the people. The assent of the States in their sovereign
capacity is implied in calling the convention, and thus submitting that
instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect liberty to
accept or reject it, and their decision was final. It required not the
affirmance of, and could not be negatived by, the state governments. The
constitution when adopted was of complete obligation, and bound the
state sovereignties. The government of the Union then, is emphatically
and truly a government of the people. In form and in substance it
emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be
exercised directly on them, and for their benefit."
[Footnote 1: _McCulloch_ v. _Md._, 4 Dall., 316.]
Said Chief Justice Chase:[1] "The union of the States never was a purely
artificial and arbitrary relation. It began among the colonies, and grew
out of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles, and
geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by the
necessities of war, and received definite form and character and
sanction from the articles of Confederation. By these the union was
solemnly declared to 'be perpetual.' And when the articles were found to
be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the constitution was
ordained 'to form a more perfect union.' It is difficult to convey the
idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words. What can be
more indissoluble if a perpetual union made more perfect, is not? But
the perpetuity and indissolubility of the union, by no means implies the
loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the right of
self-government by the States.... Without the States in Union, there
could be no such political body as the United States. Not only,
therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to
the States, through their union under the constitution, but it may be
not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the
maintenance of their governments are as much within the design and care
of the constitution, as the preservation of the Union and the
maintenance of the National Government. The constitution in all its
provisions looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible
States."
[Footnote 1: _Texas_ v. _White_, 7 Wall., 750.]
A civil war of four years' duration has decided the Unionist theory of
our government to be the one under which the Nation is to be governed.
Whether or not, in point of fact, the Nation was older than the States,
and the constitution not a compact, but an indissoluble Union, will
always remain a question to be discussed. The dispute turns upon a point
that does not admit of final determination. We can only theorize. To
maintain the view that the Union is older than the States it is
necessary to show that the Continental Congress was of such a character,
and its powers of such a nature, that a true national government may be
said to have existed before July 4, 1776, and therefore, that the
Declaration of Independence and the consequent transformation of the
colonies into States were not the result of the individual action of
separate colonies, but of the whole people united in a nation. And,
following from this, that the States were never out of the union, but
that the individual colonies became States, only as belonging to the
United States. Consequently that the theory of a 'compact' between the
States and the United States is untenable, for at the time the United
States was born, the States did not exist.[1]
[Footnote 1: As Lincoln expressed it in his message of July 4, 1861:
"The States have their _status_ in the Union, and they have no other
legal status.... The Union is older than any of the States, and in fact,
it created them as States."]
To maintain the "Compact Theory" it is necessary to show that the
"Continental Congress" had no properly delegated national powers, and
to it the character of a national government could not fitly be applied,
and that the colonies when they separated from England remained
independent of each other, because as colonies they had been
independent. Therefore, that the initial clause of the Preamble to the
Constitution "We the people of the United States" referred not to all
the people of the United States in their collective capacity, but to the
people of the several States.
In fine, admitting, as all do, the Continental Congress to have been a
revolutionary body, exercising undelegated powers, the question is, Was
it, or was it not, a _de jure_, as well as _de facto_ national
government, and this is a question that cannot be answered absolutely.
These opposing views of the character of our constitution have been
stated not with the idea of proving either of them to be the correct
one, but solely to indicate the lines along which political parties have
fought their battles. Thus, it is hoped, the student will be prepared
for an intelligent consideration of the various political parties that
have existed in the course of his country's history.
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